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This is a study of the relationship between the apartheid government and the 
commerce and industry in the Western Cape, South Africa, during the period 1960-
1990. In examining the impact of apartheid on business in the Western Cape reference 
has been made to local and overseas literature, both books and journal articles, 
government publications, and the minutes and correspondence of the Cape Town 
Chamber of Commerce, Cape Chamber of Industries and other business organisations. 
Interviews were also conducted with businessmen and relevant academics who 
occupied prominent positions in the period under review. In addition a journalist who 
occupied senior editorial positions was also interviewed. 
The thesis considers the economic performance of South Africa, from the substantial 
and sustained growth from 1960 to 1974, followed by a period when the South 
African economy weakened. The Western Cape economy was not reliant on mining, 
but had a more stable economy relying on agriculture, property and financial services, 
and later in the period developed high-tech service industries. 
Business in South Africa suffered punitive rates of tax to pay for the country's 
apartheid policies. The establishment of the Bantustans as a homeland for the black 
ethnic groups was a cornerstone of the National Party policy and the cost burden was 
enormous with the provision of all the trappings of full nationhood. The job 
reservation policies, which reserved skilled occupations created a skill shortage in the 
country and towards the end of the period by necessity the policy 'frayed at the 
edges'. Western Cape business also suffered the impact of the coloured labour 
preference policy, which was designed to prevent the movement of blacks to the 
Western Cape. Business in the area needed blacks for work which was not attractive 











throughout the country. Decentralization Benefits were granted to companies who 
opened businesses in Bantustan areas, but few such benefits accrued to Western Cape 
businesses. Civil disturbances created operational problems for Western Cape 
business, although the disruptions were not as severe as in the rest of the country. 
The thesis traces the history of sanctions and boycotts against South Africa which 
increased from 1984, and in 1985 United States banks refused to roll over South 
African loans. The sanctions affected air, maritime links and trade. The Western Cape 
tourist industry was severely affected, tourists did not come to South Africa because 
of fear or for moral reasons. 
The Chambers of Commerce and Industry in the Western Cape were concerned as to 
the impact of apartheid and raised their concerns with government over the years and 
had some success in alleviating the impact of apartheid on their businesses. The 
Afrikaner business community in the Western Cape benefited from the patronage they 
received from the government. SANLAM, the insurance conglomerate, and 
Rembrandt, the tobacco group showed impressive growth. The Afrikaner became 
urbanised over the period and Afrikaner business was more and more critical of 
government policies in the 1980s. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in its 
report said that business was central to the economy that sustained the South African 
state in the apartheid years. 
Overall, the review of the impact of apartheid on business in the Western Cape gives 
mixed signals. Apartheid restricted the economic development of the area, but on the 
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'The journey between 1960 and 1994 was a long and terrible one, wasteful of human 
life and of human potential. Yet, it was a path that everyone travelled '. I 
INTRODUCTION 
The major force in the South African economy between the 1930s and the early 1970s 
was the mining sector, which was absent from the Western Cape. In the view of many 
commentators the Western Cape was a quiet economic backwater, but others refer to 
the more stable pattern of economic growth in the Western Cape, which helped the 
region to improve its position during recessions. 2 Many commentators have taken a 
wide-brush view of the effects of apartheid, 3 but the impact on business differed from 
area to area and even more so between the Western Cape and the rest of the country. 
There is extensive literature on the relationship between business and apartheid, but 
this concentrated on the position in the former Transvaal, particularly relating to the 
mining and the agricultural industry in that area. 4 In contrast this thesis deals with the 
relationship between apartheid and business in the Western Cape from 1960 to 1990. 
Whilst this thesis only looks at the Western Cape, many of the effects of apartheid on 
business in the Western Cape also applied to other parts of the country during the 
period under review. For the purposes ofthis thesis, the Western Cape comprises Cape 
Town and the adjoining industrial and commercial areas, but does not include other 
areas which are part of the present Cape Province, but are not adjoining Cape Town. A 
I Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. Four, pA. 
D.H.M. Bridgman, 1. Palmer and W.H. Thomas (eds), South Africa's Leading Edge?, ppA2-43. 
The first official use of the term 'apartheid', within the economic movement was in 1943 in an 
editorial in the 'Volkshandel', D. O'Meara, 'Volks-kapitalisme,' p.167. 
E.G. Davies, Capital. State and White Labour in South Africa, 1900-1960. 
H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: From segregation to apartheid,' 











restricted examination of the topic will make possible a more in-depth examination of 
a number of factors. In addition, in order to keep the thesis within reasonable bounds, 
it only considers the impact on business, but obviously what affects business impacts 
on the whole community. The impact of apartheid on business is of particular interest 
as much criticism has been levelled at business for not standing up to the Nationalist 
government with more vigour and indeed business is accused of taking advantage of 
the system in terms of specific developmental incentives and through the disciplining 
oflabour. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was critical of business's role in 
apartheid South Africa and found that: 'Business was central to the economy that 
sustained the South African state during the apartheid years'. 5 In democratic South 
Africa there have been a number of calls for business to pay reparations for the 
benefits they received under apartheid. Many businesses suffered under apartheid, but 
others, especially Afrikaner business and agriculture, benefited. It is necessary to 
portray a balanced view. 
1960 was a watershed year in South Africa as it was the year of the Sharpeville 
massacre, followed by the banning ofthe African National Congress CANC) and the 
Pan African Congress (PAC). In 1961 South Africa left the Commonwealth, possibly 
with some reluctance, in response to criticism in the Commonwealth of the apartheid 
regime. This brought with it the removal of the benefits of the Commonwealth trade 
preference, which had had a particular influence on the Western Cape in the light of 
the fact that the majority of the Cape's agricultural exports went to Britain. 
Whilst this thesis does not set out to give a detailed economic review of South Africa 
from 1960 onwards, it is necessary to have a general view of the progress or decline in 
the South African economy over the period in order to assess whether changes in the 











economy of the Western Cape followed national trends. Furthermore, one has to have 
an appreciation of the world economy to gauge to what extent the South African 
economy was influenced by world economic trends. 
It is also necessary to analyse the various components of Western Cape business, 
including the processing of agricultural products such as fruit and wine. Against this 
background, one can examine what happened to the Western Cape business over the 
period assessing whether the deterioration or improvement in the economy in this area 
was due to apartheid or other factors, such as global or national economic trends. 
This thesis will consider the following factors which impacted adversely on Western 
Cape business: 
The high level of direct and indirect taxation, caused by the levels of spending 
on the military and police and the cost of government's Bantustan and 
decentralisation policies; 
Job reservation, restricting certain occupations to whites; 
The Group Areas Act, which restricted the operation of business to certain 
racially demarcated areas; 
The coloured labour preference policy in the Western Cape; 
The decentralisation of industries to the Bantustans and adjacent areas and the 
imposition of restrictions on the employment of black labour in terms of the 
Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act; 
The negative impact of government policies on tourism; 
The effect of trade sanctions, consumer boycotts and overseas trade union 
activity on exports; 











and Military conscription with its adverse effect on the availability of skilled 
white labour. 
The thesis also explores the beneficial effects of apartheid on business: 
The protection of industry by import control, tariff protection and tax 
concessions, which helped industrialists; 
Some businesses benefited from the tough attitude of government to labour 
disturbances; 
Many South African businesses profited from the large government 
expenditure on infrastructure; 
The government's protection policy benefited many businesses, but was not as 
effective as it might have been, as the assistance provided by import control, 
the tax system and tariff protection was ill-directed; businesses were assisted 
which were not economically viable without government's assistance, and 
their products were expensive and not internationally competitive. 
This thesis has been based on the examination of both primary and secondary 
documentation, the primary being government reports and White Papers etc., records 
of meetings and other documentation of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce and 
Cape Chamber of Industries and other employer bodies and archival records of 
SANLAM, KWV and other bodies, the secondary documentation covered a wide 
range of local and overseas publications, including the history of a number of Western 
Cape companies. The research was supplemented by interviews with prominent 











(a) SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
The South African economy in the 1950s was reliant on foreign capital inflows for 
investment, to strengthen the balance of payments and to pay for imported capital 
goods and machinery. When sentiment changed against South Africa in the 1960s, 
capital was taken out of the country, the balance of payments went into deficit, overall 
confidence fell and the economy slowed down. Government then introduced strict 
import control and policies to reduce capital outflows with political moves to suppress 
political dissension. The result of these actions, combined with the' long boom' in the 
Western world, led to an era of sustained unparalleled growth in the South African 
economy from 1960 to 1974. While the implementation of apartheid and the 
Sharpeville massacre drew criticism from the international community, the financial 
and commercial opportunities were attractive to international investors and overseas 
investments flowed in. During this period the state was able to carry out its Bantustan 
policy, raise defence spending and control mass resistance. As Feinstein comments: 'In 
these decades there was thus no obvious indication of any incompatibility between 
satisfactory growth and the traditional character of the South African socioeconomic 
system,.6 Dr. Verwoerd, the Prime Minister could say in 1960: 'Far from bringing about 
economic stagnation, apartheid is the fountain-head of the economic prosperity of 
South Africa'. 7 The government at that time was convinced that South Africa could 
enjoy economic growth and prosperity, while maintaining white supremacy and racial 
separation.8 Hans Middlemann, a director of Western Cape and national companies, 
said in 1976 that there were three major economic events that disguised the reality of 
the situation in South Africa in the 30 years up to 1976.The first was the increased 













earnings from gold production following on the discovery and development of the Free 
State and Far West Rand goldfields. This substantially increased the amount of gold 
produced, while later there was the extremely large increase in the international price of 
gold, which also increased South Africa's wealth. The second major event was the 
utilisation of this augmented wealth to substantially develop the country's natural and 
particularly its human resources. The third event was the significant contribution made 
by the brilliant Afrikaner industrialists, bankers and businessmen, together with the 
rank and file of the Afrikaner population, to the South African economy. They 
broadened the base of our economic development which previously was mainly a 
British initiative. In Middleman's words, "The subsequent severance of Commonwealth 
ties put the final seal on these achievements.,9 
From the 1920s till the end of apartheid in the 1990s, South Africa's industrial policy 
focussed on import substitution, rather than on export promotion. An import 
substitution programme is common in countries with mineral resources. It arose from a 
concern to provide jobs to solve the Poor White Problem. 10 There was also a desire to 
replace imports needed in the mining industry. With the intensification of apartheid and 
rising international isolation, there was a stronger emphasis on heavy industry, synfuels, 
and the defence industry. In view of the importance of the mining industry, the bulk of 
the investment went into capital intensive resource-based projects in basic chemicals 
and minerals. There was limited use of sub-contractors, which precluded small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMME's) in acquiring skills. The South African domestic 
market was small, with a modest-sized economy and poor distribution of income. 
Import substitution policies were exhausted by the end of the 1970s. These policies had 
H. W. Middlemann, 'Integration must be Acknowledged'. Cape Times. 26.10.1976, p.9. 
10 The 'Poor White Problem' was the large scale unem~loyment of whites, particularly Afrikaners, 
which was a problem which stretched back to the 19 t century, but came to the fore following the 











led to low productivity, and over-concentration of the economy. Apartheid laws greatly 
limited Afrikaner entrepreneurship.ll In the apartheid years controls were placed on 
industrial expansion in metropolitan areas. The business community protested and the 
report of the Riekert Commission in 1979 led to the softening of the controls on 
metropolitan industrialists and increased the number of decentralisation areas. In 1982 a 
package of policy reforms led to direct controls on industrial growth in urban areas 
being replaced by disincentives: reduction of housing and transport incentives as a 
means of promoting decentralisation. Most of the decentralisation zones were not in the 
Western Cape, but a decentralisation zone was set up at Atlantis in the Western Cape. 
These decentralisation zones were generally unsuccessful. 12 
The early positive attitude of Afrikaner business to the government's policies was 
emphasised by Dr. C.R.Louw, the chairman of SANLAM, the large Afrikaner 
insurance and financial group. He said in his chairman's address to the 1962 annual 
general meeting of SANLAM that, notwithstanding the attacks from within and 
without South Africa, the economy had grown remarkably. The country's gold and 
foreign reserves had also increased. He commented that of the 61 companies that 
SANLAM invested in, 46 had shown an increase in profits, whilst the profits of 15 
had declined for the year ending 30 June 1961. Calculated on the shareholders' 
interest in these companies during the same period, 33 companies reflected an 
increase, whilst 28 showed a decrease. This was remarkable in the light of what had 
occurred in South Africa: a referendum on the republican status; resignation from the 
Commonwealth with the loss of preferential treatment for its exports to Britain; and 
racial umest. In addition there was the drop in gold and foreign reserves, following on 
disinvestment by foreigners. Despite all these negative factors, in the view of Dr. 
II M. Mayer and M. Altman, 'South Africa's Economic Trajectory,' pp.33-56. 












Louw, there was nevertheless stability in political and economic spheres. 13 In contrast 
to Dr. Louw's views, Middlemann in an address to the annual general meeting of the 
Cape Town Chamber of Commerce on 24 May 1960, said that there was the 
realisation that the policy of increasingly compulsory racial separation in the 
economic sphere had failed. lt had not in fact, separated the races; had not resulted in 
harmonious social relations; had antagonised our Commonwealth friends, and had led 
to the economy of the country being placed in jeopardy. Secondly he said that the 
object of separating the races in South Africa was not capable of realisation. In his 
words: 'It cannot stand the tests of the map and of the financial and physical measures 
that would be required for its full implementation'. He also said that South Africa was 
a nation of people, different in origin and development and cannot and should not be 
divided, and should be developed as a single economic unit. 14 In November 1962 he 
said that the theory was that there were too many blacks in the Western Cape -
130000 of them, which the government wanted to return to the Bantustans. He was of 
the view that what the Cape should look forward to was job opportunities for those to 
be repatriated and 130000 more. IS 
Middleman's forebodings about where South Africa was going were borne out by 
subsequent developments. Four events between 1973 and 1976 created a security 
crisis in South Africa that threatened what Terblanche (as quoted by Maree) calls: 
'accumulative and legitimate aims of the white hegemonic order these were the 
unlawful strikes by black trade unions in Durban region in 1973, which forced 
concessions from many affected companies16; the Oil Producing Export Countries 
13 C.R. Louw, Chairman's Address to Annual General Meeting, SANLAM, 1962, pp.I-4. 
14 M iddlemann, Address to Annual General Meeting of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce on 
24.5.1960, pp.2-4. 
IS Middlemann, Address to the Canadian-South African Business Men's Club, November 1962, pp.3-
6. 











(OPEC) oil crisis in 1973; the coup d'etat in Lisbon in April 1974 that resulted in the 
abortive invasion of Angola by South Africa in 1975; and the Soweto unrest of June 
1976. The increased security costs had serious implications for agriculture, as this 
was the cause of the reduction in the budget for the Department of Agriculture from 
1.5% to only .6% of Gross Domestic Product, farmers getting a smaller and smaller 
proportion of available funds. In addition an increasing part of this department's 
budget was allocated to the Bantustans. 17 From 1976 onwards the economy 
weakened following the slump in the world economy, the fall in the price of gold and 
in particular the rise in the price of oil. This recession led to job losses and a rise in 
inflation. Conditions were ripe for the outbreak of black resistance, which occurred in 
1976. Capital fled the country, the talk was of sanctions and disinvestment and the 
country suffered a balance of payments crisis. A report circulated at the United 
Nations that the lack of overseas investor confidence in South Africa was indicated by 
the fact that overseas firms who normally reinvested more than 60% of their earnings 
in South Africa were now only reinvesting 30%.18 It took a long time for the 
resulting slump to end. There was a boom in the period from 1979 to 1981, following 
on a soaring gold price and renewed economic growth in the Western world. This was 
followed after 1982 by a further slump, with a surge in black political resistance. 19 In 
the view of Heintz, political instability, independent of other variables, was the 
primary cause of the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s.2oThe agricultural sector was 
affected by policy changes in the 1980s, which were necessitated by the economic 
position; firstly the financial sector was liberalised and the liquid asset requirements 
17 N. Vink, Macroeconomic and Sector Policy Changes in South African Agriculture. 1996-2002. 
p.18. 
18 South African Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations 1978, p.139. 
19 T.c. Moll. 'Possibly the Best Laager in the World: Record of the South African Economy,' in J.D. 
Brewer (ed), pp.136-139. 











of the banking sector were changed, making it impossible for the Land Bank to 
continue to subsidise interest rates on farmers' borrowings; controls on the mobility 
of labour were lifted by the mid-l 980s; thirdly there was microeconomic 
deregulation. The government decreased subsidies21 and the deregulation and 
liberalisation of agricultural products was a fact of life in agriculture in South 
Africa. 22 These changes were combined with a less favourable tax regime for farmers 
in order to boost tax revenue. Previously farmers could claim capital expenditure on 
dams, fencing and irrigation23 in the year the costs were incurred, in contrast to 
business who could only claim similar costs over a number of years. 24 
Table 1, on South Africa's Growth Performance in Real Terms, gives a summary of 
h ··'5 t e posltlOn- : 
21 The fact that the government was not in a position to maintain the high level of subsidies to farmers 
has been traditionally regarded as an important reason for the split in the National Party and the 
creation of the Conservative Party, R. Sandrey and N. Vink, How can South Africa Exploit New 
opportunities in Agricultural Export Markets?, p.3. 
22 Vink, Macroeconomic and Sector Policy Changes in South African Agriculture, 1996-2002, p.20. 
:?3 Referred to in the tax legislation as 'development costs'. 
24 Ibid. p.35. 











TABLE!: AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE 
1961-70 1971-80 1981-84 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 5.8 3.7 1.3 
Growth Factors 
Growth domestic fixed investment 
Private Sector 8.4 3.8 l.7 
Public Sector 7.9 l.8 l.2 
Exports of goods and services 4.6 2.4 -l.0 
South Africa's economic problems were becoming critical in the 1980s. The peculiar 
South African growth model adopted in the apartheid era has been referred to as 
'Racial F ordism ' .26 This model, unique to South Africa, gave pre-eminence to the 
racial domination of the whites and was the basis for South Africa's economic policies 
up until the crisis in the 1980s. The model suggests a coherent set of institutions and 
practices that together were temporarily successful, providing the foundation for 
growth in the 1950s and 1960s?7 Nattrass contests this view, as the rate of 
manufacturing profit declined over the years 1955 to 1974.28 Based on a study by 
Mc Dermott of a panel of countries, including South Africa, it was argued that 
exploitation harms growth, by forcing the ruling group to divert resources to subdue 
and extract resources from subject groups. Although the latter will return capital to the 
exploiter, they will not be able to save or invest in view of their increased cost 
26 The combination of government assistance to industrialists with a racial division of labour. 
27 C. Rogerson. 'Beyond Fordism: Restructuring Industry in the New South Africa: in B. Jessop (ed.) 
CountryStudies. p.218. 












burden. 29 South Africa had a dominant modem industrial sector side by side with a 
large less productive traditional and informal sector, and McCarthy said that apartheid 
hid poverty from the affluent.30 Dollery noted there was a decline in the South African 
economy's labour absorption capacity after 1970, but the decline in the economy 
really started in 1975, worsening in 1976. There were structural problems, including 
poor export perforn1ance as a result of inward-led industrialisation policies, whilst 
foreign exchange controls misallocated scarce financial resources. The rapid 
expansion of the am1S industry and the ever increasing military budget as a result of 
internal umest, international pressures and independence for the Portuguese African 
colonies, also created stress in the economy. Weak reforms in the early 1980s led to 
mass insurrection, which brought with it the debt standstill of 1985. South Africa 
ended up as a net exporter of capital. 31 On 28 August 1985 the value of the rand fell 
to its lowest level ever, 34 American cents, and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) was a summarily suspended for three days as a prelude to the introduction of 
restrictions on outward capital movements. The last time the JSE had been summarily 
closed was after the Sharpeville massacre. The reason given by the authorities in 1985 
was: 'The abnormal pressure that has arisen over the past weeks on the capital 
account of the balance of payments, as a result of reasons umelated to the healthy 
underlying economic conditions'. According to some American economists the seeds 
of the crisis were sown three years previously, when South African companies 
borrowed large amounts abroad to beat soaring local interest rates.32 The inflation rate 
at the end of 1985 was 18.4%, the highest in 66 years, the main cause being the sharp 
decrease in the foreign exchange value of the rand. According to Nedbank Group's 
29 1. McDennott, 'Exploitation and Growth,' pp.251-278. 
30 C. McCarthy,' Apartheid Ideology and Economic Development,' pp.45-46. 
31 B. Dollery, 'The Decline of the South African Economy: Review Note,' pp.77-95. 











Executive Guide to the Economy for February 1986, the high rate of inflation would 
act as a brake on economic expansion. SANLAM'S Economic Survey for June 1986 
said that capital formation had deteriorated to an alarming degree in the previous four 
years. Unemployment increased, particularly amongst the blacks, which was a major 
contributory factor to the social unrest in the country.33 According to Strydom (quoted 
by Dollery) South Africa's fiscal policy was expansive owing to the costs of apartheid 
and infrastructural development.34 
By 1986 the Afrikaner business community was very concerned as to the poor state of 
the South African economy. Dr. F.l. du Plessis stated in his chairman's address to 
SANLAM's 1986 annual general meeting, that growth was low, showing the largest 
fall since the 1930s great depression, inflation was at 18% at the end of 1985, and the 
rand's exchange rate had sharply declined. The current account of the balance of 
payments showed a record surplus in light ofthe fall in the value of the rand, but the 
capital account posed a serious problem and South Africa faced a currency crisis. 
The country could not attract overseas investments and had to resort to short-term 
overseas borrowing, which would cause problems in the future when foreign banks 
would not roll over the loans. Foreigners thought South Africa's financial position 
was out of control. Sanctions and boycotts were of concern to Dr. du Plessis and he 
called for a national strategic plan to deal with the problem.35 
He was also president of the Urban Foundation,36 and he said in an address to its 
annual general meeting on 31 January 1986 that, notwithstanding the political changes 
which had been made, the position in South Africa was critical. He said that to the 
33 Ibid, p.119. 
34 Dollery, 'The Decline of the South African Economy: Review Note,' p.77-95. 
35 Louw, Chairman's Address to SANLAM's 1986 Annual General Meeting, pp.5-7. 
36 The Urban Foundation was introduced as a specialised change agency dealing with relations 
between government and business and looking to develop a black middle-class with 'western-type 
needs and ambitions'. The Foundation was a joint initiative of Harry Oppenheimer of Anglo-











whites these political changes might have appeared to be significant, but young blacks 
considered them as mere tinkering with the system, which they rejected completely. 
He was of the view that there was a lack of confidence in the government's motives 
and attempts by external powers to mediate had been derailed by raids by South 
African forces in Cabinda and Botswana. He added that foreign governments were not 
always consistently hostile (and indeed, many were, at times sympathetic) to the 
apartheid regime: the British Prime Minister opposed sanctions at the Commonwealth 
Conference in 1985, but at the same time there were shootings in Cape Town. The 
killings at Langa in Cape Town occurred on the same day that President Botha was 
interviewed on United States television; above all, the speech delivered by President 
Botha on 15 August 1985, dubbed the Rubicon speech, dashed the hopes of those who 
had expected him to announce reforms in policy. Dr. du Plessis found it hard to accept 
that these actions were coincidental, and he considered that it was either right-wing 
forces or the government was fuelling existing tensions to minimise the chances of 
starting negotiations with all parties.37 Even the government's Economic Advisory 
Council ventured into the political arena, when it said in 1986 that: 'Although purely 
economic strategies might help alleviate some of South Africa's economic problems, 
they would be insufficient in the long tenn in the face of political factors and 
unrest" .38 
In evaluating South Africa's economic performance it should be borne in mind that it 
was influenced by what has been called the Resource Curse, the paradox that 
countries with abundant natural resources have lower economic growth than countries 
without these resources. The negative effects of the Resources Curse include: 
37 FJ. du Plessis, President's Address to the 1986 Annual General Meeting of the Urban Foundation, 
pp.6-8. 











Dutch Disease,39 whereby the revenue from natural resources caused the exchange 
rate to increase and manufacturing exports to be uncompetitive in the world market. 
Labour and capital were drawn away from the manufacturing sector. South Africa was 
vulnerable to volatility in export prices of their natural resources, and its terms of 
trade deteriorated. In addition the government borrowed excessively in the hope of 
future income from their natural resources and there was increasing corruption. The 
major impact of the Resources Curse on South Africa was the complacency of its 
government. The apartheid rulers were never concerned about their high level of 
expenditure, particularly security expenditure, as they always thought that mineral 
exports (especially gold) would come to their rescue.40 
The effect of the disadvantage of being a mineral rich country was vividly stated by 
Bodin: 'Men of a fat and fertile soil, are more commonly effeminate and cowards; 
where contrariwise a barren country makes men temperate by necessity and by 
consequence careful, vigilant and industrious' .41 
This viewpoint has been disputed, and, for example, John Drake, a retired Chief 
Executive Officer of Shell argued that many countries, including Norway, Brunei, 
Malaysia and even the Netherlands handled the impact of their large natural resources 
in a controlled and non-inflationary manner; however, there are of course, many 
examples to the contrary, ranging from Saudi Arabia to Nigeria. Drake also said that 
South Africa had managed its natural resources in a satisfactory manner and in such a 
way not to have a major adverse impact on its economic growth.42 The South African 
economy was able to ride the economic downturn in the 1970s because the sharp rise 
in the price of gold boosted her reserves, cushioning the effect of the world wide 
~9 The tem refers to the effect on the Netherlands economy of the discovery of North Sea oil in their 
territorial waters. 
40 'Resource Curse,' Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resource_Curse. 
41 M. Ross, 'The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,' p.309. 











economic decline. Similarly, Williams observed in 1985 that: 'Thanks to its virtual 
monopoly of the money commodity, the economy of South Africa stands revealed as 
the growing fingernail on the moribund corpse of capitalism'. In contrast, in Nattrass' 
view: 'South Africa failed to reap the full growth potential of the leap in the gold 
price' .43 
(b) WESTERN CAPE ECONOMY 
With the mining industry being the main driving force of economic growth in South 
Africa, the Western Cape was remote from the country's economic centre of gravity. 
Government policies such as import substitution, establishment of para stata Is in the 
Pretoria. Witwatersrand and Vereeniging (PWV) area, together with various apartheid 
legislation. adversely impacted on economic growth in the Western Cape. 
Concern was often expressed about the poor economic performance of the Western 
Cape. At a seminar arranged by the Cape Chamber of Industries (CCI) with the 
National Development and Management Foundation in 1978, the President of the 
Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI), J.P. Cronje, said the outlook for the area was 
gloomy. At the same conference Dr. R.N. Thusenius of S.A. Action Research, 
University of Stellenbosch, raised similar concerns about the poor economic 
performance of the area.44 The CCI's Year Book for 1977/78 expressed the concern 
that since the late 1960s the rate of growth in the Western Cape has been slowing 
down in relation to the rest of the country.45 In the CCl's Year Book for 1978/79 it was 
noted that the recession was felt more keenly in the Western Cape than in other areas 
43 Nattrass. 'Economic Power and Profits in Post-war Manufacturing,' p.117. 
44 'News Report: Cape Times, 14.6.78, p.6. 











in the country,46 and in the 1981/82 Year Book it was noted that the Western Cape had 
not kept pace with other regions.47 The Stellenbosch Bureau of Economic Research 
stated in 1981 that: 'Cape Peninsula now again seems to be falling behind the other 
main regions and that incisive steps would be advisable to ensure that the coloured 
unemployment does not revert to the serious position of earlier years' .48 
In 1989 the Western Cape had 13.01% of the total South African Gross Domestic 
Product, although its personal income was even higher at 16%, due to the Cape's 
sophisticated industrial sector and, possibly, also due to the coloured labour 
preference policy, which gave coloureds preference in the job market in the Western 
Cape and had an inflationary effect on wages. 
46 Ibid, 1978179. p.13. 
47 Ibid. 1981/82. p.11. 











The relative significance of the Western Cape's contribution to the sectors is 
summarized in Table 2: 
TABLE 2: SHARE OF WESTERN CAPE IN RSA'S GROSS GEOGRAPHIC 
PRODUCT 
Percentage Share 
1975 1980 1985 1989 
Agriculture 16.9 21.1 19.6 19.9 
Manufacturing 15.4 14.0 12.3 11.9 
Construction 15.4 15.2 12.6 11.7 
Trade and Accommodation 16.7 16.6 16.5 16.3 
Transport and Communication 16.7 17.3 16.4 16.2 
Finance and Business Services 16.4 16.5 18.4 18.6 
TOTAL GDP REGION A 13.1 13.3 13.1 13.0 
(Source: Department of Planning and Development Bank of South Africa's (DBSA) 
data files) 
The relative significance of the different sectors in the Western Cape economy can 











TABLE 3: SECTOR STRUCTURE WESTERN CAPE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
( 1984-1990) 
Western Cape South Africa 
1984 1990 1984 1990 
% % % % 
Agriculture 8.9 7.8 4.8 5.6 
Mining 0.3 0.2 14.7 12.9 
Manufacturing 23.7 24.6 24.4 24.2 
Electricity and Water 2.9 2.7 4.0 4.1 
Construction 3.8 4.2 3.8 3.6 
Trade and Accommodation 15.4 15.7 12.3 12.8 
Transport and Communications 10.7 9.9 8.7 8.9 
Finance, Insurance etc 15.0 15.1 10.9 Il.l 
Community/ Social services 19.3 19.8 16.4 16.8 
100 100 100 100 
Western Cape South Africa 
1984 1990 1984 1990 
TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(GDP) R Millions 13700 35000 112825 268000 
Western CaQe Share of RSA 12.1% 13.0% 











Although the Western Cape does not have a mining sector it has great strengths in 
agriculture, property and financial services, trade as well as tourism. 49 Its income from 
agricultural and tourism was obviously affected by the government's apartheid 
policies, which resulted in sanctions against South Africa. The decentralisation and 
Bantustan policies applied by the government also had an adverse impact on 
commerce and industry in the Western Cape, as the area did not receive these benefits, 
except at Atlantis, but this development proved to be disastrous. 












SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF APARTHEID 
The system of apartheid restricted economic development in South Africa with its 
artificial control of the economy and its restriction on the full employment of labour, 
and, even more important, the parlous state of education provided to those of colour, 
especially blacks. 
Generally Western Cape businessmen were of the view that apartheid had a negative 
impact on their businesses, even if there were a number of exceptions. Reports on 
interviews with prominent Western Cape business are recorded in Annexure E and the 
questionnaire used in these interviews is included on Annexure F. 
In 1987. Middlemann summarised the economic ills caused by apartheid. These 
included net emigration, inflation, the state of emergency, and high unemployment. 50 
In 1988 he reiterated his concerns: 
It was the third year of a state of emergency, the inflation rate for the last 
fifteen years had never been below 10% per annum, we (South Africa) cannot 
participate freely in international sport, and have lost the respect of most 
countries beyond our borders, there is a nasty smell of corruption permeating 
our country, and the flows of foreign investment that helped us to build a 
modem economy have stopped and are now in reverse. 51 
Bill Neate, the former Chief Executive Officer ofImperial Cold Storage, a company 
involved nationally in the perishable food industry and in the fishing industry in the 
Western Cape, when interviewed in 2006, stated that apartheid did not have a major 
50 Middlemann, 'Towards a New South Africa: pp.1-2. 











impact on the Western Cape, but it did affect the company's development into all 
areas, as well as its exports and imports, especially equipment.52 
Philip Krawitz, the Chief Executive Officer of Cape Union Mart, a national retail 
store group with a head office in Cape Town but trading nationally, referred to the 
additional costs the company had had to bear in providing separate staff facilities for 
each race. He also said that the inflated cost of imports reduced the company's profits, 
as higher import prices impacted on its margins. 53 
Herbert Hirsch, Chief Executive Officer of Walter Hirsch, a small import agency in 
the Western Cape that imported fabrics from the East, said that apartheid did not 
materially affect the profitability of his company, but it created uncertainty in the 
market, and South Africa would have been in a stronger economic position, if liberal 
policies had been followed. 54 
Professor Wolfgang Thomas said that the Western Cape benefited by being far from 
major South African markets, and the strict labour laws had influenced the growth of 
high-tech service industries rather than those where unskilled labour was required. 55 
Drake stated that the major impact of apartheid on Shell was the erection of Sasol, 
which converted coal into oil, and the development of the Mossel Bay oilfields, 
making South Africa less reliant on imported oil. South Africa's poor image meant 
that the company's coal exports were affected. He added that there was not much 
competition in the South African market, and when the South African market grew the 
'1' d d S6 01 111 ustry prospere .-
52 Interview with W.H. Neate on 2.3.2006, Annexure E. 
53 Interview with Krawitz on 5.4.2006L Annexure E. 
54 Interview with H. Hirsch on 5.4.2006, Annexure E. 
55 Interview with Professor W. Thomas on 5.4.2006, Annexure E. 











Kenneth Marcus of Marcus Medical, importers of medical and surgical products with 
their head office in Cape Town but trading nationally, said that apartheid did not have 
an adverse effect on the company. It in fact benefited from apartheid, as the Group 
Areas Act resulted in hospitals being erected in areas adjacent to non-white areas and 
Marcus Medical did good business in equipping these hospitals.57 
In the view of Raymond Ackerman, the Chairman of Pick 'n Pay, a national food and 
general merchandise retailer with its head office in Cape Town, South Africa was 
held back by apartheid in every way: morale, immigration, education, fear of the 
future, fear of black/white confrontation. He said that, while apartheid adversely 
impacted on Pick 'n Pay, the company developed the skills in dealing with the 
problems apartheid brought. He said that the South Africa of today is so much better 
than in the past, but the legacy of the poor education system under apartheid is still 
. h d 58 WIt us to ay." 
In considering the impact of apartheid on business it should be borne in mind that the 
Botha regime in South Africa made a number of reforms in the 1980s. D. Simon 
stated that these did mark a 'gradual retreat from grand apartheid', although they did 
not represent sudden altruism and enlightenment on the part of government. The 
reforms were part of a survival strategy, trying to maintain white power and influence 
in the face of changing circumstances. 59 Previously apartheid had been beneficial to at 
least some sections of business and white labour, by restricting skills acquisition 
largely to whites and facilitating the exploitation of cheap black labour. By the late 
1970s the racial division of labour had become a significant constraint on the 
increasingly sophisticated capital intensive economy, which required a much higher 
57 Interview with K. Marcus on 20.9.2006, Annexure E. 
58 Interview with R. Ackerman on 24.10.2006, Annexure E. 











skills leve1. 6o This caused significant liberalisation in the labour area including 
permitting the formation of black trade unions, the phasing out of discriminatory job 
reservation, allowing some provision of family accommodation for migrant labour, 
and changes to migrant labour, influx control and pass laws etc. 
There was an element of contradiction in government's policy. On the one hand 
government was trying to establish credibility with the new black middle class, or at 
least secure their quiescence, whilst on the other hand it was unwilling to alienate part 
of its power base in the white-working and middle-classes. In addition the state faced 
an unprecedented level of black violence, which was ruthlessly suppressed by the 
emergency measures in force since 1986.61 Botha referred to this as the total 
strategy,62 combining a counter-insurgency brutality with limited ad hoc reform. By 
1985 it was obvious that this policy had failed. The turning point came in May 1986 
when Botha and his generals decided to scuttle the proposals of the Eminent Persons' 
Group (EPG) by bombing the capitals of three frontline states, declare a state of 
emergency and activate the National Security Management System (NSMS). The 
EPG was a team of veteran Commonwealth politicians, whose task was to develop 
negotiating positions with South Africa. The NSMS was set up to execute the will of 
the State Security Council (SSC), a 'securotocracy' under the direct control of the 
State President. The change in the constitution in 1983 established an executive state 
president in place of the former cabinet system of government and included the 
establishment of a tri-cameral system of government giving limited political rights to 
coloureds and Indians. The changes were rejected by these communities, hardened the 
60 Rogerson, 'Beyond Racial Fordism,' pp.3SS-366. 
61 Ibid, p.190. 
62 In the words of J. Selfe, 'A marshalling of the creative (and destructive) talents of the modern 
state .. The Total Onslaught and Total Strategy, p.IIS. P.1. Botha borrowed the idea from the French 












attitude of blacks, and also led to the fonnation of the United Democratic Front 
(UDF), which united hundreds of community organisations, women's groups, civic 
associations and youth groups in opposition to the government, and in response to the 
call of Oliver Tambo's (leader of the ANC) for 'one front for national liberation' . 
The NSMS structures, mainly staffed by securocrats from the armed forces and 
police, had as their main purpose the restoration of law and order. The NSMS system 
reached from at the a macro level, the State Security Council (SSC) to, at micro level 
the more than 500 district and local Joint Management Centres (JMC). Other sections 
of the community were involved in these structures, notably the business community 
at lower levels, but the securocrats controlled and ran the system. 63 
By 1988 South Africa was governed by five presidents, nine chief ministers or 
chairman of councils of ministers, fourteen cabinets or ministers councils, close to 
three hundred cabinet ministers and one thousand five hundred members of various 
parliaments, together with tens of thousands of local councillors. All were paid by the 
state and required a substantial infrastructure. 64 A further aspect of Botha's reforms 
was his efforts to promote dialogue with business, strictly on the government's terms. 
A number of public meetings were held between business and government in 
November 1979 and November 1981. These brought together cabinet ministers, 
senior civil servants and leading businessmen. At the 1979 Carlton conference Botha 
said: 'We have our differences, but we are creating reciprocal channels to plan 
national strategy in South Africa as a team'. Harry Oppenheimer chairman of Anglo 
American, replied that he saw: 'Greater reason for real hope in the future of the 
country than I have felt in many years'. 65 Middlemann said that at the time of the 
63 M. Swilling and M. Phillips, 'The Emergency State: Its Structure, Power, and Limits,' in G. Moss 
and 1. Obel)' (eds), South African Review 5: 1989, p.76. 
64 O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p.351. 











Carlton Conference in 1979 there was a clear indication of changes in policy in a new 
South Africa, eventually without racial discrimination. He gave some examples of an 
apparent willingness to change. These inc I uded the Riekert and Wiehahn 
commissions; the stress laid on the importance of free enterprise; the abolition of the 
Senate and its replacement by the President's Council; the concept of a constellation 
of states; the proposed large development bank and, later on, the anticipation that the 
de Lange Commission would call for a single education system. Further there was the 
recommendation that District 6 in Cape Town be made available to its original 
inhabitants. He said that in 1981 the disillusionment was great, as the expectations 
raised in 1974 had not been realised. Middlemann was of the view that in spite of the 
President's high motivation, his freedom to reform was as circumscribed as that of 
any of his predecessors. On the eve of the second presidential conference with 
businessmen in Cape Town in 1981 Middlemann called for: an open society, in which 
all people would be equal before the law; the current institutional framework should 
be changed from one of discrimination, restrictions and monopolies, both state or 
private, to a free market economy; the essential nature of such an economy required 
South Africa to be a single economic unit with a single currency and no internal 
economic frontiers; all South Africans should have equal opportunities and rights, 
including freedom of movement, the right to acquire skills and to exercise them with 
access to education and vocational training and easy access into and participation in 
the informal sector. 66 
The changes instigated by Botha from 1979 onwards can be divided into two 
categories, those dealing with racial zoning, and other measures. Whilst the racial 











changes received more attention in the media, many other changes had great 
significance in their effect on the black majority. These changes were as follows: 
Repeal of the Mixed Marriages Act ; the proclamation of central business 
districts and other trading areas for commercial and professional occupation 
and ownership by all races; desegregation of amenities in opening drive-in 
cinemas and cinemas in central business districts to all races, and the opening 
of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban beaches, swimming pools and bus 
services to all ; opening of hotels, restaurants and accommodation 
establishments to all races and granting of 30,60 and 99 year leasehold rights 
to blacks in urban areas. Full freehold rights were granted to blacks in their 
urban areas in 1986. 
These reforms may have created new business opportunities, but any gains were offset 
by challenges in other areas. The government was forced into granting property 
concessions to blacks, because of its deteriorating financial position and its inability 
to finance shelter provision for the increasing black low income urban population. 
They were also forced to pressurise business to increase its contribution to low 
income housing for blacks.67 











(a) HIGH LEVELS OF TAXATION 
During the apartheid years there was much concern in the business community as to 
the high level of direct and indirect taxation and the adverse impact this had on 
business profits. The Margo Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of South 
Africa in 1986 referred to this fact in its report. A table included in the report noted 
that the total tax payable by companies and individuals who receive dividends from 
those companies amounted to 53.33% in 1960 increasing to 67.83% by 1986. In fact 
in 1973 the rate was 69.32%. In all cases the percentages were calculated after tax 
surcharges. 6s The reduction in the overall rate in 1979 was due to the introduction of a 
General Sales Tax (GST). In 1985 approximately 36% of state revenue came from 
indirect taxation of which 60% came from GST.69 
Comparing taxation as a percentage ofthe Gross Domestic Product (GDP) it 
increased from 19.4% in 1975 to 24.4% in 1985.70 Wassenaar, the Chairman of 
SANLAM, the major Western Cape Afrikaner insurance and financial conglomerate, 
also complained in 1977 about the high levels of taxation. He said this had an adverse 
effect on the development and expansion of private enterprise in South Africa. 71 He 
was critical of the management of the economy by the Nationalist government, and 
used the term, 'Blunder after Blunder', to describe their policy.72 
Many business people stated that South African tax rates during the period were not 
out of line with international tax rates. In making any such comparison one should 
note that the tax allowances and incentives granted by overseas countries, were in 
68 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South Africa, p.193, 
Annexure A. 
69 Ibid, p.69. 
70 Ibid, p.38. 
71 Wassenaar, Assault on Private Enterprise, pp.90-94. 











many cases, considerably more generous than those granted to South African 
taxpayers during the period under review. 
South Africa was a nation with a high level of central state control which resulted in a 
high level of government expenditure. In addition the apartheid policies necessitated 
large expenditure on defence and the police. In the fiscal year 197011 defence 
expenditure only amounted to R260m,73 but it rose to R1654m in 1978/9 (an increase 
of235% over four years),74 then to R3755rn in 1984/575 and R6683 in 1987/8. To this 
must be added the cost of police; for instance in the 1987/8 budget speech the 
Minister of Finance reported that police costs had increased by 42.8% compared to 
the previous year. 76 Gerald Shaw, who occupied senior editorial positions with the 
Cape Times, said that during the apartheid years South Africa was fighting two 
surrogate wars, in Angola, and in Mozambique with its support for Renamo who 
opposed the government in that country.77 The cost of imposing apartheid on the 
country was inflicting an impossible and non-sustainable burden on the country and 
would eventually bring about the change to democracy. As Strydom commented: 'The 
most important factor responsible for the acceleration in government spending, 
particularly during the 1980s, was the rising cost burden of the apartheid system'. In 
addition to these costs the Bantustan policies had enormous cost implications through 
the provision of tax incentives and other concessions which costs had to be met by 
taxation and in the later apartheid years by loans necessitating large budget deficits. 78 
In addition to the disadvantages the Western Cape had in being far from the main 
markets in the PWV area, it paid the same taxes as all other taxpayers, without being 
73 Minister of Finance Budget Speech, 12.8.1970, pp.2-3. 
74 Minister of Finance Budget Speech, 29.3.1978. p.3-4. 
75 Minister of Finance Budget Speech, 28.3.1985, p.12. 
76 Minister of Finance Budget Speech, 3.6.1987, p.ll. 
77 Interview with Gerald Shaw on 4.4.2007, Annexure E. 











able to benefit from the close proximity of rural low wage slums, or most of the 
decentralization incentives. 
Krawitz of Cape Union Mart said that the heavy burden of tax restricted the 
development of companies. 79 Thomas said that in the 1970s and 1980s our tax rates 
were not out ofline with the rest ofthe tax-paying world,8o and this view was shared 
by Drake of Shell.8) Neate ofImperial Cold Storage, said that he had no particular 
view on the tax burden.82 A point to bear in mind is that tax was paid by companies on 
profits boosted by inflation, although for a time they received relief by the 'Last-In-
First-Out' system of stock valuation. Individuals received salary increases to 
compensate them for inflation, which moved them into higher tax brackets. Krawitz 
said that a culture developed where it was legitimate to avoid tax, if one had 
reservations as to how taxes were spent.83 Neate commented on the tax and other 
benefits received by the co-operative societies, which created unfair competition with 
the private sector. The benefits they received included tax concessions and cheap 
finance from the Land Bank. 
In the view of Professor Hermann Giliomee many taxpayers invented moral reasons 
for reducing their tax burden. He is very sceptical about the motives of people, who 
said that, for political reasons, they endeavoured to avoid paying taxes in the apartheid 
years. In his views this is a retrospective rationalisation, as a result of their guilty 
feelings they have about their behaviour in the apartheid years. Their motives were 
suspect, even if they said that they adopted this action, as they were against the 
excessive expenditure on the security establishment.84 
79 Interview with Krawitz on 5.4.2066, Annexure E. 
80 Interview with Thomas on 5.4.2006, Annexure E. 
81 Interview with Drake on 5.9.2006, Annexure E. 
82 Interview with Neate on 2.3.2006, Annexure E .. 
83 Interview with Krawitz on 5.4.2006, Annexure E. 












The Bantustans were those areas designated by the South African government in the 
apartheid years as "homelands" for the country's black ethnic groups. They were the 
cornerstone of the National Party's policy for the blacks,85 and the cost to the taxpayer 
was enormous. The Bantustans were provided with all the trappings of full nationhood 
including: state presidents and cabinets, parliamentary buildings, so absorbing large 
sums of South African public funds. During the years from 1982 to 1988 the South 
African government's contributions to the independent homelands amounted to 
R3395.8 million,86 South Africa providing on average about 77% ofthe revenue. 87 In 
the words of van Zyl: 'For 30 years, South Africa had created a system of 
bureaucratic patronage and privilege that was costing a fortune'. 88 This policy which 
set out to develop South Africa as a set of separate political entities was referred to by 
McCarthy in 1990 as balkanization. In his words however, 'Political sovereignty 
meant little without economic substance'. 89 It placed a heavy burden on the South 
African taxpayer, and in particular on business, and it impacted on the Western Cape, 
as it diverted economic resources away from that area. 
Ackerman of Pick' n Pay, expressed controversial views and one such view was his 
opinion of the Bophuthatswana Bantustan, after a visit to that area in 1975. He said 
that he saw much on the positive side, even if there was a lot of squalor and many 
squatters. He was impressed with black businessmen building up chains of stores, 
owning land and houses. He also saw 32 schools, a hotel school, and even plans to 
85 Egero, South Africa's Bantustans, pp.6-7. 
86 Egero. South Africa's Bantustans, p.28. 
87 Tomlinson and Hyslop, Industrial Decentralisation. Bantustan Policv and the Control of Labour in 
South Africa, p.9. 
88 Van Zyl, 'Industrial Decentralisation, Homeland Poverty and Urban Growth: Review and 
Appraisal,' p.2. 











build an I8-hole golf course. He was of the view that these developments could only 
build up the self-esteem ofblacks.90 In a somewhat contrary view he also said that the 
system of border industries, which was introduced by the government was immoral, 
exploiting the people living in the Bantustans and benefited no one other than the 
owner of the border industries, who were able to exploit the cheap labour. 91 
90 Ackerman, Hearing Grasshoppers Jump, 149-150. 





















(c) JOB RESERVATION 
The policy of job reservation goes back to the 1930s and even earlier, but in the 1930s 
a so-called 'civilised labour' policy was introduced, which reserved, by law, skilled 
employment for whites; blacks were to remain unskilled.92 On the National Party 
coming to power in 1948 job reservation was intensified. The Industrial Conciliation 
Act of 1954 contained provisions to protect white workers and in the words of the 
then Minister of Labour, Senator Jan de Klerk, 'In practice the Bill meant that the 
European's economic position in the industrial world could never be lowered by the 
non-European' .93 The Minister of Labour stated in 1957 that: 'The European worker 
in this country must be protected or else European civilisation will go under' .94 These 
conservative and short-sighted policies resulted in a scarcity of skilled labour as the 
economy grew. The Cape Chamber of Industries (CCI) expressed concern in 1960 as 
to the policy as applied in industry. Coloureds who were in occupations reserved for 
whites could continue to remain in their positions, but when they left the job had to be 
filled by whites. At a meeting of the CCI held on 28 July 1960 the following 
resolution was passed: 
• 'That this General Meeting of the Cape Chamber of Industries is convinced that 
job reservation is unnecessary for the prevention of inter-racial competition in 
the Western Cape where the labour of the various races is complementary and 
not in conflict; 
• that the Chamber is convinced that job reservation will retard the economy of 
the Western Cape to the detriment of all races; 
9:2 Tomlinson and Hyslop, Industrial Decentralisation, Bantustan Policy and the Control of Labour in 
South Africa, pA. 
93 Bunting. The Rise of the South African Reich, p.359. 











• that particular apprehension is felt at the forthcoming effect of job reservation on 
the Cape coloured community and upon traditional maintenance of good inter-
racial relationships in the Western Cape; and 
• That it is particularly urged that the coloured community of the Western Cape 
should be excluded from all existing or future work reservation 
determinations' .95 
The CCI had expressed a concern about job reservation for a number of years and in a 
Memorandum submitted to the Minister of Labour two years previously on 19 August 
1958, the following points were made: The re-distribution of work and the 
substitution of workers was a natural economic process, which had not resulted in one 
racial group advancing at the cost of another; the displacement of white workers was 
due to a shortage of such workers or to the reclassification of operations and or skills 
following mechanisation or technological progress; the artificial entrenchment of 
employment might engender a lack of interest on behalf of some workers; workers of 
different races should be looked on as complementary to each other; and job 
reservation was likely to have an impact on future development.96 An example of the 
government's restrictions imposed was the declaration in 1962 that in the Western 
Cape, the occupations of firemen and traffic officers, above the rank of constable, was 
reserved for whites. With regard to employees of City Tramways in the Western Cape, 
in not less than 24 days in the month, at least 84% of bus drivers must be white. In 
1965 the regulations were relaxed and 24% of bus drivers could be coloured.97 
The impact on business of the shortage of skills was material, and by 1977 
government figures showed vacancies for 99000 workers in technical, professional 
95 Cape Chamber of Industries, Mid-Year General Meeting, 28.7.60, pp.12-13. 
96 Cape Chamber of Industries, Memorandum submitted to the Minister of Labour on Job 
Reservation, 19.8.58, pp.2-7. 
97 South African of Race Relations, Survey of Race Relations 1962, p.6 and Survey of Race 











and semi-professional grades. 98 As early as in 1964 C.T.Hupkes, chief economist of 
the Bureau of Economic Research at Stellenbosch University, had commented in a 
labour survey:' If, in certain sectors of the skilled labour market, the required white 
manpower cannot be recruited by means of immigration, present needs dictate that 
recruits be sought in other sections of the population' .99 However towards the end of 
1964 the government's Department of Planning published an economic development 
programme, which was compiled after consultation with government departments and 
the private sector, and which programme recommended that South Africa should aim 
at a real growth rate in the gross domestic product of 5.112% per annum over the 
period 1965 to 1969. In the programme various assumptions were made - that there 
would be 20000 white immigrants a year ; that the process of repatriating "foreign" 
blacks would be accelerated; that there would be an increase in exports and some 
capital inflow; and that inflation would not exceed 1.75% per annum. The programme 
laid particular stress on the need for substantial additions to the skilled labour force; 
various schemes for training whites were discussed, and it was recommended that 
Indians and coloureds should be encouraged to undertake more advanced work in 
specific areas; blacks meanwhile should be given further assistance to do so in the 
Bantustans and in border areas. 100 Surveys conducted by employers between 1969 and 
1971, revealed persistent shortages of skilled artisans in the furniture, motor, metal, 
clothing and construction industries. 101 By the late 1970's business was suffering a 
permanent and severe shortage of skilled and technical labour in all sectors of the 
economy, especially the manufacturing sector and this was a major factor in the 
98 O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p.I77. 
99 South African Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations, 1964, p.240. 
100 South African Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations, 1965, p.203. 











recession from 1973 onwards. 102 The Cape Town Chamber of Commerce in its 
1973174 Annual Report not only stated that immigration was failing to meet the skill 
shortfall, it said: 'Official restrictions on the employment of non-whites and the lack 
of training facilities led to a shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers'l.I03 
In this period Hersov, Chairman of Anglovaal (a large industrial company with 
interests in the Western Cape in building supplies and particularly fishing), in 1979 
stressed that South Africa faced the problem of a shortage of skills together with a 
large unskilled labour force, and he also said that socio-economic stability was 
essential. Rosholt, the Chairman of the conglomerate Barlows, which had extensive 
interests in the Western Cape, said in 1981 that the shortage of skills was the single 
most important obstacle to an acceptable growth rate. These criticisms were echoed 
by Coetzer the Chairman of the Afrikaner mining group, F ederale Mynbou. I04 
The government faced the choice of allowing the economy to stagnate or to permit 
blacks to be trained for semi-skilled jobs in the cities to meet the demand. lOS 
Kane-Berman also commented that: 'South Africa's spectacular success in developing 
its abundant mineral resources contrasts strikingly with its failure to develop its 
human resources' .106 In his view, whenever the economy boomed, there was a scarcity 
of skilled labour. The development of a more sophisticated economy necessitated 
more skilled labour. He also noted that South Africa was not an attractive country for 
overseas job- seekers and that many whites emigrated. lo7 
Kane-Berman quoted a statement of the Bureau for Economic Research at the 
University of Stellenbosch, which in the second quarter of the 1980s warned that 
10:' O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, pp.171-172. 
103 Cape_Town Chamber of Commerce Annual Report 1973/4, p.l. 
104 Bolton, Business and State in South Africa, pp.92-93. 
105 Kane-Berman, 'The Erosion of Apartheid,' p.IS. 
106 Ibid, p.IS. 











'Skill shortages could choke the economy prematurely.' 108 A survey conducted by the 
Bureau at that time of a number of businesses, revealed that the demand for skilled 
workers exceeded the supply. The Bureau said that: 'The inflation rate will be very 
difficult to control.' Even the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council was 
especially worried at the shortage of skilled labour and its possible inflationary 
consequences. These views were shared by the Natal Chamber ofIndustries, which 
found that shortages of skilled labour were starting to emerge during the first quarter 
of 1980, with 33% of firms surveyed reporting that they were a major limiting factor 
. d 109 to Increase output. 
Kane-Berman noted that the Anglo American Corporation, which also had 
considerable business interests in the Western Cape, shared these concerns as to the 
skills shortage. In the same period Harry Oppenheimer, in his chairman's review in 
the annual report of African Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI), the 
chemical giant which had a major plant at Somerset West in the Western Cape, said 
that: 'Shortages of skilled manpower remained a major reason for concern and could 
well prove to be the main threat to economic growth'. I 10 Gavin ReIly, Deputy 
Chairman of Anglo American declared at the same time that one of the most 
devastating criticisms that could be levelled at the private sector, the government and 
the trade unions was the lack of foresight and planning to ensure an adequate supply 
of skilled manpower in anticipation of an economic upturn. He said: 'we find 
ourselves in this position for the umpteenth time. Once again we are bewailing the 
fact that the manpower is not available to take advantage of more favourable 
108 Ibid, pp.79-80. 
109 Ibid, pp.79-80. 











economic conditions. It must never happen again that South Africa is kept from 
progress through this lack of foresight' .111 
Concerns were also expressed by an unnamed chief executive of a US-owned 
subsidiary in South Africa in the field of industrial and agricultural chemicals. He 
said: 'It's very difficult to follow the Sullivan principles on equal pay and equality of 
opportunity, because the black in South Africa is nowhere near the level of the black 
in the US'. He was of the view that most US companies in South Africa wanted to 
give equal opportunities, regardless of race, colour, creed or sex, but for this to happen 
people would have to be properly educated and developed. He expressed concern that 
the education standard of blacks in South Africa was very much lower than in the U.S. 
This Chief Executive also said: 'I feel the economy could collapse in the next five 
years because of the lack of skilled personnel, or at the least have very limited 
growth', and he also expressed concern that the wage inflation implications were very 
serious. 112 Not only were non-whites prohibited from performing certain skilled or 
semi-skilled occupations, but the standard of education they received was so inferior 
to that which the whites received, that even if job reservation were not in place, the 
non- whites would have great difficulty in occupying positions requiring skills.]]3 
Kane-Berman endorsed these views on the consequences of the kind of education 
provided for black South Africans and stated that: 
The inferiority of non-white - especially African - education is in part the 
inevitable outcome of the fact that the whites-only Parliament has provided for 
its own children first. But it is also a consequence of deliberate policy. When 
African education, pioneered in South Africa by church missions, was 
nationalised in 1955, Hendrik Verwoerd, the Minister responsible (he later 
111 Ibid, pp.79-80. 
112 Ibid, pp.80-81. 











became Prime Minister), declared that this was necessary in order to ensure 
the implementation of the National Party's policy, which was that there was no 
place for blacks in the white community, above the level of certain forms of 
labour. 114 
Verwoerd had stated that: 'There was no point in teaching Africans mathematics since 
they would not be required to use it in practice, neither must they be taught that they 
would live their adult lives under policy of equal rights'; he was of the view that 
education had to be rooted in tribal culture.' 115 The result was that most black pupils 
dropped out of school within a few years. Only one child out of 63 in the 1962 intake 
into school reached matriculation. II6 Wilson noted from the South African Labour 
Research Survey (SALRS) 1993 data, that black primary education failed miserably 
in providing basic literacy and comprehensive skills. II7 
The National Party starved non-white education, especially black education. When 
Verwoerd took over, the cost of black education was frozen at 1953 levels. Any 
additional revenue had to be provided by the black community themselves, and this 
included all capital expenditure. State expenditure on black education actually 
declined in per capita terms throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Inadequate financing 
and too few matriculants, and thus too few black teachers, gave black pupils a poor 
and limited education. Table 4 summarises the position of government expenditure on 
education. 
114 Ibid, pp.80-81. 
115 Quoted in ibid., pp.8l-28. 
116 Ibid, pp.83-84. 











TABLE 4: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE PER SCHOOL PUPIL, 1953-197911/S 
White Indian Coloured Black 
Year R R R R 
1953 128 40 40 18 
1960 145 - 59 12 
1968 228 70 - 14 
1975 644 190 150 42 
1977 654 220 158 49 
1979 724 357 225 71 
A further problem was the introduction of mother-tongue education in primary 
schools, with the hope that blacks would retain tribal links. This policy was 
detrimental in that blacks were less able to obtain employment where proficiency in 
English or Afrikaans was required. The economic consequences of this disastrous 
education policy came to a head in 1976, when hatred of the segregated and inferior 
educational system for blacks caused the Soweto riots and nation-wide boycotts by 
non-white school pupils. The economic consequences of these riots were extremely 
. 119 serIous. 
Some companies introduced internal training programmes and Tony Bloom, Chairman 
of Premier Milling, a national group of companies with Western Cape industrial 
interests in milling and baking, said in the 1970s that whilst they were starting an in-
house training programme, they were having difficulty n finding suitable candidates 
118 Source: F.E.Auerbach, Discrimination in Education (Cape Town: Centre for Intergroup Studies, 
1976): Loraine Gordon et al (Compilers)., Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1978 
(Johannesburg, 1979), p.399; Intergroup (Cape Town: Centre for Intergroup Studies) June 1980, p.19. 











for training, owing to the poor education system. no Wim de Villiers, the Chairman 
and Managing Director of General Mining Union Corporation, a leading Afrikaner 
mining group, also expressed concern as to the skills shortage. In a book published in 
1974, de Villiers noted that the main problem in South Africa was not a labour 
shortage, but a skills shortage. He said that: 
In South Africa, it is estimated that 85% of the present economically active 
population is unskilled or semi-skilled, while only 15% - (compared with 48% 
in the US during a comparable stage of economic development) - can be 
grouped as the leaders, clerks, salesmen and skilled workers.!2! 
De Villiers said that the whites were too small a proportion (17.4% in 1974, 16.5% in 
1978) of the population to be able to provide the necessary skills on their own. In his 
view there were simply not enough whites to meet the demands of the growing 
economy for leaders in the group and for clerks and salesmen, skilled workers and 
foremen. Even immigration on a large scale could not meet the demand. He 
considered that the shortage of available managerial, entrepreneurial, technical, and 
intellectual talent, and the fact that largest proportion of the population was non-white 
and unskilled, would not only limit the rate of increasing productivity, but also the 
]7, 
growth rate. --
De Villiers was of the view that at that stage of South Africa's development, it could 
not afford to have such a large proportion of its non-white population working as 
unskilled labour. The required programme for the training and development of South 
Africa's non-white represented a massive task, and South Africa's economic growth 
will be dependent on the speed with which any programme to train and develop non-
whites was executed. He said: 'The movement of suitably qualified non-whites to 
120 Ibid. pp.83-84. 
121 Ibid, pp.83. 











positions regarded as the prerogative of the whites is one of the most difficult social 
aspects of the problem of the better utilisation of the Republic's human resources,.123 
During the 1970s the government realised that its educational policies needed 
revision, and a programme of improvements was introduced. It would, however, have 
been some time before the benefits of an improved educational system could filter 
through to commerce and industry. All companies, either local or subsidiaries of 
overseas companies, faced the problem that the school system failed to produce even 
a moderately high level of general education, that could provide the basis for blacks 
to obtain technical or other specialised skills.124 There were also serious limitations 
in technical and vocational training: with a few minor exceptions, trade schools and 
technical colleges for blacks simply did not exist in the white areas. 125 
Skill shortages did not only affect the lower job bands. Business opportunities in the 
black community forced companies to consider employing black managers in certain 
areas. Old Mutual, for example, the insurance and financial group in the Western 
Cape, employed black managers to supervise its black marketing force. 126 Seekings 
and Nattrass noted that the racial barriers began to be less restrictive in the 1970s, 
mainly because new opportunities opened up for better educated black workers. 
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, education and skills became even more 
important for blacks both in determining earnings and whether they would find 
employment. I27 From the middle of the 1 960s the shortages of skilled labour led, in 
the words of Seekings and Nattras, 'To the racial labour dispensation fraying at the 
edges'. Bottlenecks in the supply of skilled labour led to the disintegration of the 
123 Ibid, p.81-82. 
124 Ibid, p.86. 
125 Ibid, p.86. 
126 P. Brooke Simons, Old Mutual 1845-1895, pp.183-184. 











colour bar or 'floating upwards'. In the Bantustans, however, black workers were 
denied the opportunity of skills development and upward mobility. 128 
Owing to 'territorial apartheid' in South Africa, 86% of the land area of South Africa 
had been unilaterally designated by the ruling white minority as 'white areas', the 
remaining 14% being allocated to 'non-whites'. The area allocated to whites 
contained nearly all the country's mines and industrial and commercial centres of any 
consequence. The result was that there were many more blacks employed in white 
areas than in the homeland (Bantustan) areas. These latter areas, mainly rural, were 
over-populated and impoverished, and made a negligible contribution to the GDP of 
South Africa. 
The South African economy was heavily dependent on black labour, but as has been 
discussed, up until the mid-1970s blacks were prohibited from being trained for 
skilled jobs in the 'white' areas. The official view was that such training should be 
provided, and skills utilised only in the Bantustans. This policy applied not only to 
industrial skills, but also to managerial, professional and entrepreneurial skills. 
Restrictions on the movement of blacks in the white areas were also a factor in the 
skill shortage, as they tended to prevent the industrial labour force becoming 
permanently settled and discouraged management from investing in industrial 
training. The migratory labour system was an obvious deterrent to employers wishing 
to provide technical training, as this system resulted in a large turnover of staff. 129 
In accordance with the government's policy of 'territorial apartheid' the government 
was opposed to the indenturing of blacks as apprentices in the white areas. This 
approach was not enacted in law, but was stated to be a policy and was applied 
administratively, and it accorded with the views of the white trade unions. Any trade 
128 Ibid, pp.146-147. 











union that agreed to indenturing blacks as apprentices in white areas could face 
ostracism by other unions. Most trade unions had a procedural mechanism that also 
blocked the indenturing of blacks as apprentices. 130 
Kane-Berman referred to 'customary exclusion', which was a form of the colour bar 
that was difficult to identify but which permeated most sectors of the economy. It was 
not caused by decrees imposed by government or trade unions, but arose from the 
attitude of company management; for instance, managers of supermarkets would 
insist that those who were in contact with customers should be white, otherwise 
customers might object. Kane-Berman cited one example of a managing director who 
insisted that his personal secretary must be white: 'Because we don't really have the 
proper toilet facilities on this floor'. Kane-Berman also cited the example of a 
consulting engineer who would not employ a black draughtsman: 'because the other 
chaps in the office are not yet ready for it' . A further example was that of a lawyer 
who would not have a black as an articled clerk: 'Because it would be awkward if the 
typists had to take dictation from him' .131 Even Anglo American, a company which 
was regarded as progressively minded, admitted that the employment of black 
graduates in senior technical positions, even when permitted by law or trade union 
regulation, would meet with a hostile reaction both from the present occupants of 
similar jobs and from those who had to work under them. As a result even ifblacks 
possessed high qualifications they experienced difficulty in obtaining suitable 
employment, and even the best-intentioned companies were to fall in with this long-
d · 132 stan mg custom. 
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Thomas was of the view that job reservation, combined with the emigration of skilled 
whites created inflexibility in the labour market. 133 Drake of Shell, on the other hand, 
said that job reservation and the coloured labour preference policy had not affected 
Shell as the oil industry was capital intensive and shortages of skilled workers could 
be met from the overseas Shell Group. 134 Ackerman of Pick n' Pay said that labour 
restrictions made it difficult to run a business. 135 Krawitz of Cape Union Mart referred 
to the resistance from some customers to employing coloured sale staff. 136 
Multi-nationals, who adhered to the European Economic Community (EEC) code, or 
the Sullivan principles, had to take particular care in appointing and promoting 
staff. 137 They operated in a society, which was pem1eated by apartheid over so many 
years, and this affected the racial attitude of their staff and customers. Krawitz, of 
Cape Union Mart, in the interview with him, also referred to this attitude. 138 
Kane-Berman stated that the shortage of skills was to be found in almost all sectors of 
the economy, the public sector as well as the private sector. The skill shortage was 
present at practically every occupational level, requiring anything more than 
rudimentary skills. He quoted the following examples139 : 
• The Post Office reported in January 1980 that they had 4000 vacancies in jobs 
that included professional and administrative staff, pupil-technicians, 
telecommunication trainees, telephonists and postmen. 
133 Interview with Thomas on 5.4.2006, Annexure E. 
134 Interview with Drake on 8.9.2006,Annexure E. 
135 Interview with Ackerman on 24.10.2006, Annexure E. 
136 Interview with Krawitz on 5.4.2006_Annexure E. 
137 Kane-Berman, 'The Skills Shortage,' p.88. 
138 Interview with Krawitz on 6.4.2006, Annexure E. 
139 The source for the following examples is Kane-Berman, 'The Skills Shortage,' 
pp.88-94. It is appreciated that using a single source for numerous consecutive examples is not 
unproblematic in that it may be used to selectively reinforce a single point of view; at the same 
time, this account does bring together a number of useful practical illustrations as to how the skills 











• Iscor, the state-owned iron and steel corporation, stated that in April 1980 their 
complement of artisans was 13% below its requirements. It also was 
experiencing a 32% stafftumover of skilled labour which was a major problem 
in the private sector, as there was frequent poaching of skilled staff. 
• The South African Railways reported in March 1980 that certain projects, vital 
for rising traffic volumes in the improving economy, were being delayed 
because of a shortage of engineers, technicians, draughtsmen and other staff. 
• A large computer personnel consultancy reported in October 1979 that there was 
a countrywide shortage of systems analysts and analyst programmers which 
stood at 28%. The acute shortage was caused by the rapid growth in the 
economy, combined with an increasing demand for data processing systems, 
following on a decrease in the cost of these systems. 
• Dennis Etheridge, president of Chamber of Mines in 1979/80, said in November 
1979 that: 'Because of the shortage of skilled manpower the industry may not be 
able to achieve in full measure the expansion which the substantial (gold) price 
makes possible' .140 Etheridge said that while there was an overall shortage of 
skilled labour, the problem was especially serious in management and 
professional areas. 'We can train black people and we can also retrain white 
workers for these positions - but this would take about ten years for the industry 
to derive any benefit. We are facing this grave shortage now,141. 
• The Building Industries Federation of South Africa (BIFSA) stated in January 
1980 that about 30% of its member construction firms were complaining of 
skills shortages. The building industry had hoped for an intake of 1000 












apprentices in 1979, but had signed on fewer than half that number, whilst an 
intake of 1600 was needed in 1980142. 
• The Steel and Engineering Industries Federation (SElF SA), which represents 
more than 5000 firms, reported in January 1980 that there was a shortfall of 
4000 apprentices. In February 1980 SEIFSA said that there was a shortage of 
draughtsman and technicians which was: 'Inhibiting growth in vital sectors of 
the national economy', and it also remarked on the: 'Unimaginative and 
sometimes poor quality ofteaching of mathematics and physical science at 
secondary school level' .143 In a review of specific sectors in the first half of 
1980, SEIFSA noted the appearance of shortages of both skilled and semi-
skilled workers in general engineering, agricultural and irrigation machinery and 
implements, foundries and steel and ferro-alloys.144 
• In May 1980 Kane-Berman quoted the Standard Bank Review which said, in a 
review of the heavy electrical equipment industry that increasing demand was 
causing: 'A difficult supply situation in which the most critical factor was a 
shortage of skilled labour especially qualified engineers, skilled artisans and 
d h -145 raug tsman . 
• The South African Institute of Civil Engineer reported in March 1980 that the 
shortage of civil engineers was likely to be one of the major problems of the 
1980s. The Institute said that for every civil engineer graduating in 1982, there 
would be three jobs available. They said that shortages were also reported 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid, p.90. 
144 Ibid, P .90. 











among electrical, mechanical and chemical engineers, as well as among architects 
d · 146 an quantity surveyors. 
In April 1980 in his chairman's review for General Mining, the Afrikaner mining 
group, Wim De Villiers, noted that the population of South Africa increased by 22% 
during the period 1970 to 1978 and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had increased 
by 31 %, but the number of artisans and apprentices had only increased by 5%.147 
With regard to multi-national companies, Kane-Berman reported on their experience 
of operating in South Africa. 
Ciba-Geigy 
This company said that there is a skills shortage in South Africa, that the output of 
schools was not sufficient, and that it would take time for blacks to be trained for 
skilled occupations148. They posed the question as to why there was only one black 
Chartered Accountant in South Africa. They also said that there was a tremendous 
shortage in the finance and accounting fields, and it was difficult to find the 
agronomists, production managers, and people skilled in the computer world. In their 
view blacks had not been given the opportunity to be trained and developed. They 
considered it was not only a question of training, but also of attitude. They posed the 
question as to whether blacks would be given the opportunities to be employed in 
skilled jobs. Their company needed many people with technical knowledge of their 
products, who would have to interact with their customers, yet they also repeated the 
view that blacks were not fully acceptable to their customers in these jobs. Ciba-
Geigy was reluctant to employ them in these positions as the company believed that 
146 Ibid. p.90. 
147 Ibid, p.90. 











social attitudes could not be changed overnight. The company felt that even if blacks 
were trained they would have a subservient attitude, in that they believed whites were 
superior. They had found that blacks from Malawi and Swaziland to be more 
confident and sure of themselves, whilst South Africa blacks needed to be more self-
. 149 assertIve. 
General Motors 
They stated that: 'In certain job categories, there is a lot of job-hopping, and there will 
be a critical shortage in those areas, especially since training takes so long' 150. General 
Motors South African assembly plant is less automated than the plants in other 
countries. Assembly hours were substantially higher than they would be normally. 
The shortage of skills was particularly difficult, in the light of nature of the South 
African plant, with its great proliferation of car and truck models, in contrast to the 
position with other General Motors' plants in the rest of the world. 
Volkswagen 
They stated that: 'Skills shortages are an enonnous problem in many areas,)SI. There 
were few skills in the South African motor manufacturing industry until the local 
content programme was introduced in the 1960s. They believed that they had 
nevertheless progressed reasonably well because of their aggressive internal 
apprenticeship and training schemes. 
Goodvear 
In February 1980 this company was only operating at three-quarter capacity, but the 
skills shortages were already being felt, especially among technicians and in 
149 Kane-Berman, 'The Skills Shortage,' pp.91. 
150 The views expressed in this paragraph were also quoted in Kane-Berman,' The Skills Shortage,' 
pp.91. 











maintenance jobs done by artisans. They considered that it would only get worse if 
the economy grew, and that the country's black education system did not adequately 
prepare blacks for industry. Pupils who were trained in ordinary academic schools 
were weak in mathematics and science. 1S2 
Dunlop 
The company stated that the worst skill shortages were in respect of engineers, 
technicians and artisans. They also said that there were shortages in sales and 
administrative staff IS3 
Alfa-Laval 
In their company blacks were employed mainly at operational level, with coloureds 
and Indians in skilled occupations1S4 . Their main skills bottleneck was at the sales 
and technical level, but not particularly wi th artisans. The company said that other 
employers, especially Sasol, were offering very high salaries to entice senior 
personnel to work for them. This resulted in their having to increase their salary 
packages to levels which would not nommlly applylS5. 
Ingersoll-Rand 
This company reported that: 'Certain mechanical skills are in short supply, especially 
those needed to operate sophisticated machine tools' .156 
General Electric Corporation 
The company said that: 'Without doubt, the shortage of skilled labour will be a factor 
that seriously inhibits meeting demand and possibly even expanding production 
facilities'. They were of the view that the shortage was particularly severe at the 
technical level and in respect of highly skilled artisans. They said that: 'Black training 
152 Ibid. p.92. 
153 Ibid. p.92. 
154 Ibid. p.92. 
155 Ibid. p.92. 











has to start at levels much lower than apprenticeship. We have a literacy problem in 
the foundry, where we employ a lower class of manual labour '.157 
Metal Box Company (A group with large manufacturing plants in the Western Cape) 
This company also faced severe shortages of engineers and artisans such as 
electricians, fitters and turners, and tool-makers. In the past they had recruited 
overseas, but they were now reluctant to do so, not because of political pressures, but 
'because it would be treating the symptoms, rather than the cause'. 158 
Premier Milling (A group with milling and baking plants in the Western Cape) 
They too complained of a skills shortage and said that this was a major problem 
especially at senior administrative level, and among artisans. They too referred to 
staff being poached by other employers. They had had to shelve projects because of 
the scarcity of senior administrative personnel. 159 
Lonhro 
They too experienced problems with the shortage of skilled staff. They referred to the 
shortage of teachers and trainers. 160 
A striking example of the skills gaps was in the building industry. At the end of the 
Second World War the building industry was dominated by a division of labour 
between white and coloured craftsmen on the one hand, and unskilled black labourers 
on the other. This division was maintained by traditional craft union methods. 161 The 
industry had a low capital intensity,162 and after the war there was an increasing 
demand for housing and services for the rapidly urbanising black working class. In 
157 Ibid. p.93. 
158 Ibid .. p.94. 
159 Ibid. p.94. 
160 Ibid, pp.9I-94. 
161 The craft unions controlled training and supply of apprentices by giving on the job training and by 
representation on the Apprenticeship Board and committees. 
162 Crankshaw, 'Apartheid and Economic Growth: Craft Unions, Capital and the State in the South 











order to ensure the provision of skilled labour in the industry, the post-war Smuts 
government introduced legislation to provide training for blacks in skilled trades in 
the industry, which the craft unions in the industry opposed. 
Kane-Berman stated that two most important observations about the skills shortage 
were firstly, that it was to be found not only amongst skilled trades, but in professional 
and management occupationsl63 . Secondly gaps in skills cannot be remedied in the 
short term, since, apart from the time that teclmical training takes, the roots of the 
problem go back to the country's school system, which was not producing enough 
people with an adequate grounding for further educational development. 164 This was 
despite an expansion in the provision of primary education for black children in the 
mid-1950s, and, from 1972 onwards, expansion of secondary schooling in urban 
areas. There was also a marked expansion of tertiary education yet in 1960 there were 
fewer than 800 black students at universities, (excluding University of South Africa 
(UNISA), which offered correspondence courses). By 1983 there were about 20000 
black university students with an additional 12700 at UNISA. Most of the expansion 
occurred in the 1970s.165 It should be borne in mind that the improvement in the 
education of blacks was from a very low base, and whilst more blacks were educated, 
the standard of teaching was extremely poor. Blacks were advancing up the 
occupation ladder. Until 1960 almost all black workers had been unskilled, but by 
1980 unskilled workers accounted for less than half of blacks in employment in 
Johannesburg and between one-half and two-thirds in other areas in the whole 
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal area. 166 
163 Kane-Berman, 'The Skills Shortage,' pp.89-94. 
164 Ibid, p.94. 












Military conscription had posed a major problem according to most of those 
interviewed. Krawitz of Cape Union Mart was of the view that this had created 
serious difficulties, especially for small businesses.167 Professor Thomas was of the 
opinion that the Western Cape suffered more than the rest of South Africa from the 
consequences of conscription, as a result of its efforts to develop a more 
sophisticated economy in the area. 168 While Shell, presumably like other overseas 
companies, could always deal with the skills shortage by importing skilled staff from 
its overseas group companiesl69, Marcus Medical only overcame the problem by 
employing females and older males. 170 
When the National Party came into power in 1948, training of black artisans was 
suspended, and legislation was introduced to protect white workers from undercutting 
by employing cheaper black labour. The employment of black labour in skilled 
building work was restricted to black townships however legislation in 1951 allowed 
for the training of semi-skilled blacks outside the existing apprenticeship system, and 
allowed employers to be exempted from job reservation and by 1955 general 
exemptions could be granted to employers in the industry to employ blacks in certain 
skilled work in white areas. 171 The fines imposed by government for illegally 
employing blacks in skilled work in the trade were relatively low. Employees could 
thus employ cheaper black skilled labour and pay the fines as it was still to their 
benefit. A contractor could cut his wage bill by 75%, ifhe employed black artisans, 
167 Interview with Krawitz on 5.4.2006, Annnexure E. 
168 Interview with Thomas on 5.4.2006, Annexure E. 
169 Interview with Drake on 8.9.2006, Annexure E. 
170 Interview with Marcus on 20.9.2006, Annexure E. 
171 Crankshaw, 'Apartheid and Economic Growth: Craft Unions, Capital and the State in the South 











and would only face a fine of one hundred pounds plus, at the discretion of the officer, 
the difference between wages paid and the rate for skilled work. I 72 
The period of unprecedented economic growth in the 1960's intensified the shortage 
of skilled labour in the industry. The wages of artisans increased, but the craft unions 
lacked the power to negotiate improved conditions of employment and thus attract 
white apprentices. Businessmen in the building sector redoubled their efforts to 
change the traditional labour patterns in the industry and in 1966 they won the right to 
employ cheaper black labour in semi-skilled work in the Transvaal; this concession 
was soon extended to the Western Cape and Durban. 
Over the next ten years the craft unions were forced to concede more and more skilled 
tasks to blacks. 173 The change in the racial division in the industry altered from a ratio 
of black workers to non- black workers of 1.7 in 1945 to 2.2 in 1961 and 2.8 in the 
early 1970s. In the 1970s employers were openly disregarding job reservation in the 
building industry. By 1974 the extent ofthe employment of (illegal) black labour can 
be measured by the statement of a builder on the Witwatersrand that if blacks were 
not employed illegally on skilled work, 50% to 75% of building sites on the 
Witwatersrand would have to stop working. 174 Notwithstanding the views of the 
Minister of Labour in 1950 that the employment of cheap black labour in the industry 
would impact on the standard of living of white artisans, as early as 1965 the state 
began to turn a blind eye to the employment of blacks in semi-skilled work. I75 Job 
reservation in the industry was not as severe as building contractors expected and the 
172 Ibid, p.51 o. 
173 Ibid, pp.518-20. 
174 Ibid, p.521. 











state willingly granted exemptions to employers if they could not find suitable white 
labour. 176 
The report of the Wiehahn Commission,I77 which was presented in June 1980, said in 
Part 2 that: 
The general educational level of the South African labour force is very low 
and ... there are large numbers of workers who, for various reasons, present 
their services on the labour market under severe handicaps - handicaps that 
make it difficult for them to find jo bs in the first place, to reap the full benefits 
of on-the-job training, and to meet the rapidly expanding demands of a full 
and productive working life ... According to the 1970 census figures 39.9% of 
the 1.9 million black male workers in urban areas had no educational 
qualification, while 82% had an educational qualification below the level of 
the eighth year of schooling, or none at all. 178 
The Commission also was of the view that the low formal educational level of the 
largest segment of the South African labour force contributed to low productivity and 
• • • • C' I 179 lllcreaslllg trallllllg costs lor emp oyers. 
Skills shortages were exacerbated by the impact of military conscription of whites on 
the economy. Up to July 1989 national servicemen had to serve two years military 
service followed by 60 days a year for 12 years. I80 A further problem was the 'brain 
drain'. Old Mutual was affected by this and noted in its history that many skilled 
people emigrated as they feared the future of the country under apartheid. 181 Industry 
176 Ibid, p.524. 
J77 A Commission appointed in 1977 to investigate the wider labour reforms that were proposed by 
business. 
178 Ibid, pp.89-95 
179 Ibid,pp. 89-95. 
180 Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Council Meeting, 22.2.90, Submission to the van 
Loggerenberg Committee on Nationalising the Military Commitment of Conscription, Annexure to 
Minutes, p.24. 











sought to overcome the skills shortage by substituting capital for labour, but this 
created problems for industry in raising additional capital to finance the cost of the 
new machinery and equipment. 182 
Wood and Glaister commented on the rapid growth in manufacturing in the 1980s 
which was halted by a growing skills shortage. Apartheid had opened increasing 
opportunities for the upward mobilisation of whites. This allowed skilled white 
workers to enter supervisory and administrative positions. Black labour was not 
effectively utilised owing to racial discrimination and the chronic lack of adequate 
training. The introduction of import substitution led to the creation of highly capital 
intensive and inefficient industries, with high production costs. These industries were 
dependent on the imports of machinery and raw materials, funded by gold exports. 
Because of the skill shortage, the apartheid government had to gradually allow 
coloureds and Indians to move into jobs, previously only occupied by whites. This 
was followed by a general relaxation of the colour bar and the de-racialisation of 
industrial relation legislation. The latter resulted in the increasing number of blacks 
moving into semi -skilled occupations by the late 1980s.183 Prior to the 1980s blacks 
were generally relegated to low-wage and unskilled occupations and productivity was 
increased by the use of a greater number of cheap unskilled labour, rather than by 
expanding the pool of skilled labour. The colour bar collapsed in the 1980s and 
thereafter there was a gradual skilling of the black labour force. By the mid-1990s, the 
majority of blacks in the mining and manufacturing sector were at least semi-
skilled. 184 Both Bonner and Maree noted the increase in black wages, after 1974, due 
182 Feinstein, An Economic History of South Africa, p.222. 
183 Wood and Glaister, Competitiveness and Participation - Evidence from South Africa, pp.13-14. See 
records in Salt River Labour Research Service. 1988. 'Operatives Wages: April 1987 - March 1988'. 
Labour Research Service. 1990. 'Operatives Wages: April 1989 - March, 1990. 
184 Salt River Labour Research Service. 1988. 'Operatives Wages: April 1987 - March 1988,' Salt River. 











to a range of reasons. The gold price windfall enabled the mines to increase wages in 
order to make greater use of South African labour. Migrant labour from Mozambique 
seemed less certain after independence, and the Banda regime stopped Malawians 
working on gold mines. There was also the knock-on effect of the 1973 strikes in the 
Durban area, which resulted in wage increases in that area. Management was forced to 
change their attitude as a result of strikes and union activity.18s Wages also rose, not so 
much as a result of labour shortages, but because of the need for skilled labour. 
Emolment of blacks in education had increased by 20% per annum after 1972 and 
state spending on black education increased significantly, which was part of the 
process of skilling blacks, and led to their moving upwards into higher semi -skilled 
and skilled occupational categories. 186 The rise in black wages also led to the move to 
more capital intensive production, which caused productivity gains, and in turn 
I d
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185 P. Bonner. 'Overview: Strikes and the Independent Trade Unions,' in Maree (ed.), The 
Independent Trade Unions. p.32. 
186 J.Hofmeyr, 'The Rise of African Wages 1974-1985,' pp.198-215. 











(d) GROUP AREAS ACT 
This act was described by Bunting as establishing racial ghettos in which ownership 
and occupation ofland was restricted to a certain population group. 188 The terms of 
reference of a Technical Committee set up in 1981 to investigate the Group Areas Act 
and other legislation said that: 'The South African community can best be ordained 
and served on a basis of our traditional way of life of residential separation' .189 To 
achieve the objects of the Act hundreds of thousands of people were moved from their 
homes to other areas. 190 
In terms of this legislation the central business districts of many towns in the Cape 
were closed to coloured and Indian businesses. There were also severe restrictions on 
blacks trading; they were also not allowed to trade in white areas, and in 1963, blacks 
trading in their own areas were restricted to one-man shops and prohibited from 
trading in anything but "daily domestic necessities". It is remarkable that the black 
trading community survived and expanded, but between 1977 and 1980 most of the 
restrictions on black trading were relaxed. The difficulties confronting non-white 
businessmen were exacerbated by the establishment of supermarkets on the 
boundaries of the non-white areas. 191 Dr.Sam Motsuenyane, the president of the 
National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC), said at a function in 
Johannesburg in April 1987 that :'Ifthe future of the free enterprise system in South 
Africa was to be preserved, government and the private sector would have to work 
towards integrating Africans in the mainstream of commerce and industrial life'. 192 
Rosholt, chairman of Barlows, said at the same function that blacks perceived big 
188 Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, p.161. 
189 Report of the Technical Committee of Enquiry into the Group Areas, 1966, The Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act, 1953 and Related Legislation, p.l. 
190 Bunting. The Rise of the South African Reich, p.161. 
191 Davenport, South Africa, A Modern History, pp. 514-515. 











business as an extension of government. 193 Overall coloured and Indian businessmen 
were very critical of the application of apartheid policies to their businesses. The 
Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa (ASSOCOM) pressed for free 
trading areas in evidence to the Technical Committee referred to above, as the 
restrictions in place on free trading were not conducive to the growth of business 
throughout the country. The Cape Town Chamber of Commerce was severely critical 
of the declaration of the centre of Cape Town as a white area and complained about 
the effect this action had on Indian and coloured businesses. They wrote a letter 
complaining about this in April 1964 to the local Group Areas Committee. 194 
The government had established open trading areas in 1983 to accommodate 
disqualified traders who due to lack of trading potential, could not be settled in their 
own group areas. Such open trading areas did not at that time exist in the Western 
Cape,195 another adverse factor affecting Western Cape business. By 1986 there had 
been a change and free trade areas had been opened in Cape Town in the City Centre, 
Wynberg, Claremont and Sea Point, though not in adjoining areas, a matter of concern 
to the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, 196 The Chamber addressed a letter to the 
Cape Town City Council on 20 April 1989 supporting the initiative of the City in 
approaching government to declare the City an open area and to rescind the 
application of the Group Areas Act to the City of Cape Town. 197 
The Group Areas Act provided opportunity for property developers and estate agents 
to purchase properties very cheaply in coloured areas and Simon also noted that many 
193 Ibid, p.385. 
194 Commercial Opinion, April, 1964, p.7. 
195 Report of the Technical Committee of Enquiry into the Group Areas, 1966, The Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act, 1953 and Related Legislation.l...pp.12.17. 
196 Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Council Meeting, 27.11.86. p.57. 












whites made substantial profits out of Group Areas Act removals. 198 Krawitz, of Cape 
Union Mart, said that the major impact of the Group Areas Act was to move the poor 
far from their work. Initially government subsidised the additional costs, but this did 
not last and employers had to meet the additional transport costS.199 Professor 
Giliomee shared this view and said that the Group Areas Act moved the poor far from 
their places of employment, in contrast to the position, elsewhere in the world, where 
generally the poor lived close to their work. 200 Shell could not own property in non-
white areas, but they overcame this by trading through dealer-owned sites. 20t By 
virtue of the Group Areas Act, the trading activities of major supermarket chains', 
such as Pick'n Pay, were restricted to only 40% of the country. In addition the act 
restricted their financing of houses for managers of colour.202 Ackerman of Pick n'Pay 
was in favour of a 99 year lease for blacks in white areas, and discussed this proposal 
with Prime Minister Vorster. Ackerman was of the view that this proposal could 
stabilise the position in black areas?03 
198 Simon, 'Crisis and Change in South Africa, Implications for the Apartheid City, pp.191. 
199 Interview with Krawitz on 5.4.2006, Annexure E. 
200 Interview with Giliomee on 3l.3.2007, Annexure E. 
201 Interview with Drake on 8.9.2006, Annexure E. 
202 Interview with Ackerman on 24.10.2006, Annexure E. 











(e) COLOURED LABOUR PREFERENCE POLICY 
One ofthe distinguishing features of Western Cape society and politics was the 
coloured labour preference policy. This policy was a component of the National Party 
government's apartheid policy. It was announced by the Secretary of Native Affairs, 
W.W. Eiselen, in January 1955.204 The first goal of the policy was to prevent the 
movement of blacks to the Western Cape, and secondly it was hoped that it would 
bolster the participation of coloureds in the Western Cape economy and protect them 
from competition from blacks. In the view of Humphries there was a further implicit, 
rather than explicit, goal which was to preserve the Western Cape as one area of South 
Africa where whites were numerically superior. This was linked to the bizarre 
proposal of partitioning South Africa. 205 The impact of this policy can be seen in the 
employment data for the manufacturing, water and gas sectors for the Cape Peninsula 
for the period from 1961 to 1980?06 
204 Eiselen justified the policy by stating that: 'The coloureds as a local population have a moral right 
to demand that their workers' interests be protected against the natives". He also said that 'Early 
termination of the symbiosis between Coloureds and native is advisable as it has a demoralising 
effect on both'; See M. West, 'From Pass Courts to Deportation: Changing Patterns ofInflux 
Control in Cape Town,' pp.463-4). 
205 R. Humphries, 'Administrative Politics and the Coloured Labour Preference Policy during the 
1960s,' in w.G.. James and M. Simons (Eds) The Angry Divide, p.180. 
206 W. A. van der Westhuizen, Employment Data for the Manufacturing. Water, Gas Sectors, Western 











Details are as follows (table 5): 
TABLE 5: TOTAL EMPLOYED 
YEAR WHITE COLOURED/INDIAN BLACK 
1961 30059 73224 23038 
1965 34944 103739 27157 
1970 40508 134007 27879 
1975 44009 157083 29277 
1980 39796 155612 22894 
Minister Coetzee announced on 21 December 1966 that each year the number of 
blacks employed in the Western Cape was to be reduced by an average of 5%, a 
policy to apply only to contract workers. In a previous statement he said that the black 
labour complement of Western Cape employers was to be 'frozen' as from 31 August 
1966.207 
The implementation of the policy resulted in a freeze on black family housing, and 
was accompanied by strict and harsh implementation of the influx control legislation. 
The Western Cape was the first area where passes for black women were required. 
There was a shift in the area to the use of migrant labour, a very cumbersome 
procedure for employers in the Western Cape if they wished to employ black labour. 
They had to obtain a certificate from the Department of Labour that stated that there 
was no suitable coloured labour available, then had to present the certificate to the 
local black Labour Officer, who had to see if qualified local black people were 
available. before authorising the recruiting of migrant black labour. Although the 











system was harshly enforced for more than a quarter of a century, the flow of blacks 
to the Western Cape was not reversed and there were a large number of blacks 
working illegally in the Western Cape.20B The strain this legislation placed on black 
employees and their families and on employers cannot be measured. West said that 
there were an estimated quarter of a million pass arrests in the area from 1967 to 1975 
and in 1980 alone 16327 were arrested. During that year R283576 was paid in fines 
by blacks illegally in Cape Town. 209 
As part of the National Party's policy regarding blacks in the Western Cape, Piet 
Koorhof announced in 1983 that all blacks in the Cape Peninsula are to be relocated to 
Khayelitsha, a new township 35 kilometres from Cape Town. The announcement was 
greeted with disbelief. It would create anger and bitterness in the settled communities 
at Guguletu, Nyanga and Langa and there was a tendency to dismiss the whole 
exercise as bureaucratic madness. Van Niekerk said that: 'Surely not even the 
Nationalist government in these times of 'reform' - and on the doorstep of the 
country's largest metropolitan area - contemplate uprooting and resettling more than 
200000 people'. He also said that the plan could be seen as being consistent with 
official attitudes and actions against blacks in the area and could be interpreted as the 
'final solution' ?IO 
Furthermore the particularly harsh application of influx control in the area, as seen in 
the endless pass raids, was not an aberration of the official policy of influx control, 
but reflected a particular regional condition. Influx control and pass laws were 
cornerstones of apartheid and had three distinct aims: labour control, containment of 
the black population within the Bantustans and national security. All three were 
208 M.West, 'From Pass Laws to Deportation: Changing Patterns ofInflux Control in Cape Town,' 
pA64. 
209 G.P. Cook, 'Khayelitsha: Policy Change or Crisis Response?,' p.SS. 











present in the influx control policies in the Western Cape, and are exemplified by the 
creation of Khayelitsha. 2II The policy was implemented with the vague proviso that 
its effect would not be detrimental to the economy of the Western Cape. In 1982 Fanie 
Botha, Minister of Manpower, told a meeting of business leaders in Cape Town that 
there was a shortage of unskilled labour in the Cape Peninsula, unique in a country 
where there is so much unemployment. He also said that the Western Cape is 
stagnating, but he was not sure as to how much this was due to an artificial shortage 
of certain kinds of labour, or how much it was due to other factors, such as distance 
from the economic centre. 
What irritated the business community at that time was that 3000 applications to 
employ blacks in the Cape Peninsula were turned down whereas, in the rural areas of 
the Western Cape not a single application to employ 59000 blacks was refused. 
According to van Niekerk the continuation of this policy was due to the intransigent 
attitude of the Cape Nationalist Members of Parliament, and their desire to maintain 
the Western Cape as a white homeland, where blacks would always be in the minority. 
The chief proponent of the coloured labour preference policy was Alex van Breda, 
Member of Parliament, who said that: 'The policy is designed to protect the coloured 
in his natural habitat': the stumbling block to scrapping the coloured labour 
preference policy was the apartheid hard-liners, who allowed their racist ideology to 
. h f f . 212 get In t e way 0 ree enterpnse. 
The policy was again referred to in the White Paper on the Report by an Inter-
Departmental Committee on the Decentralisation of Industries issued in 1972. In this 
document reference was made on the one hand to the importance of industrial 
211 Ibid, pAS. 











development proceeding with the least possible obstruction, but on the other hand it 
recorded that the employment of blacks in the Western Cape was to be relatively 
restricted. In the words of the White Paper: 'This area (Western Cape) must be looked 
on as mainly the employment sphere of the whites and coloureds and the industrial 
develop,ment in the area will have to be adjusted to this pattern of labour supply'. 213 
This policy remained in force until September 1984.214 The Western Cape Association 
of Local Bantu Administrators reported that: 'Unless a limitation is to be placed on 
the economic development of the region, that serious problems in the successful 
implementation of the policy can be expected in the present and immediate future,.215 
Wesgro noted that the systematic restriction of black migration to the Western Cape 
slowed population growth and curtailed the supply of (low-wage) unskilled labour. 216 
The problems that the coloured labour preference policy and job reservation created 
for commerce and industry in the Western Cape were enormous, as recorded in the 
minutes of the meeting of the Council of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce held 
on 9 February 1967. when a member raised a concern in that his company was not 
allowed to employ black drivers notwithstanding the fact that suitable coloured 
drivers were not available?17 Further, at a meeting of Council of the Chamber held on 
8 October 1970, it was noted that there were problems in getting permits for black 
drivers when coloured drivers were not available. At that meeting it was also reported 
that this was a long standing complaint. 218 In the Chamber of Commerce's Annual 
report for 1973174 it recorded that: 'Official restrictions on the employment of non-
213 White Paper on the Report by the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Decentralisation of 
Industry, p, I O. 
214 Humphries,' Administrative Politics and the Coloured Preference Policy during the 1960s,' in 
James and Simon, _p.180 
215 Ibid,p.178. 
216 Bridgman et ai, South Africa's Leading Edge?., p.42. 
217 Cape Town Chamber Of Commerce, Council Meeting. 9.2.67, p.456. 











whites and lack of training facilities lead to a shortage of skilled and semi -skilled 
workers'. In this report it also noted that immigration was not meeting the need. 219 At 
a meeting of the council of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce held on 24 
February 1977, concern was expressed as to the lack of training facilities for blacks 
who were only expected to do labouring work, which were the only jobs government 
would let them do in the Western Cape. 220 At a meeting of the Council of the Chamber 
held on 25 August 1977 it was reported that blacks could only be employed in the 
Cape in exceptional circumstances and that the authorities regularly refused to grant 
certificates to employ blacks, particularly if they were contract workers.22I The 
Chamber also raised concerns in the Annual Reports for 197617 and 1978/9 that the 
coloured labour preference policy had an adverse effect on the employment 
opportunities of blacks and also on their living conditions and this, in the view of the 
Chamber, was a matter of urgency and needed action, if social stability was to be 
assured. 222 The concerns of the members of the Chamber as to the impact of 
apartheid on their labour supply continued and they proposed a motion to the Cape 
Regional Congress of Assocom on 20 July 1978 calling for blacks to be permitted to 
compete for jobs in the Western Cape on an equal basis with other work seekers in the 
area. 223 Above all business needed stable social conditions to prosper and even to 
surVIve. 
Whilst the Cape Chamber of Industries (CeI) found in a survey conducted amongst 
its members that in 1969 there was no evidence that job reservation as such had 
219 Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Annual Report, 197617, p.l, 1973/4, p.l. 
220 Cape Town Chamber of Commerce Council Meeting, 24.2.77, pA87. 
221 Cape Town Chamber of Commerce Council Meeting, 25.8.77, p.22. 
m Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Annual Report, 1978/9, p.9. 











adversely affected the labour position in the Western Cape. 224 It was concerned as to 
the impact that the coloured preference labour policy had on the Western Cape. The 
ccrs views on the effects of job reservation was not shared by the Cape Town 
Chamber of Commerce, who called for the removal of job reservation225 . In the words 
of the President of the Chamber in 1962 the government should remove job 
reservation and its implications: 'Which deter private enterprise from playing its part 
fully in raising the living standards of our people' ,226 and in an address by the 
President of the Chamber in 1959 he said that: 'Job reservation was morally wrong 
and economically indefensible' .227 
The CCl conducted the survey referred to above in October, 1969 and said that 85.7% 
of members participating in the survey had difficulties in filling labour requirements 
in the following areas: professional and semi-professional categories, administrative 
and clerical (both higher and lower levels), skilled trades, operators and semi -skilled 
workers, and unskilled workers.228 The Cel also noted in the survey that there were 
certain types of work that coloured males are unwilling to undertake and where black 
employees are essential. Some of these categories were handling goods in cold 
storage, loading and unloading coal, night watchmen, stevedoring, handling heavy 
bales of materials, concreting, general quarry work, and a number of other activities 
requiring physical strength. Of the participants in the survey, 68% said that for certain 
224 Cape Chamber of Industries, Report of the Chamber of Industries' Labour and Non-European 
Affairs Committee on an Investigation of Labour Shortage in the Western Cape in Industry and 
Related Matters, p.18. 
225 Commercial Opinion, April, ] 964, p.7~ June, 1964, p.7. 
226 Commercial Opinion, June, 1962, p.5. 
227 Commercial Opinion, May, 1959, p.7. 
228 Cape Chamber of Industries, Report of the Chamber ofIndustries' Labour and Non-European 
Affairs Committee on an Investigation of Labour Shortage in the Western Cape in Industry and 











types of work coloureds were unsuitable and black workers were essential. 229 In 
addition the participants said that: 'Bantu are regarded as essential for "heavy" and 
"unpleasant" work'. The survey also noted that: 'Coloureds are unwilling to undertake 
heavy, unpleasant and monotonous work' ?30 In the report on the survey the CCI asked 
for a relaxation of government policy to bridge the gap between current unskilled 
labour policies and the projected coloured population increase. This survey was 
conducted in 1969, but a number of years were to pass before the law was to change. 
There has been much criticism of business on its approach to apartheid, but there is no 
doubt that the coloured labour preference policy had a major impact on business and 
commerce and industry in the Western Cape. The report on the survey did not call for 
the abandonment of government policy, but flexible application of the policy.231 The 
CCI did not want to upset the government, but it did raise its concerns during 1971 at 
a meeting with the heads of six government departments, stating in their view that the 
decentralisation concessions would not work and there was a need for black labour in 
the Western Cape?32 Pretorius referred to the cautious attitude of the Federated 
Chamber ofIndustries (FCI) and noted that the director of the FCI in 1976 reaffirmed 
the organisation's traditional inclination against public intervention in political 
issues.233 The CCI referred, in its Year Book for 1978179, to the difficulties in getting 
a certificate that coloured labour was not available, when an employer wished to 
employ black labour,234 and by 1981 the shortage of skilled labour was still a major 
c29 Cape Chamber of Industries, Report of the Chamber of Industries' Labour and Non-European 
Affairs Committee on an Investigation of Labour Shortage in the Western Cape in Industry and 
Related Matters, pp.12-13. 
230 Ibid, p.24. 
231 Cape Chamber of Industries, Report of the Chamber of Industries' Labour and Non-European_ 
Affairs Committee on an Investigation of Labour Shortage in the Western Cape in Industry and 
Related Matters. p.24. 
m Cape Chamber of Industries, Year Book, 1971172, p.IS. 
233 L. Pretorius, 'The Head of Government and Organised Business: pp.:?24-225. 











problem for industry in the Western Cape, creating bottlenecks in the area's economic 
235 progress .. 
The Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, at a Regional Congress of Chambers of 
Commerce in the Western Cape held in September 1962, called for industrial, 
commercial and other undertakings, including the hotel industry, not be deprived of 
'Bantu' labour, while alternative labour was not available. This resolution was 
adopted by the Congress. 236 Even as late as 1985 the urgent need to provide 
employment for urban blacks in the Western Cape was raised at a meeting of the 
Council of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce.237 
On the practical side, Neate, Chairman and Managing Director ofIrnperial Cold 
Storage, said that the major impact of the coloured labour preference policy was that it 
created major difficulties for the company in obtaining milk deliverers: at that time 
door-to-door delivery of milk was used, and it was only with great difficulty, much 
effort and long meetings with government representatives, that they were able to 
employ black milk deliverers. 238 In a case study on Crons Dairies, in the Western 
Cape, Cronwright noted that whilst the coloured labour preference policy was 
introduced in 1955, the milk industry did not experience problems in obtaining labour 
at that stage. Later the controls were more strictly enforced. Black labour had to be 
authorised by the City Council, but Crons Dairies still experienced no difficulty in 
obtaining black labour. The establishment of the Black Affairs Administration Boards 
in 1972 brought about stricter controls, with a one-year contract labour system. The 
severity of the restrictions on the employment of black labour was exemplified by the 
controls introduced in 1977, whereby, unless the worker had been previously 
235 Cape Chamber oflndustries~ Year Book~ 1981/82, p.9. 
236 Commercia1 Opinion, September, 1962, p.5. 
237 Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Council Meeting, 19.9.1985, p.38. 











employed by the same employer, he/she could not be re-employed. It was alleged that 
this measure was introduced due to the large number of blacks, who were 'qualified' 
to be in the Western Cape, but who were unemployed. The tightening of the controls 
with introduction of the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards, combined with the 
'Africanisation' of the administration in the Transkei, resulted in delays of up to three 
months in obtaining clearance for black workers to return to a dairy. In fact workers 
had to be personally fetched from the Transkei in times of labour shortages in the 
dairy industry. From 1908 (when company was established) to 1977 Crons Dairies 
never had to use the local labour bureau for recruitment purposes. All labour was 
obtained by word of mouth, with a waiting list, but with the introduction of the 
restrictions in 1977, this all changed. For Crons Dairies there was the prospect that the 
type of labour traditionally used in the industry would not be available. With new 
blood not available, and urban blacks and coloureds not interested in early morning 
shift-work, the future of the home delivery of milk seemed likely not to continue, and 
h·· h d "39 t IS IS W at occurre .-
Krawitz of Cape Union Mart said that his company was severely affected by the 
coloured labour preference policy. He said that the coloured community was not keen 
on jobs requiring manual labour. There was a large pool of blacks available, but it was 
a major administrative burden to get permits, which were needed to employ them. 
There was even a service industry which assisted businesses to obtain permits. 24o 
Professor Thomas said that there was a stigma in the coloured community in 
undertaking manual labour and the business community were forced to apply to 
government to employ blacks.24I Drake of Shell, said that job reservation and the 
239 R. Cronwright, 'The Changing Techniques of Milk Distribution Industry over the Past 30 Years and 
the Consequent Labour Implications,' pp.5 J -52. 
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coloured labour preference policy did not have a major impact on Shell. The oil 
industry, other than its mining operations, was capital intensive, and if they 
experienced skill shortages they could always import skills from the overseas 
resources in the international Shell group. As far as the Western Cape was concerned 
they did not have plants in the area, their major depots being at Alberton in the 
Transvaal and at Durban, with their refinery in Nata1.242 Marcus of Marcus Medical 
said that the coloured labour preference policy did not have any impact on the 
company.243 Ackerman said that job reservation and the coloured labour preference 
policy made it difficult to run a business,244 and Gerald Shaw, who held senior 
editorial posts with the Cape Times, said that they had difficulty in employing black 
journalists, as they could not obtain the authority of the authorities to employ these 
. 1· 245 Journa IStS. 
With regard to job reservation, and in particular the coloured labour preference policy 
in the Western Cape, Giliomee said that these policies were purely ideological and 
politicaL and that the coloured labour preference did not succeed in stemming the 
flow of black immigration to the Western Cape and created a skills shortage and by 
the mid-1970s coloureds were being more and more used in administrative 
. . 246 
posItIOns. 
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(f) DECENTRALISATION POLICY 
In 1972 in a White Paper on the report of an Inter-Departmental Committee on 
Decentralisation of Industry, the government stated that it attached great importance 
to a high, but balanced rate of economic progress for South Africa. It noted in the 
White Paper that, without a decentralisation policy, economic development would 
only take place in existing developed centres. The White Paper recorded that: 
For economic, social and political reasons, however, it is necessary that 
economic development should also take place within or near the areas with 
large non-white population concentrations, especially Bantu. 
The White Paper stressed that the manufacturing sector would play an important role. 
It stated that the process of decentralisation should not harm development in white 
areas. 247 
Van Zyl commented that political considerations were paramount in the efforts to 
develop the Bantustans economically.248 The decentralisation policy was all part of the 
grand apartheid plan to relocate the blacks to the Bantustans areas, regardless of the 
cost to the state or the human distress it caused. In van Zyl's words: 'It was hoped that 
industrial decentralisation would actually reverse the black rural-urban migration' ,249 
but this was a forlorn hope. As Houghton said: 'Industrialisation of the African areas 
are absolutely essential to the success of the scheme of separate development'. 250 The 
attraction of industries to the Bantustans and border areas would impact adversely on 
the Western Cape. Even if it tried to attract industries to the border areas, the 
government assured their support base, the whites, that their sphere of employment 
247 White Paper on the Report by the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Decentralisation of 
Industries. p.l. 
248 Van Zyl, 'Industrial Decentralisation, Homeland Poverty and Urban Growth: Review and 
Appraisal,' p.l. 
249 Ibid. p.3. 











would be protected. 251 The government was aware that a problem might arise in 
providing employment for coloureds in the Western Cape, but in the White Paper on 
the Report by the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Decentralisation oflndustry 
they did not, at this stage, recommend the establishment in the Western Cape of any 
growth points, that would enjoy decentralisation benefits. 252 
The basis of the government's policy was that the blacks should live and work in the 
Bantustans and every effort must be made to provide employment for the maximum 
number of blacks in or near their Bantustan. Accordingly in terms of this policy, 
industrial growth should be diverted from existing development areas. The use of 
black labour in Bantustan areas would be subjected to fewer restrictions than those 
that applied in existing developed areas, to the extent of allowing blacks to do more 
skilled work.253 
The White Paper also stated that the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources 
Act of 1967 decreed that blacks might not be employed in new industries in white 
areas without the approval of the Minister, and that existing industries in those areas 
might not increase their black labour force unless the Minister agreed. 254 This 
legislation, in conjunction with Physical Planning Act No.88 of 1967, which 
controlled the use and zoning of industrial land, also placed restrictions on the 
creation of jobs for blacks in metropolitan areas. 255 The Physical Planning Act 
restricted the expansion of labour intensive industries in the main urban areas. Almost 
all the firms that moved to growth points did so because of incentives, and more than 
251 White Paper on the Report by the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Decentralisation of 
Industries, p.2. 
252 Ibid, pp.2-3. 
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254 Ibid, p.9. 
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50% of firms in growth points depended on subsidies in order to survive. Firms being 
subsidised had fewer incentives to produce goods cost-effectively. The weak economy 
in the 1970s onwards, high costs and difficulties in importing new machinery, 
influenced conglomerates towards acquisitions, mergers and rationalisation, rather 
than expanding into new industries.256 
The Minister could grant the following concessions: 
Cash grant to compensate industrialists for immediate and direct costs of 
removal of their factory and personnel; 
loans for land (excluding land within the Bantustans), buildings, plant and 
operating capital at interest rates from nil to the ruling bank lending rate; 
loans to a maximum of R15000 per dwelling for white key personnel, these 
loans to be repayable over 20 years, with interest charged at 2.5% below the 
official building societies' lending rate; 
railage rebate of up to 15%; 
on goods manufactured in the Transkeil Ciskei and shipped through East 
London, a rebate of 25% on port charges; 
a price preference of up to 5% on State tenders; 
and tax concessions providing for a reduction in tax payable over seven to ten 
years, and increased tax investment allowances over those enjoyed by other 
"-7 taxpayers .• :> 
These concessions were not highly successful in attracting industries to the border 
areas, mainly due to the fact that the concessions were inadequate to compensate for 
256 M. Addleson, 'Decentralisation Incentives, Industrialists Plans and the Location of Manufacturing 
Activity,' pp.174-186. 












the benefits effect of investing in the metropolitan areas,258 notwithstanding the views 
of Dr. P.L.Rautenberg of the government, who said that industrial decentralisation was 
I'fi d '59 an unqua I Ie success.--
In 1982 these concessions were increased to make it even more attractive to 
industrialists to invest in the Bantustan areas. The changes were: 
rail rebates now 40 - 60%; 
employment incentives for 7 years, 80-95% of total wage bill to be paid by the 
state, with a maximum amount per worker, per month ofR30-RII 0; 
rental and interest subsidy of 15 - 80% per month for 10 years; housing 
subsidy of 20 - 40% of interest rate; training grants; 
relocation allowances; and 
price preferences on tenders of 4 - 10%. 
In the 1984/85 financial year the government proposed to spend more than R250 
million on incentives for industrial decentralisation,26o but the Western Cape did not 
materially benefit. The approach to the migration of blacks to the cities was a carrot 
and stick approach. On the one hand there were the tax and other decentralisation 
concessions and on the other hand there was the Physical Planning and Utilisation of 
Resources Act, which created barriers to the employment of blacks in urban areas?61 
The Western Cape lost out on most of these material benefits. Wesgro commented in 
1992 that the strategy of industrial decentralisation had diverted development to the 
Bantustans areas away from the Western Cape. 262 
258 Van Zyl, 'Industrial Decentralisation, Homeland Poverty and Urban Growth: Review and 
Appraisal,' p.5 
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The only growth point that was established in the Western Cape was at Atlantis. When 
it was originally established in the 1970s industrialists took advantage of the generous 
decentralisation benefits; more than 108 large and small enterprises were set up, and 
another 24 enterprises were in the course of construction. It was, however, reported in 
1984 that Atlantis had been hard hit by the recession: factories were closing down, 
workers were working short-time and over 1500 workers had been retrenched. 
Unemployment in the government's showpiece had reached crisis proportions, and 
job prospects were poor. At least 12 factories had retrenched workers, closed or were 
working short-time. Those firms who had retrenched workers included Atlantic Diesel 
Engines (ADE), the major enterprise established at Atlantis. ADE, the largest 
employer in the area, was most severely affected by the recession. It was established 
in 1978 under the auspices of the Industrial Development Corporation, to manufacture 
truck and tractor engines with a capital outlay ofR400 million. Notwithstanding the 
backing it received, it was not able to make a profit. Over 1983 and 1984 it had 
retrenched one-third of its workforce. The manager of ADE explained the necessity of 
the retrenchments by blaming the general recession and the effect it had on the tractor 
and truck sector, the drought, the cancellation of contracts and the fact that they had 
been running at a loss. Generally the reasons given by other companies for 
retrenchments varied: contracts had been cancelled; interest rates had increased; 
competition from larger enterprises had caused smaller enterprises to close; and 
generally there was a shrinking market.263 Many completely uneconomic industries 
were established in the Bantustan areas, but enjoyed good profits due to these 
concessions. It appeared that the more inefficient these relocated industries were in 
controlling costs, the more profit they made. Whilst industries were attracted to the 











Bantustans areas, they were mostly of a fly-by-night nature and often relocated after 
h · . . d . d 264 t e mcentlve peno expIre . 
At a meeting of the Cape Town Chamber's Council held on 8 June 1967 it was noted 
that the Chamber had a meeting with the Minister of Planning, Dr de Wet, on 23 May 
1967. At that meeting the Chamber stressed that whilst the Chamber accepted the 
principle of decentralisation, its implementation had caused problems. Concern was 
also expressed as to the negative impact decentralisation would have on economic 
development. Dr. de Wet's response at the meeting was extremely negative in that he 
said that no useful purpose would be served in any prior discussion of the subject with 
the Chamber. as he knew Commerce's views and that the priority of the future of the 
country outweighed any economic considerations. He, however, also said that it was 
not the government's intention to curtail or hamper industrial development, but in his 
view labour could not be brought to industry, the reverse must apply. 265 The Cape 
Chamber of Industries at a Mid-Year General Meeting held on 28 July 1960 expressed 
concern at the decentralisation policies. They were of the view that these concessions 
could create industries with an unfair competitive advantage over existing industries. 
It was noted that the Prime Minister had said on 3 June 1960 that: 'A programme, 
which merely involves the large-scale transfer of existing factories from present 
industrial centres to centres in border areas, would have none of the stimulating and 
cumulative effects associated with economic development' .266 In practice in many 
cases this is what happened. Factories were merely moved from urban areas to border 
areas, and the decentralisation benefits were enjoyed. 
264 G. Maasdorp, 'Economic Survey, 1970-2000,' in S. Jones (ed.) The Decline of the South African 
Economy. p.12. 
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Bunting stated in the October 1968 issue of the journal Report from South Africa, 
that there were 300 factories in border areas employing 126000, but that these 
numbers were not impressive in comparison to the whole South African economy.267 
Whilst the results of the decentralisation policy were overall not impressive, they did 
divert investment from urban areas and as far as the Western Cape is concerned they 
obviously attracted investments away from that area. 
Krawitz of Cape Union Mart was of the view that the decentralisation benefits created 
an unsustainable business model. The government used business to achieve political 
ends and most of the assisted businesses did not survive. In addition they provided 
unfair competition to businesses in urban areas.268 Professor Hermann Giliomee said 
that the decentralisation policies, as applied in South Africa had not worked.269 In 
1970, the Volkshandel (organ of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the national 
Afrikaner business organisation) said that the decentralisation policy had caused a 
decline in investment in the industrial sector and could lead to stagnation in white 
urban areas. 270 Professor Thomas was of the view that the decentralisation benefits 
were disadvantageous to labour-intensive Western Cape industries. 27I Drake, of Shell, 
said that the financing of the Bantustans and the security establislunent and border 
industry incentives, diverted resources from education and other socio-economic 
needs?n 
There was doubt as to the effectiveness of the decentralisation benefits and Shaw 
referred to the Tomlinson Commission, set up in 1954 to investigate the socio-
economic development of the Bantustans, and to discussions he had had with Dr. 
267 Bunting, Rise of the South African Reich, p.SO 1. 
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Tomlinson, who said that even if white capital had poured into the Bantustan areas, 
and industries had been set up, the best hope there was that one-third of the rural 
population of the Bantustans would move into industry. Millions would have to be 
invested, and Shaw doubted that whites would have been prepared to make this 
sacrifice. Even then, no magisterial district in South Africa would have a majority of 
whites. 273 The Tomlinson Commission at the end of its report stated that: 
It is the conviction of the Commission that the development programme must 
be tackled in the spirit of an act of faith, in the same manner in which many 
other great undertakings in the Union have already been launched as acts of 
faith at times when the chances of success were at their minimum. 
The Commission also stated that: 'The choice is clear, either the challenge must be 
accepted, or the inevitable consequences of the integration of the Bantu and European 
population groups into a common society must be endured,.274 Holden was of the 
view that the evidence he had obtained on the efficiency of the decentralisation 
benefits was mixed. The estimates of output per unit in the Bantustans and the rest of 
South Africa, show that generally the infant industryargument 275 for protection was 
not valid for the period 1976 to 1979. His research suggested that if industry was 
being subsidised in order to eventually become efficient, the strategy would fail. The 
exception, he said, was Ciskei, which experienced a higher rate of growth of output 
than did the rest of South Africa. 276 Business enterprises were attracted to Ciskei 
because of its extremely generous tax regime, but whether the profits these businesses 
earned arose only from trade in the Ciskei is a moot point. 
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(g) OTHER EFFECTS OF APARTHEID 
Civil disturbances affected all the companies whose representatives were interviewed. 
particularly in the later years of apartheid, although Thomas said that the Western 
Cape was not as badly affected by civil disturbances as other parts of South Africa. 277 
Neate, of Imperial Cold Storage, said that apartheid brought stability to the country, 
but in later years it broke down.278 Marcus Medical had problems in their sales 
representatives going into certain areas to provide technical assistance. 279 
Giliomee said that if more liberal policies had been adopted in South Africa in the 
period of apartheid rule there would never have been stability. If the United Party had 
come into power in 1948, there would, in his view, not have been a stable 
environment in South Africa. He said that the United Party would have introduced a 
qualified franchise by the early 1960s. If this had occurred, the position in South 
Africa would have been very unsettled, somewhat like what occurred in Argentina. If 
the South African society had structurally changed in the 1970s, it would have faced 
the larger evil of communism.28o Shaw does not agree with this view, and said that the 
United Party had right-wing sentiments, particularly after the more liberal elements 
broke away to form the Progressive Party in 1959 and it was extremely unlikely that, 
if they were in power, they would have introduced a qualified franchise. 281 
Professor Giliomee was of the view that liberal policies would have resulted in 
tremendous costs in terms of stability. He did not accept the view that liberal policies 
always had a positive outcome, particularly in South Africa, which had come out of 
colonialism. In his view there would have been serious trouble in South Africa, if the 
transition to full democracy had occurred before the fall of communism. In Giliomee's 
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view there were fewer civil disturbances in the Cape than in the rest of the country 
during the period under review, and throughout South Africa civil disturbances were 
concentrated in short periods in the early 1960s, in 1974 and in the 1980s. 282 
One of the problems highlighted by Ackerman and BY Hirsch, of Walter Hirsch, was 
that top businessmen had to spend so much time away from their businesses in 
participating in community organisations, which were endeavouring to influence 
government to change the apartheid system. If their efforts had been employed in their 
companies they would have been so much more profitable.283 
Professor Giliomee said that there was less corruption under apartheid than there is 
now, as in those earlier years the Afrikaners had the ideal of apartheid, but later as 
their belief in the ideal faded, there was only greed. Government policies lost their 
moral foundation during the latter years of apartheid and the government had to 
evolve policies merely to survive. He referred to an article which recorded the views 
of a Polish visitor to South Africa in 1970, who said that the country was the least 
corrupt society he had visited. Giliomee was of the view that there had been a fall off 
in business morals and greed had created problems in South African society.284 Shaw 
said that no empirical data is available as to the extent of corruption in the apartheid 
period, as it was swept under the carpet, but towards the end of the apartheid years 
corruption raised its head, examples being the trial of Minister Piet du Plessis for 
corruption and Minister Fanie Botha's resignation under suspicious circumstances. 
For most of the time corruption was covered up, in contrast to the position now where 
corruption is widely reported on by the media, but he said that the culture of 
corruption continues under the new dispensation. Apartheid had left a legacy of low 
282 Interview with Gil iomee on 31.3.2007, Annexure E. 
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moral standards and business ethics had deteriorated and in the apartheid years respect 
for the law declined in the light of the repressive and illogical laws which were 
introduced. Shaw quoted the words of George Soros, the prominent and well known 
financier, who said that self-interest had been elevated to become a moral principle. 285 












SANCTIONS AND BOYCOTTS 
(a) HISTORY OF SANCTIONS 
The history of sanctions against South Africa began in 1946 when India imposed a comprehensive trac 
embargo against South Africa because of South Africa's domestic discrimination against Indians. In 
1954 India severed diplomatic ties with South Africa, as did African states as they became independen 
In 1954 Father Trevor Huddleston called for an international boycott of South Africa and in 1958 the 
President of the African National Congress (ANC) called for sanctions. ANC members who went into 
exile in London called for a boycott of South Africa, and in South Africa the Liberal Party supported t1 
call for a boycott. 286 This early boycott movement was not very successful and it was only in the late 
1 980s that sanctions began significantly to hurt the South African economy. After its establishment in 
1985, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), along with the National Council of 
Trade Unions (NACTU), moved to support full sanctions.287 It was accepted by the unions that 
sanctions would bring about hardships, but in their view unemployment and poverty would not be 
eliminated unless the economy was restructured, which could only occur if the regime was removed?8 
The position of COSATU and NACTU was significant in that it represented the view of an important 
sector of black South Africans.289 The churches in South Africa, excluding the Afrikaner churches, had 
been at the forefront of the calls for sanctions and disinvestment, particularly through the South Africa 
Council of Churches and the South African Catholic Bishops' Conference?90 
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Although South Africa's neighbouring states are economically linked to South Africa 
and in many cases dependent on South Africa for their economic survival, these states 
had repeatedly called for effective international sanctions. In the view of Seidman 
these countries could not achieve: 'national or regional development capable of 
providing productive employment opportunities and rising living standards for their 
citizens until South Africa's domination over Southern Africa ends'. 291 Seidman was 
not realistic if she expected the close economic links between South Africa and its 
neighbours, the Front Line States, to disappear, for trade links were strong and many 
of the inhabitants of these states worked in South Africa. In 1980 the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was formed by South Africa's 
neighbours to reduce their dependence on South Africa and SADCC' S support for 
sanctions from 1985 caused it to draw up contingency plans to contain the costs of 
sanctions to their economies.292 
Following the Sharpeville massacre the Anti-Apartheid Movement was founded in 
London and the American Committee on Africa began a sanction campaign in the 
United States. In 1962 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly called for 
diplomatic, economic and military sanctions against South Africa. Members were 
called on to break diplomatic ties with South Africa, to sever shipping and air links 
and to boycott South African trade. Britain and France abstained from the voting and 
without the support of the West nothing could be achieved. In order to enforce 
sanctions the approval of the UN Security Council was needed and in that body the 
Western Countries, who opposed sanctions, had a veto. 293 In response to increasing 
pressure the UN Security Council in 1963 adopted a voluntary arms embargo against 
South Africa. This arms embargo had varying degrees of compliance, but the United 
291 A. Seidman, 'Frontline States, Economic Dependence and Sanctions,' p.16. 
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States ended military sales to South Africa. South Africa's major trading partners were 
opposed to sanctions until well into the 19 80s. 294 
In 1963 the newly formed Organisation of African Union (OAU) excluded South 
Africa from membership and announced its support for sanctions. In 1964 Britain 
followed the United States' lead and banned arms exports to South Africa and in that 
year Japan banned direct investment in South Africa. In 1970 South Africa was 
expelled from the Olympic movement and some other governn1ents banned 
investments and loans to South Africa. In 1973 the Arab countries instituted an oil 
embargo against South Africa and in 1974 South Africa was suspended from the UN 
General Assembly. In 1977 the UN imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South 
Africa and in that same year a number of United States' universities and colleges 
adopted policies in favour of disinvesting in South Africa and the Sullivan Principles 
were drafted. These laid down rules for the non-racial corporate behaviour of 
American companies in South Africa. Similar codes were adopted in Europe and 
Canada. Against much of world opinion the Reagan administration adopted a 
'constructive engagement' policy with South Africa, including the relaxation of 
previous sanctions. The West saw South Africa as a bulwark against communism and 
did not want to see it collapse. 
Pressures from all quarters of the world increased following the widespread uprisings 
from 1984 onwards and in 1984 the UN Security Council prohibited members from 
entering into any new nuclear-related contracts with South Africa. In 1985 Chase 
Manhattan Bank and other United States banks refused to roll over their loans to 
South Africa, causing a financial crisis in South Africa and a collapse of the South 
African currency. and this lead to South Africa declaring a moratorium on repaying its 
294 N. C. Crawford & A. Klotz (eds), How Sanctions Work, p.283; M.R. Doxey, International Sanctions 











overseas debt. The mass insurrections in the 1980s also resulted in more unrest and 
the trade unions adopted a more politically outspoken stance. 295 The nature of South 
Africa's debt had changed. Before 1970 the largest component of capital inflows was 
short-term investment. Between 1970 and 1980 and again from 1983 to 1985, there 
was an outflow of short-term capital, which was compensated by increasing long-term 
capital inflows. Borrowing by the authorities for balance of payment purposes played 
a subordinate roll in the 1950s and 1960s, but in the 1970s they increased as a source 
of finance and they dominated capital flows in the 1980s.296 
More and more countries were imposing sanctions, and in 1985 the British 
Commonwealth passed an initial package of sanctions against South Africa. Only 
limited sanctions were agreed to, after opposition from Britain. These included a ban on 
Kruger Rand imports, enforcement of the UN arms embargo, a sports boycott, a ban on 
the sale of computer equipment, nuclear items and technology and crude oil. This was 
later followed by a ban on air links, a ban on new investments or re-investment of 
profits earned in South Africa and a ban on the importation of South African 
agricultural products. Further, it included the termination of Double Tax Agreements,297 
the ending of government assistance to, investment in, and trade with South Africa, a 
ban on government procurement in South Africa, a ban on government contracts with 
majority-owned South Africa companies and a ban on the promotion of tourism to 
South Africa. 
The major step in the escalation of sanctions was the passing by the United States 
Congress of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986. This included 
substantially the same stipulations as that of the Commonwealth and the European 
295 Baskin, Striking Back: A History of COSATU, p. 7. 
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Community and was passed, notwithstanding President Reagan's veto. In terms of this 
act the Sullivan Principles were made mandatory for United States companies operating 
in South Africa. The Act provided that further sanctions could be invoked if substantial 
progress had not been made within twelve months. These additional sanctions were: 
prohibition on the importation of steel from South Africa, prohibition of military 
assistance to those countries who circumvented the arms embargo against South Africa, 
prohibition on the importation from South Africa of food, agricultural products, 
diamonds and textiles, prohibition of US banks accepting, receiving or holding deposit 
accounts from South African nationals and the prohibition on the importation into the 
US of strategic materials from South Africa. 298 
Whenever there were civil disturbances in South Africa, the call for punitive action and 
sanctions against South Africa intensified. The Sharpeville massacre was followed by 
the establishment of the Anti- Apartheid Movement and the American Committee on 
Africa, which began a sanction campaign. The Soweto riots in 1976 resulted in 
increased calls for sanctions, but South Africa's major trading partners resisted the call 
for sanctions. until the 1980s, when the riots in the country forced Britain to introduce 
limited sanctions. As noted above, the major turning point was the United States' 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. The world at large condemned South 
Africa's apartheid policies. Mc Dermott said that sanctions have a discontinuous effect: 
when applied weakly, they worsen the problem; but when applied strongly, they may 
4": hI' . h h . 299 Lorce t e exp Oltmg group to c ange t elr ways. 
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(b) EFFECT OF SANCTIONS 
(i) TRADE 
One of the major consequences of apartheid policies on business in South Africa, and 
particularly in the Western Cape in particular, was the imposition of sanctions against 
South Africa and the various overseas consumer boycotts of South African products. 
This affected the Western Cape particularly as the economy was dependent on the 
export of agricultural products (fruit and wine) and on the tourist trade. The 
interdependence between South Africa and the international community is very 
evident in the economic sphere and thus the South African economy was the main 
target of those opponents of its policies who sought to isolate it. 300 The table that may 
be found in Annexure B gives a summary of trade sanctions against South Africa in 
force in 1988.30I Oeldenhuys records that agricultural products accounted for 6% of 
South Africa's exports in 1988, most of these emanating from the Western Cape. 
Whilst sanctions did not stop South Africa from trading, they imposed greater costs of 
trading, eroded foreign confidence and caused the loss of export markets which would 
not be easy to regain. 302 The impact of sanctions on South Africa led to the use of 
false labels as to the origin of exports, and to export being made via a neighbouring 
country, which country was recorded on the label as the country of origin. These 
tactics to avoid the stigma of a South African label came at a cost and reduced the 
exporter's profit margin. The Cape Town Chamber of Commerce in its Annual 
Reports for 1984/85 and 1985/86 expressed its concern as to the direct boycott of 
South African products.303 The South African Federated Chamber of Industries' (FCI) 
report on the State President's Conference held on 7 November 1986 said that the 
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government did not appreciate or understand the impact of sanctions on South 
Africa's export trade.304 The growth of exports for goods and services, in real terms, 
showed an increase of 4.6% from 1961 to 1970 and 2.4% from 1971 to 1980, but a 
decrease of 1 % from 1981 to 1984.305 Whilst the decease in the latter period could be 
accounted for by weakening world trade, nevertheless apartheid played its role. In 
2002 Everett recorded that Scandinavian and Japanese sanctions appear to have had 
little effect on South African exports, but exports to the United States were cut by a 
third as a result of sanctions. Some estimates suggested that the European Union (EU) 
ban on South African imports cut the country's exports to the EU by a quarter, 
although the evidence is not conclusive.306 The report of the Overseas Representative 
of the Deciduous Fruit Board on the 1962-1963 season said that: 'In Scandinavia 
propaganda against South African produce has introduced an additional complication, 
though advertising for grapes has continued' .307 This contrasted with the more 
buoyant report on the 1961-1962 season, when the display of South Africa fruit at the 
Ideal Homes Exhibition in London was well received by visitors to the exhibition?08 
The report on the 1963-1964 season said that: 
Though less intense than in 1963, anti-South African propaganda continued to 
smoulder in Sweden and Norway, and it was deemed inadvisable to embark on 
normal publicity. Expenditure was therefore generally limited to editorial 
articles, though in the case of Denmark, some use was made the fruit trade 
press. 309 
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In 1960 South Africa experienced a bumper export year for citrus products to United 
Kingdom, Germany and Sweden, notwithstanding the overseas boycott of South 
African products.3lo The wool export trade was also threatened by boycotts. 
Dr.J .H.Moolman, chairman of the South African Wool Board, said in 1960: 'We may 
laugh at boycotts, but when they are organised in the countries of our origin and 
spread to other countries, it is time to give them serious thought' .311 He also said at 
the same time that: 
As leader of an industry with such an enormous investment and such a 
valuable contribution to foreign exchange, I would be neglecting my duty, if I 
did not draw attention pertinently to what our present policy is doing to our 
market.312 
This was a surprisingly liberal comment from someone in the farming community in 
1960. 
In an address by the chairman of the Ko-operatieve Wijnbouwers Vereniging van Zuid 
-Afrika (KWV), the large Western Cape co-operative wine producer, at the 1960 
annual general meeting, he said that: 'The criticism which was unleashed against us 
throughout the world as a result of the riots in this country, has amazed us all, the 
more so in view of the frequent exaggeration of and misrepresentation in overseas 
reports'. He noted that boycott movements against South Africa had been initiated in a 
number of countries, and South African liquor had been mentioned as products which 
should not be purchased. He said that at this stage it was not possible to determine to 
what extent South African trade had been detrimentally affected. He also remarked 
that the KWY'S results for 1960 were satisfactory, but he was concerned as to what 
the position would be in the current year, where the country was facing adverse world 
310 'The Union's Citrus Export Industry Grows Despite Rivalry,' Farmers' Weeklv, 13 July 1960, p.20. 
311 'Dr Moolman Fears for Exports,' Farmers' Weekly, 6 April 1960, p.3l. 











· h' 1 ld IT 313 . reactIOn, w IC 1 cou aliect exports. The chaIrman of the KWV also, with guarded 
optimism, addressed the 1960 annual congress of farmers, saying that there was 
concern that with South Africa leaving the Commonwealth, the country could lose 
Commonwealth preference on its exports. He remarked that these preferences were 
based on mutual agreements between South Africa and various countries. He doubted 
whether most of these countries would terminate the agreements in the light of their 
favourable balance of trade with South Africa. 314 An aIiicle in the Wynboer magazine 
in November 1960 said that Swedish statistics reflected a drop of S.kr 300000 in the 
value of alcoholic products imported from South Africa. There was no doubt that 
some of the falloff in liquor imports from South Africa was due to the boycott of 
South African products. At that time, in response to the boycott campaign, some of the 
Swedish retail liquor establishments removed South African liquor products from 
their shelves, or hid the products. That the sales of South African liquor to Sweden 
were not more adversely affected was due, in the view of the author of the article, to 
the popularity of South African products. It was also stated that by the middle to the 
end of 1960, the effects of the propaganda had worn off31S In an address by the 
chairman of the K WV to a conference of wine farmers on 25 November 1961, he 
mentioned the measure of uncertainty and nervousness that arose overseas as to future 
stability of South Africa, as a result of it leaving the Commonwealth and the 
disturbances in the country. As a result there was an outflow of capital from the 
country, which led to official steps to protect the balance of payments. He noted that 
the balance of payments had improved during the previous few months and as a result 
JI3 Address to the 1960 Annual General Meeting of K wv. 
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overseas confidence in South Africa was recovering. The South African economy was 
rapidly improving and there was an economic revival in South Africa.316 
The chairman of the K WV in an address to its 1961 arumal general meeting said that 
it was difficult to predict the future of the exp0l1 trade. The board of directors of the 
K WV was of the view that they would not experience drastic shrinkage of their 
markets, but much would depend on the general international political situation and 
on economic factors. 317 One of the restrictions on the local market of the KWV was 
the prohibition on sales of certain liquor products to blacks. Much to the delight of the 
KWV this prohibition was repealed in August 1962.318 One wonders whether it was a 
liberal step, or merely intended to help the wine industry, which could be facing 
overseas boycotts. The majority of the Western Cape wine farmers were supporters of 
the govenunent. 
Jenkins raised the problem that South Africa was dependent on technology which was 
developed abroad and transferred to this country in imported capital equipment. Bans 
on the sale of sophisticated equipment and technology transfers impacted on South 
Africa's development. The longer these sanctions applied, the greater the technology 
gap. By 1989 sanctions, and the rise in the cost of imports as a result of the 
depreciation of the rand, led to a burgeoning market in second hand foreign capital 
equipment.319 Owing to sanctions Imperial Cold Storage had problems in obtaining 
overseas know-how relating to the perishable products industry,320 and Pick 'n Pay 
also had problems in keeping up-to-date with overseas retailing trends.321 Thomas 
said that the Western Cape was affected by sanctions in having difficulty in obtaining 
316 Address by the Chairman of KWV to a Conference of Wine Farmers, 25 November 1961, p.24. 
317 Address to the 1961 Annual General Meeting of K wv. 
318 'The Bantu and his Liquor,' Die Wynboer, September 1963, p.3. 
319 C. Jenkins, 'Sanctions, Econonlic Growth and Change,' p.282. 
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foreign technical knowledge for its high-tech industries. Imperial Cold Storage had to 
source trawlers locally at increased cost, because they could not obtain them overseas 
owing to sanctions.322 As far as Cape Union Mart was concerned, when sanctions 
applied, they could only purchase certain overseas goods by using a third party 
intermediary, which impacted on the cost of goods.323 Sanctions affected Shell's coal 
exports, as many customers would not buy South African coa1.324 During the period 
Marcus Medical did not have the support of its overseas principals in coming to 
South Africa to meet and consult with customers, both private and government.325 
Oi) AIR LINKS 
One of the major factors affecting travel to South Africa was the imposition of various 
restrictions on flights to and from South Africa, including restrictions on its routes; 
from 1963 South African Airways were not allowed to fly over most African 
territories. The profitability of South African Airways was seriously affected, but 
being state-owned it could survive through subsidies. Overseas airlines were under 
constant pressure not to fly to South Africa. For the first time in 1962, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations approved a sanctions resolution requesting member 
states not to grant landing and passage facilities to all South African airlines. Since In 
most of Africa's airspace was closed to South African aircraft, South African Airways, 
at great cost, had to change its routes to fly around the bulge of Africa. Flights thus 
took longer and travel to South Africa was not as easy. This inconvenienced travellers, 
but it created no insurmountable obstacles. By the end of 1988 air links to South 
322 Interview with Neate on 2.3.2006, Annexure E. 
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Africa had been banned by most African states and in the Third World, Eastern 
Europe and Scandinavia, United States Canada, Australia and New Zealand.326 These 
restrictions had a major impact on the tourism industry in the Western Cape. Annexure 
C gives details of foreign visitors to South Africa from 1959 to 1988; the Cape being a 
major tourist attraction in South Africa would be visited by the greater majority of 
foreign visitors. 
(iii) MARITIME LINKS 
South Africa's maritime links were under the same pressure as its air-links. The UN 
General Assembly resolution of November, 1962 included a request to states to close 
their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag. This resolution was supported 
in 1963 by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Over the years the UN repeated 
and broadened its request for a maritime ban on South Africa. In 1977 the General 
Assembly urged the Security Council to consider, amongst other measures, the denial 
of facilities by members to shipping companies (and airlines) providing services to 
and from South Africa. The General Assembly's resolutions had little success with the 
Security Council, but in 1985 the Council appealed to members to re-examine 
maritime relations with South Africa. Calls for a maritime ban against South Africa 
had been heeded by many countries and officially the harbours of African states and 
many Third World and communist states had been closed to South Africa. 
Scandinavian countries imposed various restrictions on maritime trade with South 
Africa and a number of ports in the West had banned trade with South Africa, 











examples being Wilmington (Delaware) in the United States and Bristol in Britain. 
Whilst the majority of seafaring nations upheld the ban on maritime relations with 
South Africa, it had not been officially enforced by South Africa's major trading 
partners in Western Europe, Japan and the United States. South Africa's merchant 
fleet was small and it had to rely on foreign ships to carry its imports and exports,327 
which was another impediment to the export trade of the Western Cape. 
(iv) TOURISM 
South Africa's efforts to attract tourists despite its tarnished image overseas, was 
inhibited by restrictions imposed by foreign governments to discourage or ban 
tourism to South Africa. The UN General Assembly repeatedly requested all states to 
impose a tourist boycott on South Africa, which inter alia required a prevention of the 
promotion of tourism to South Africa. Commonwealth members in 1986 agreed on a 
ban on the promotion of South Africa as a tourist destination, but Britain only 
accepted a voluntary ban, requesting British business not to promote South Africa as a 
tourist destination. Hong Kong and Canada also in 1986 decided on a voluntary ban 
on tourism to South Africa, and this action was followed by Norway imposing a ban 
on the promotion of South African tourism, following similar action in New Zealand. 
A number of counties also closed the South African Tourist Corporation (Satour) 
offices in their countries. 328 Satour was a state- funded organisation set up to promote 
South Africa as a tourist destination. 
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The attached table gives details of the number of overseas tourists visiting South 
Africa from 1959 to 1988.329 From this table one can see the adverse impact of crisis 
periods in South Africa's recent history, e.g. 1976-77 (Soweto) and 1984-1986 (State 
of Emergency). The drastic decline was between 1975 and 1976 when the figure 
dropped by 12.6% compared to 1986 when the figure was 11.4% lower than in 1985. 
The slump in tourists in the middle 1980 years meant that the monetary tourist 
turnover shrank by half.33o The number of British tourists declined from nearly 
140000 in 1984 to some 85000 in 1986 while West German tourists declined over the 
same period from 56808 to 45383.331 The wide fluctuations in tourists visiting South 
Africa made it difficult for the Western Cape tourism industry to provide 
accommodation and other services for the constantly changing tourist market. There 
was reluctance to invest in tourism in the Western Cape, as the prospects were so 
uncertain in the light of the impact of apartheid. Geldenhuys was of the view that 
most prospective tourists stayed away because of fears for their personal safety. It is 
more difficult, in his view, to assess the impact of South Africa's policies on the 
tourism market as it could be affected by many factors. In his words: 'It seems 
reasonable to conclude that ostracist moves do in fact prevent the optimum realisation 
of South Africa's tourism potential' .332 South Africa's political style hindered the 
tourist trade in the Western Cape and minimized the opportunity of expoli growth,333 
the main strengths of the Western Cape economy. 
Strong views were expressed by Western Cape businessmen on tourism. Krawitz of 
Cape Union Mart said that prior to the apartheid years their company had a 
considerable turnover with foreign tourists, and many cruise liners called at Cape 
129 Ibid, p.587, Annexure C. 
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Town. Under Nationalist government rule this lucrative business dried up and cruise 
liners did not call. Since the fall of apartheid one has seen a boom in the tourism 
industry, but the Cape lost considerable tourist revenue in the apartheid years.334 
Professor Thomas agreed with this view 335as did Ackerman of Pick n' Pay. The latter 
said that one could not measure how much tourist revenue South Africa lost in the 
apartheid years. 336 Giliomee said that: 'The major adverse impact of apartheid on the 
Western Cape's economy was in respect of the tourism industry'. Fear discouraged 
prospective tourists and the Western Cape could not achieve its tourist potentia1.337 
334 Interview with Krawitz on 5.4.2006 Annexure E. 
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ATTITUDE OF THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ORGANISATIONS TO APARTHEID 
(a) CAPE TOWN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (THE CHAMBER) 
The Chamber had a membership, mostly English-speaking, of2300 in 1984 rising to 
3200 in 1992, comprising members in the manufacturing, retail, wholesaler, agency 
and services (professional and other) sectors, 338 and thus covered a wide range of 
commercial and industrial activities. Its members included most of the larger 
commercial and industrial companies in the area, but most of its members were small 
and medium enterprises. It claimed to be an apolitical organisation, and did not get 
involved in party politics; it adopted a more liberal attitude than many of the 
chambers throughout the country, although within its ranks were those, in common 
with other English speakers, who voted for the Nationalist Party. In reviewing the 
attitude of the members of the Chamber to apartheid an examination of the Minutes of 
the Council meetings of the Chamber from 1960 to 1990 gives an illuminating picture 
of business' reaction to apartheid. 
Following the Sharpeville massacre on 21 March 1960, which resulted in the 
declaration of a State of Eri1ergency and the decision to leave the Commonwealth in 
1961, business in the Cape was alarmed as to the impact these events would have on 
their businesses. Accordingly a joint meeting of the Councils of the Chamber and the 
Cape Chamber of Industries was held on 13 May 1960 and a wide ranging public 
338 Interview with Director of the Cape Regional Chamber of Commerce (successor to the Cape Town 











statement was issued expressing the deep concerns of both organisations. The 
statement gave the following background views: 
The responsibility for maintaining and improving the standard of living in South 
Africa rests largely on industry and commerce, which cannot fulfil this function whilst 
the circumstances continue which caused the unrest and in the view of the Chambers 
the disturbances were due to the poor conditions under which blacks lived and 
worked, which was caused by inadequate economic development. The Chambers 
stated that economic development could only be achieved in their words by: 
'Harnessing all the people in the fullest productive effort of which they are 
individually capable'. 339 The Chambers said that the cowltry could not reach its 
economic potential whilst four-fifths of its population was seriously lacking in 
economic opportunities compared to the remaining fi11h (the whites). The creation of 
additional employment opportunities in separate undeveloped areas would call for 
vast resources of capital, managerial skill and trained labour, which could not be 
provided without placing intolerable strain on the existing economy, even if those 
providing the finance could be convinced as to the soundness of the investment. It 
followed in the organisations' view that the existing economy should be strengthened 
and expanded by the more effective utilisation of non-white labour in urban areas and 
a satisfactory social enviromnent was needed to be created for all workers on whose 
co-operation the economy depended. 
Against this background the Chambers stated that black workers were essential to the 
total economy and the full employment of whites and coloureds in the Western Cape 
and that the economic development of the Cape coloured were closely related to and 
m Public Statement, Cape Town Chamber of Commerce and Cape Chamber of Industries, Adopted at a 











interwoven with the economic progress of the whites. In the view of the Chamber the 
coloureds were not in competition with the black worker, as the latter was prepared to 
undeliake occupations not attractive to the coloured population. The continuing 
economic development of the Western Cape had led, in their view, to replacement of 
white workers by coloureds as whites had moved into more responsible positions. The 
economic advancement of the whites would not be possible without the availability of 
coloured and black workers and the continuous acquisition of greater skills and the 
assumption of greater responsibility by all workers. It followed that the placing of 
limitations on the advancement of non-whites would retard the economic position of 
whites. As far as the coloured people in the Western Cape were concerned, there was a 
strong recommendation from the Chambers that job reservation should not apply, the 
splitting of coloured workers into separate unions should not be required, and 
employer organisations should assist coloured workers to enter into apprenticeships. 
Whilst in the Chambers' view some form of influx control was needed, it 
recommended that the blacks have a full family life, with their wives and children 
living with them, while improved police and transport services should be provided.340 
In the light of the fact that Dr.Verwoerd was Prime Minister in 1960 and the apartheid 
government was dividing the nation ever more on a racial basis, it was not surprising 
that government did not take any action on the recommendations in the statement, 
even though a joint letter setting out the statement was sent direct to the Prime 
Minister, all Members of Parliament and Senators. Dr. Verwoerd had accepted an 
invitation to address the 1960 Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa 
(ASSOCOM) Congress, but retracted his acceptance, saying that any discussion of 
340 Public Statement, Cape Town Chamber of Commerce and Cape Chamber of Industries, Adopted at 











Assocom's stance on coloured policy would serve little good purpose. The 
relationship between government and Assocom was strained, although not completely 
severed.
341 
Bolton noted that Verwoerd referred to businessmen as "traitors" in not 
committing themselves to the survival of the white man in South Africa. Verwoerd 
also stated that Assocom was part of an organised campaign against the state.342 The 
civil disturbances and the State of Emergency, combined with the fear of the impact of 
the loss of the Commonwealth preference were of great concern to business. They 
feared the impact of these on the economy and on their own businesses. 
In the light of the 'long boom' in the Western world and the extraordinary growth in 
the South African economy from 1960 to 1974, the impact of apartheid on business in 
that period was offset by increased business earnings. The weakening South African 
economy, the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement and the forced withdrawal 
of South African troops from Angola were factors causing the outbreak of the Soweto 
riots, which erupted in 1976?43 Business was shaken out of its complacency and it 
occurred to the average businessman that apat1heid was at the core of his problems. 
Whilst the world economy was in recession, the position in South Africa was 
exacerbated by apartheid. In examining the minutes of the Council of the Chamber 
from 1960, there were few references to the problems caused to business by apartheid 
from 1960 to 1976, but after the riots in 1976, business expressed concerned as to the 
future of the South African economy and in particular their own businesses. There 
was a degree of panic in the business community and the Chamber proposed the 
following motion to the 1976 National Congress of its umbrella organisation, 
ASSOCOM. The motion recorded that business was convinced that the future well 
being and prosperity of the Republic of South Africa depended upon recognition of 
HI Pretorius, 'The Head of Government and Organised Business,' pp.216-2IS. 
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the defacto presence of all her people, their fundamental human rights, their economic 
interdependence and their actual and potential contribution to the economy and the 
quality of life enjoyed in the country. Business also stated that the future depended on 
the growth of the per capita real income of the whole population, and the evolution of 
a stable and contented middle class of all races, with a vested interest in that 
wellbeing and prosperity, and a desire to uphold and defend it. It also said that training 
and development of skills and the encouragement of entrepreneurship were essential. 
The motion passed said that: 
Congress urges the government to: 
• Move more purposefully towards elimination of discrimination on grounds of 
race - especially in the economic sphere 
• Recognise the de facto presence of and need for all races, including blacks, in 
urban areas 
• Permit ownership of residential property by all racial groups in their own parts 
of urban areas 
• Relax restrictions on black traders in their own areas and to permit their pursuit 
of otherwise lawful occupations in urban areas 
• Set aside mixed trading areas in which all races may trade freely 
• Relax restrictions on employment in white owned businesses of persons of other 
races which might thereby gain needed experience and skills for their running of 
their own businesses, and 
• Facilitate the establishment of restaurants in the white central business districts 
(CBD) to cater for the needs of black business and professional persons and 
others who do business there.344 











The resolution was passed at the Congress. The Prime Minister, B.J.Vorster, addressed 
the congress and said that business should look after economic matters and leave 
politics to the government. This was not well received by the delegates at the 
congress, and after Vorster had left the congress, a delegate from Natal was highly 
critical of the government and what Vorster had said. This resulted in the Secretary for 
Commerce, Joep Steyn, leaving the congress in anger and repOliing the critical 
attitude of the congress to Vorster. Steyn, by the way, was the only person present at 
the congress to give Vorster a standing ovation.345 While the debate at congress caused 
some strain in Assocom's relations with government, relations with government were 
soon restored and the resolution was discussed with Vorster on 1 September 1976, 
stressing the concerns of business and the need to sustain business confidence, the 
interdependency of politics and economics as a solution of the problems in 1976 and 
increasing the stake of all races in the economy. The Prime Minister reiterated his 
view that business should look after the economy and leave politics to the 
politicians.346 He also made the same comments in his condemnation of the Chairman 
of SANLAM, Dr. A.D. Wassenaar's book, which criticised state interference in the 
economy. Vorster said that Afrikaner business should keep out of politics. 347 While 
access to government decision makers became easier in the Vorster era, the 
government remained averse to public calls for the abolition of apartheid.348 The 
somewhat more relaxed approach of government is confirmed by a story Ackerman, 
Chairman of Pick n' Pay relates in his autobiography. He recounted an interview he 
had with Prime Minister Vorster. Pick n' Pay had appointed their first black manager 
345 Assocom Congress Proceedings August 1976, (No written record). 
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at their Rondebosch store in Cape Town. He proved to be efficient, and well accepted 
by the customers. Ackerman had received a number of letters [rom customers 
expressing favourable views of the manager, including some from the wives of 
Cabinet ministers. Ackerman obtained an interview with Vorster, and showed him the 
letters. Vorster said that he could continue to employ the black manager, but that he 
was not going to change the law.349 
The Cape Town Chamber of Commerce was also concerned at the civil unrest in the 
Cape Peninsula and surrounding areas, which had followed on the Soweto uprising. 
The Chamber was worried as to effect that this had had, and could have on the future 
of commerce and industry in the area. Accordingly at a meeting of the Council of the 
Chamber held on 23 September 1976, a memorandum was approved setting out a 
programme of action to counter civil Uluest in the area.350 The Chamber expressed 
concern as to the negative impact that job reservation and the coloured labour 
preference policy had on commerce and industry in the Western Cape, and it instituted 
a programme asking members to commit themselves in their businesses to non-
discrimination against employees on racial grounds. The Chamber asked members to 
sign a manifesto confirming their undertaking to institute these practices, and there 
was a favourable response from large and small businesses. While the programme was 
introduced out of a deep concern amongst Chamber members for a relaxation of the 
apartheid policies, it was also promoted because of business' concerns about the skill 
shortage. 351 
The continuing concern of business as to the impact apartheid was having on its 
operations and profits, was the background to the following motion proposed by the 
349 Ackerman, Hearing Grasshoppers Jump, pp.90-91. 
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Chamber to the 1976 Cape Regional Congress of Assocom. This motion was 
approved at the Regional Congress and referred to the National Congress of Assocom, 
where it was approved subject to minor textual amendments. The motion read: 
Congress welcomes the government's acceptance of the recommendations of 
the Theron Commission that certain concentrated business areas be opened to 
allow coloured and Indian traders to carryon business in these areas and urges 
the government to take immediate steps to open principal business districts for 
coloured and Indian traders.352 
In introducing the motion it was pointed out that there was a pressing need to remove 
all restrictions on the employment of non-white labour, remove all restrictions on 
black trading in their own areas, and at an appropriate time to allow whites to trade in 
black areas.353 lfwas feared that if white business was allowed unrestricted trading 
rights in black areas, the competition would kill black business. 
Business was perturbed as to the toll apartheid was taking on their business profits 
and at a meeting of the Council of the Chamber held on 29 July 1977 concern was 
expressed at the deterioration of the Western Cape economy. Businesses in the area 
had to deal with high railage rates, being far from the main South African markets, 
and to exacerbate the position they had to contend with apartheid policies, which 
adversely affected the Western Cape in comparison with other areas.354 
1978 was another poor year for the South African economy and Western Cape 
business suffered. Business in that area pressed for a change in government policy 
which they hoped would improve their profitability. The Chamber proposed a further 
motion to the 1978 Assocom congress seeking a hastening of change in South Africa. 
The motion called for the recognition of the de facto presence and need for all races, 
352 Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Council Meeting, 21.7.77, p.IS, 25.S.77, p.26, 3.11.77, pAS. 
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including blacks in urban areas, relaxation of restrictions on black businesses in their 
own areas so as to facilitate their incorporation into the competitive enterprise system, 
allocation of mixed trading areas in which all races might trade freely, and relaxation 
of restrictions on employment in white owned business of persons of other races. This 
motion was passed at the Domestic Session of the Congress. 355 The domestic session 
was closed to the media, whilst the open sessiun was upen to the media. The motion 
should have been debated in the open session, but the more conservative elements in 
Assocom outside the Western Cape did not want to upset government too much by 
open debate. The Western Cape was the more enlightened and liberal arm of the 
organised business movement. 
During the year 1979 the business community in the Western Cape was concerned at 
the impact of the decentralisation benefits on the area and accordingly the following 
motion was proposed by the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce at the Cape Regional 
Congress of Assocom held on 28 June 1979 and subsequently approved by the 
congress: 
Congress is of the opinion that if the Western Cape is to grow at a pace 
sufficient to promote adequate employment opportunities for its growing 
population, serious consideration needs to be given by the government to 
extend decentralisation concessions to such areas of the region as are likely to 
lend themselves to fast development.356 
The following motion was proposed and passed at the Assocom National Congress 
later in 1979: 
355 Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Council Meeting, 24.S.78, p.IIS. 











Because of the problems arising from the practical application of Influx 
Control in its present form, Congress urges the government to implement the 
R· k C .. 357 d' I I . Ie ert ommlsslOn recommen atJons t lat t le control measures mmed at 
the individual be abolished and that effective control be instituted over 
employment and housing which should be the only criteria for regulating 
. .. b 358 111lgratJon II1to ur an areas. -
With the boom in the South African and Western Cape economy from 1979 to 1981 
business was not motivated to press government to reform apaJiheid policies, as they 
were too busy making money. By 1981 business was feeling the squeeze on its profits 
and was once again motivated to seek a relaxation of the apartheid policies to help 
them out of their problems. Accordingly the Chamber proposed the following motion 
to the 1981 Assocom National Congress: 
In view of the urgent need to open the private enterprise system to all 
population groups as soon as possible, Congress notes with disappointment the 
slow progress made towards freeing central business centres of cities and 
towns of the provisions of the Group Areas Act as recommended by the 
Riekert Commission and accordingly urges government to proceed more 
speedily with the implementation of the recommendations.359 
This action was followed by a proposal in 1982, from the Chamber to the Cape 
Regional Congress of Assocom. The recession was hitting profits and business 
realised that apartheid was affecting profitability. The motion recorded that business 
believed that the existing prohibition on the ownership or occupancy by disqualified 
persons of business premises in the major commercial areas of larger towns served to 
restrict the full participation by members of all population groups in the economic 
357 The Riekert C0l11111ission exanlined Inanpower utilisation~ See O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p.193. 
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development of the country, denied full opportunity to non-white businessmen to 
acquire additional management skills, discouraged the development of non-racial 
partnerships and acted as a brake on the private enterprise system in South Africa, 
The motion urged that Municipal Authorities, affected Management Committees and 
Community Councils be empowered to declare free trade areas within their respective 
areas of jurisdiction and that the Group Areas Act be amended accordingly at the 
earliest possible opportunity. At the same Congress they proposed the following 
motion: 
Congress believes that it is inconsistent with the free enterprise system to 
apply the coloured preference policy to blacks who are part of the permanent 
population of the Western Cape and urges, therefore, that the black labour 
regulations be amended to allow such blacks to be employed without 
.. b' I' bl 1 360 restnctIOns emg app lca e to t 1em. 
These motions were approved. 
The appointment of P W Botha as Prime Minister in 1978 was looked on by many in 
the business community as the beginning of a new era in South African politics as he 
was viewed as verligte (enlightened).361 He came into power determined to introduce 
reform. Many in business thought, somewhat misguidedly, that the introduction of the 
Tri-Cameral Parliament (separate Chambers for whites, coloureds and Indians with 
limited joint sittings) in 1984 was a move in the right direction. They did not 
appreciate the adverse reaction this would have in black areas; this together with the 
economic decline caused the riots in 1984 and the imposition of a further state of 
emergency 
360 Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Council Meeting, 24.6.82, p.9. 











The Chamber's members expressed deep concern in 1985 about the impact of internal 
and external threats on the South African economy. Accordingly they approached 
Assocom and the latter, jointly with the Federated Chamber of Industries, issued a 
Press Statement calling on government to issue a clear statement of intent to release 
political detainees who were prepared to participate in a process of peaceful 
constitutional reform; to set up mechanisms whereby blacks could decide who their 
leaders were; to enter into visible and meaningful dialogue with such black leaders 
with a view to accommodating the reasonable political aspirations of blacks in the 
Country's constitutional development; and urgently to press ahead with a process of 
reform on all fronts and particularly in areas of education, job creation and better 
living conditions for all. It was also stated that the business community had a vital 
stake in the future political stability of the country.362 
The Chamber followed up with the following motion to the 1982 National Congress 
of Assocom: 
Believing the removal of all forms of racial discrimination in business to be 
essential for the proper functioning of the free enterprise system, Congress 
urges the government to expedite the removal of the many remaining 
legislative and administrative measures that discriminate on the grounds of 
race in the business sector. 
The motion was passed at the National Congress of Assocom in an amended form 
although the sentiments in the Cape Town motion were retained. 363 
The Council of the Chamber was perturbed about the political, economic and social 
conditions in the country; on 31 October 1985 the Chamber addressed a letter to all its 
362 Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Council Meeting, 5.8.85, pp.6-7. 











members which said that it was concerned as to the following features of the 
government's apartheid policy: prohibition on the employment of blacks in 
managerial and supervisory positions; coloured labour preference; Physical Planning 
Ace which limited the number of blacks that may be employed; difficult and 
cumbersome procedure in opening business districts to all races; and restrictions on 
black traders, who could only trade in premises allocated by the Development Board 
and cannot have any white shareholders. 364 
South African society was in a state of crisis and the economy was in a parlous 
condition, bus boycotts and work stay-aways were a problem; while previously the 
Cape was insulated from the extremes of political expression, the situation had 
changed.365 The business community realised that there had to be a fundamental 
change in government policy, the era of apartheid had to end.366 The Western Cape 
was more liberal than the rest of South Africa and business there was pushing 
government to reform. Accordingly the Chamber proposed a motion to the 1985 
National Assocom Congress calling for the removal of discrimination in business. The 
motion was amended at the Congress and the final form of the motion acknowledged 
that legal restraints inhibited the full participation of all races in the private enterprise 
system and that the system will only survive if all South Africans have a stake in it. 
The Congress urged the government to expedite the removal of the many remaining 
legislative and administrative measures that discriminate on grounds of race.367 This 
motion was passed by the Congress. 
1986 was a difficult year for business. Government had introduced reforms to phase 
out certain elements of apartheid, but the Chamber pressed government to eliminate 
36~ Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Letter to Members 31.1 0.85, Council Meeting 19.9.85. 
365 Cape Chamber ofIndustries, Year Book, 1985/86, p.9. 
366 O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p.365. 











the remaining forms of racial discrimination and accordingly the Chamber proposed a 
motion to the National Congress of Assocom calling on government to take 
immediate steps to repeal the Group Areas Act and publish a timetable for the removal 
of other remaining discriminatory measures that exist in the economy.368 
By 1987 there were signs of changes in govenmlent policy, particularly in the 
government's White Paper on Urbanisation. The Chamber proposed a motion to the 
National Congress of Assocom which said that it recognised the positive objectives 
contained in the government's White Paper on Urbanisation, that are aimed at 
accommodating the irresistible shift towards the urban centres in South Africa, but 
that it remained concerned that the strategies proposed might not achieve the 
objectives envisaged. The motion called on government to support the President's 
Council call for a review of the decentralisation programme, and to place greater 
emphasis on metropolitan development as a means of job creation. It also asked for 
the devolution of authority to plan and determine priorities, relating to development in 
urban areas, to the local level, and for the process to be undertaken in consultation 
with the private sector, and further for the right of freedom of movement, including 
the right to live and work in urban areas on a permanent basis, be extended to the 
citizens of the TBVC (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) countries.369 
By 1989 the Chamber was making major effOlis to get the government to complete its 
reform process and proposed to that year's National Assocom Congress a motion 
stressing its concerns. This motion was amended at Congress and the final wording of 
the motion which was approved at Congress was: 
Economic Growth and Reform 
368 Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Council Meeting, 27.8.86, p.16. 











Believing that economic growth and political progress are interdependent and 
acknowledging that private investment - whether local or foreign - is essential 
to economic growth, Congress recognises that the prospects for generating 
investment in South Africa are directly dependent on the elimination of all 
forms of statutory racial discrimination and the accommodation of all people 
in a new political dispensation, 
And urges that: 
• All concerned endeavour to create a favourable climate for political negotiation 
in South Africa; 
• Every effort be made to reduce the pre-conditions, including those by 
government, which currently hamper the chances of successful negotiation 
between all representative political leaders; and 
• All remaining discriminatory legislation be dismantled as soon as possible.37o 
In reviewing the action taken by the Chamber in calling for the repealing of the 
apartheid policies during the years from 1960 to 1990, one has a clear picture of the 
impact of apartheid on the members of the Chamber during that period. The main 
concerns of business over the period were the necessity of involving all races in the 
economy and the removal of racial discrimination in the work place, without which 
the Western Cape would never prosper. In addition the Chamber was concerned as to 
the cost to the country of the decentralisation policy, in terms of finance, managerial 
skill and trained labour. Business was also wonied as to the impact of civil 
disturbances on the economy and their businesses in the Western Cape and also on the 
availability of black labour in the Western Cape, which was essential to the economic 











development of the area. Restrictions on the employment of coloured labour in skilled 
and semi-skilled occupations, and the overall skill sholiage were major causes of 
concern to business, as was the restrictions on black traders, and the lack of open 
trading areas in the Western Cape. 
The Chamber, in a document dated 6 February 1990 prepared for their Planlling 
Committee, stated that: apartheid was recognised as the most significant single factor 
restraining economic development in the country, and the Chamber must promote a 
climate for change away from apatiheid, and encourage the government to move 
toward its stated goal of abolishing apartheid in all its forms as soon as possible. It 
was proposed in the document that the Chamber should inter alia use all forums 
available to it, that is, meetings with MP's, senior government officials, business and 
other organisations to encourage change and that the Chamber should encourage its 
members to participate in, and sign the Manifesto for Change. In addition the 
Chamber should promote corporate social responsibility amongst its members and in 
more specific actions the Chamber called for Cape Town to be declared an open city, 
and for District Six to be developed.371 
In reviewing the impact that the Chamber of Commerce movement had on 
government policy, it must be recorded that discussions with the various Ministers of 
Finance were normally cordial and results were often achieved. The organisation had 
many meetings with the Ministers of Economic Affairs, particularly Chris Heunis, 
who was minister in the Vorster and Botha years. He was willing to listen to business 
and to try and help, but he was restricted by government policy. Where the Chamber 
had difficulties was in its relationship with departments concerned with black affairs 
who were generally a law unto themselves and considered they had the answers to all 











of South Africa's problems. This attitude was particularly noticeable in dealing with 
departmental officials, both senior and junior; when reforms changes in policy were 
introduced in the 1980s, the officials often dragged their feet in implementing the 
changes. When Koornhof was the responsible minister he made the comment at a 
meeting which Assocom had with him that he wanted to bring about change, but his 
officials resisted reform. 
(b) CAPE CHAMBER OF INDUSTRIES (CCI) 
The other major business organisation in the Western Cape was the CCI. It also 
claimed to be apolitical and did not get involved in party politics. Whilst it had a 
smaller membership than the Chamber of Commerce, it included in its membership 
most of the major industrial concerns in the area including agricultural distributors 
and manufacturers, clothing manufacturing, coal suppliers, export traders, food and 
drink producers, furniture manufacturers, knitted goods and leather manufacturers, 
metals and metal products manufacturers, millers and bakers, quarry owners and the 
steel and engineering industry. There was not as much material available in the eel's 
archives and accordingly it is difficult to get a pattern of the organisations attitude to 
apartheid over the period 1961 to 1990. The loss of the Commonwealth preference 
after South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1960 as a result of the government's 
apartheid policies was of major concern to the members of the eCI. The S.A 
Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI), eCI's national organisation had made an 
analysis of the South Africa's export trade and reported that 32% of its exports, 











extent on exports to Britain, particularly the fruit canning and wine industries in the 
Cape. Not only did these industries concerned benefit from the preference, but 
supporting industries that provided cartons, containers and labels for fruit canning 
also enjoyed benefits under the Commonwealth preference. It was noted that 73% of 
South Africa's grape exports went to Britain. The Economic Committee of the CCI 
emphasised that; the Commonwealth Preference provided an assured and conlinuous 
system of trading - alternative possibilities of export trade to the same extent were 
purely conjectural; in the event of losing the preference, even if some other export 
outlets were found, there would be no assurance that they would be open to South 
African exporters year after year in the way that the preference system assisted the 
export trade; special arrangements of the kind constituted by the Commonwealth 
preferences, which had been incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), would now be ditTicult to conclude in view of GATT itself~ the 
European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association; and big 
investments had been made in local industries and agriculture on the basis of the 
continuing advantages conferred by the Commonwealth preference. The CCl 
Executive Council was aware that serious damage would be done to the economy of 
the Western Cape, should it lose the preference. What happened in practice was that 
other export markets were found and Britain's share of South Africa's exports, 
excluding gold, dropped from 30% in 1970 to only 8% in 1984.372 The entry of 
Britain into the European Economic Community finally ended all preferential access 
to the British market which South Africa, as a former commonwealth member, had 
. d 373 enJoye· . 
J72 Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis, p.351. 











The CCI was concerned at the same time as to the impact that boycotts could have on 
members' exports. The government had urged the CCI to continue effOlis to export, 
despite boycott threats. The FCI also urged the CCI members to persevere with 
exports. Somewhat naively the FCI's view was that, as boycotts were a reaction to 
public policies followed by the South African government, they should assist 
exporters to a greater extent to cover losses by means of export insurance, in respect 
of political risks. Whilst overall exports had increased by 22 million pounds in the 
first six months of 1960, individual industries had suffered losses through boycotts. In 
the words of the minutes of the Mid-Year General Meeting of the CCI held on 28 July 
1960 ... 'and ifmost of the views of business were officially adopted, the Union 
would have boom conditions and undoubtedly assume the leading position on the 
African continent' .374 
The CCI supported the representations of the FCI to the Cabinet on 3 May 1960 
which called for immediate steps to be taken to revitalise South Africa's economy and 
that notice should be paid to the dangers of international repercussions, which were 
gravely threatening South Africa's trade. It also said that realistic acknowledgment 
should be made of the permanency of the urbanised 'bantu' people, that a policy 
should be adopted to eliminate friction between them and the administration, and that 
permanent machinery of consultation with the urbanised 'bantu' should be formulated. 
The position of labour in the Western Cape was always a major problem for industry 
in the apatiheid years. When blacks had no trade unions, the employers had no one to 
talk to when there were strikes or stay-aways. From 1981 all racial distinction in trade 
unions was abolished375 and this gave business someone to negotiate with in the event 
of labour disputes. The difficulty of dealing with labour disputes arose again during 
m Cape Chamber of Industries, Mid-Year General Meeting, 26.7.60, pp.3-7. 











the period of the State of Emergency in 1986. The CCl was concerned as to the 
detention of trade union leaders and the impact this and the State of Emergency had 
on industrial relations. In a letter distributed to its committees on 4 July 1986, the FCI 
laid down guidelines for communication between employers, trade unions and their 
members under the emergency regulations, which stated that trade union meetings 
might, subject to certain restrictions, be held indoors, but outdoor meetings needed 
approval by the authorities, and there were also restrictions on strikes and when the 
. f' . 1 . 376 secuntyorces nllg 1t ll1tervene. 
At an extraordinary meeting ofthe FCl's Manpower Standing Committee held on 30 
June 1986 the members present noted the demands of the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions' (COSATU) that any employee detained in terms of the emergency 
regulations should not be dismissed and that those detained should be paid in full for 
the period of their detention. The meeting agreed that, subject to the employee 
committing no ofIence under the security laws or the State of Emergency, 
employment relationships should not be prejudiced by involuntary absence from 
work, but the technical issue of pay should be addressed by each individual employee. 
The other demands of COSATU should be addressed at regional and company 
level.377 
Over the years from 1960 to 1990 the major concerns of industry were the poor 
economic performance of the Western Cape compared with the rest of the country. 
I ndustrialists were concerned as to labour shortages in the area, particularly as a result 
of job reservation and the coloured labour preference policy applied to the Western 
Cape. Further the difficulty of labour relations in times of civil disturbance and States 
m Letter by the South African Federated Chamber oflndustries dated 4.7.1986 to Members of the 
Board of Management and other committees of the South African Federated Chamber of Industries. 
377 South African Federated Chamber of Industries, Extraordinary Meeting of the Manpower Standing 











of Emergency created difficulties in operating businesses and affected profits. In 
addition to these difficulties there were the decentralisation incentives which were 
generally granted to industrialists in other parts of the country. The Chamber of 
Industries was not as liberal as the Chamber of Commerce owing to the influence of 
its officers and even more the views of its senior permanent staff. 
(c) OTHER BUSINESS ORGANISATIONS 
The other major business organisations in the Cape were the Afrikaanse Sakekamer, 
with a national body, the Handelsinstituut, and the National African Chamber of 
Commerce (NAfCOC). The Sakekamer, with its Afrikaner membership, was not 
openly critical of government, although in the later years of apartheid, one saw 
criticism of apartheid from Rupert of Rembrandt and Wassenaar of SANLAM. The 
Volkshandel (organ of the Afrikaanse Handelinstituut), repeatedly warned that 
apartheid might be wrecked because of economic factors. It asked the question: 'How 
much sacrifice can a democratic government ask of its population in the interests of 
long-term stability?' Despite these objections Volkshandel and the Afrikaanse 
Handelsinstituut stressed their support for apartheid and that any changes to the labour 
policy should be within the framework of that policy?78 A small survey of leading 
Afrikaner businessmen was conducted by the Financial Mail in March, 1971, which 
showed that those polled were concerned about labour shortages and black poverty, 
but remained supporters of apatiheid. The question was asked; 'Should separate 
development be pursued, irrespective of any economic effects'?' The replies were: 











'The policy is not irreconcilable with economic prosperity'; 'It should be proceeded 
with at all cost, but we should try to minimise economic disruptions'; 'It could even 
be an economic stimulus'; , I haven't seen any proof that we can't achieve both 
separate development and economic progress'; If this questions means, 'Should we 
accept a lower growth rate for the sake of separate development, then the answer is 
yes'; 'Ifit means 'Should we press on with separate development at any price?, then I 
would have doubts'; 'We can't reverse the trend now, but we must alter the concept 
we started with'; 'If the repercussions were severe, I would reconsider certain aspects 
of separate development'. In the views of Welsh it was likely that these answers were 
representative of a far wider stratum of at least the upper level of the Afrikaner 
executive class. The Financial Mail concluded: 'Beneath the worldly, successful 
exteriors, Afrikaner blood runs strongly and, so long as the Nationalist Party remains 
the only protagonist of separate development, it will command their loyalty'. Dr. Jan 
I-lupkes, a manager of Federale Volksbelegging, a subsidiary of SANLAM, said on 23 
October 1971 that 70% of employers in the private sector would welcome a new 
government, because firstly the National Party had increased the company tax rate by 
approximately one per cent per alU1Um during its twenty-three years in power and 
secondly because South Africa's political aIigllllent was still based to a greater an 
extent on linguistic divisions, his remarks were criticised in the Afrikaner press who 
said he should join the political opposition (United Party).379 Welsh is of the view that, 
whilst the Afrikaner business community had not played a major role in influencing 
National Party policy, they did have some influence and they helped the govenlllent 











in promoting detente with English-speaking whites, with a view to creating a white 
nation and they also promoted the outward-looking foreign policy.380 
The Sakekamer obviously had a closer relationship with government than Assocom; 
the government was deeply suspicious of Assocom, with its mainly English-speaking 
base. They felt it was too close to the liberal political movements. Both the 
Sakekamer and NAFCOC did not make any major visible contribution during the 
apartheid years to the efforts to change or ameliorate the government's policies. The 
relationship between Afrikaans business and govermnent will be dealt with more fully 
in the following chapter. 
(d) GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE ATTITUDE OF BUSINESS 
Nattrass was of the view that by 1980 there was wide disaffection among South 
African capitalists with the government and that, 'The old argument that apartheid 
was functional for capital accumulation and that the interests of capitalism and white 
supremacy were coterminous had been undermined by then' ?81 There had been an 
argument between those, the liberals, who argued that state interference in the 
economy had retarded and distorted the path of capital development and those who 
said apartheid was good for business. The latter said that the cheap supply of black 
labour contributed to the profits of business. In the light of the limitations on the 
employment of black labour in the Western Cape, this advantage, which Nattrass does 
not accept, had limited benefit to the area.382 Bolton was of the view that: 'It would be 
380 Ibid, p.274. 
381 Nattrass, 'Controversies about Capitalism and apartheid in South Africa: an Economic 
Perspective,' p.674. 











difficult for business to deny that it had over the years derived enOlIDOUS benefit from 
the system of apartheid' ,383 but this was a somewhat simplistic view, as some 
businesses benefited, but many did not. Bolton's view is that business in advanced 
capitalistic societies has come to be identified with large organisations which 
dominate the economy and seek to influence the manner in which the state carries out 
its power.384 In the South African environment the Afrikaner business community had 
much more influence on government than the English business community. It should 
also be borne in mind that the greater majority of the members of Assocom came from 
small businesses as did a number of its presidents. 
Oppenheimer, the Chairman of Anglo American, the large mainly mineral corporation, 
with extensive business in the Western Cape, speaking in 1977, said that: 'For many 
years, under generally favourable economic conditions and with friendly governments 
on South Africa's borders, the basic artificiality and instability of the system was 
largely forgotten or ignored'; but the position had changed and he was of the view that 
the racial problems of South Africa would not be met by the Tri-cameral 
P I· . b . bl I . 38<; ar Iamentary system, It emg unaccepta e to most non-w lItes. -
The 1998 annual report of First National Bank expressed concern as to the impact of 
apartheid. It said: 'The economic penalty of the apartheid era has been its opportunity 
cost. The Gross Domestic Product is well below what it might and should have been 
by now, and the difference would have contributed to solving many of our 
problems' .386 The report also said that the outflow of capital from South Africa 
compounded the 0pp0l1unity cost in two respects, firstly there has been a withdrawal 
383 Bolton, Business and State in South Africa during the period 1976 to 1986, p.79 
3R4 Ibid, p.ii. 
385 Oppenheimer,' Prospects for Change in Southern Africa,' Address to the Foreign Policy 
Association, New York City, 14 October, 1977. 











of scarce managerial and technical skills and secondly the withdrawal of capital funds 
from South Africa sources resulted in the use of local investment funds, which might 
otherwise have met socio-political needs. 
The annual report of Rand Mines in the same year stated: 'Sanctions are beginning to 
have an adverse effect on the economy'. This report also noted that the economy was 
being restricted by the continued absence of substantial capital inflows and that the 
confidence of overseas investors needed to be restored. 387 












IMPACT OF APARTHEID ON AFRIKANER BUSINESS IN THE WESTERN 
CAPE 
When one considers the impact of apartheid on commerce and industry in the Western 
Cape, one has to pay particular attention to the Afrikaner business community in the 
area, which gained much from apartheid. Dr. O. F. Malan and his successors as Prime 
Minister and/or President vigorously promoted Afrikaner rent seeking, often within 
the bounds of legality. This included providing jobs for Afrikaners, awarding 
government contracts to Afrikaner enterprises, and vastly extending Afrikaner 
dominated parastatals. This led to an influx of poorly qualified Afrikaners, particularly 
at lower levels, and a decline in service levels and professionalism in the public 
service. Illegal corruption was restrained in the earlier years of apartheid, in the light 
of the belief of senior public servants that they were serving the volk (Afrikaner 
community). 388(This view was also expressed by Professor Giliomee).389 When the 
apartheid regime's policies were so1tened under President Botha, and there was a rise 
of a consumerist outlook in the Afrikaner community, there was an increase in 
corruption and the Afrikaner establishments could no longer discipline their 
employees. This was the period of the Information Scandal (Muldergate), which led to 
the fall of the President John Vorster. The Erasmus Commission was appointed to 
investigate the information scandal and Judge Erasmus, in his report, referred to the 
scandal in the following terms: 'The purpose of the Information Department's secret 
fund had all the attraction of a lovely fresh apple, but the germ which could cause 
388 Hyslop, 'Political COlTuption Before and After Apartheid, pp.781-783. 











complete rot to set in was already there in the flowering stage because of lack of 
1 . . 1 .. 390 canty 111 t le eXlstll1g statutory control'. Large sums of money were siphoned off in 
this period to promote South Africa's image abroad and at a time when the economy 
was stagnating. Sanction busting was rife, and those involved were free from scrutiny 
by the media and parliament. A search for arms led to growing links with overseas 
criminal networks, including the mafia, which brought with it the temptation for 
officials to skim off some of the invisible money flows. This was also a period when 
the military increased their influence and displaced civil servants from institutional 
posts. There was massive corruption in the security services, with covert operations 
leading to a vast range of opportunities to generate revenue - from ivory to drug 
smuggling, with growing links to the criminal underworld. The police were more 
interested in suppressing dissent, than in solving crime.391 
In 1939 Afrikaner nationalism took stock of its economic situation at an economic 
conference organised by Federasie van Ajrikaanse Kultuurvereeniging (FAK) 
(Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Associations). The congress was marked by a strong 
sense of the Afrikaner's relative deprivation in relation to other whites. It was stated at 
the congress that it was necessary to mobilise Afrikaner capital, to conquer the cities 
and for Afrikaners to support Afrikaner business. Whilst this approach was criticised 
as sectional and party-political, the retort was that this was necessary if Afrikaners 
were to achieve economic self-reliance. The congress also criticised capitalism 
because it promoted a 'spirit of material ism' .392 The rise in the economic power of the 
Afrikaner was helped by the post war boom, but the major force was the patronage of 
the Nationalist govemment from 1948 onwards. Up until 1948 the Afrikaners were 
not involved to any great extent in commerce or industry in South Africa. In 1946 
390 O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p.241. 
391 Hyslop, 'Political Corruption Before and After Apartheid', pp.773-789. 











30.3% of Afrikaners were involved in agricultural occupations. This declined to 16% 
in 1960, and to just 8.1 % by 1977. The number of Afrikaner 'blue-collar' workers 
remained static throughout the 1950s (40.7% in 1946 and 40.5% in 1960), but it then 
dropped precipitously during the boom years of the 1960s and was a mere 26.7% by 
1977. Most of the 'blue-collar' workers had moved into skilled and better paid 
positions and there was a marked increase of Afrikaners in the 'white collar' 
categories (29% in 1946,43.5% in 1960 and 65.2% in 1977).393 
The urbanisation of the Afrikaners, together with their movement into more skilled 
occupations, obviously was a major factor in the improved economic position of the 
Afrikaners, but their businesses received their biggest boost from the favourable 
attitude of government to them. O'Meara lists four major factors which contributed to 
the greater stake of Afrikaners in business in South Africa. These were: the 
proliferation of state corporations and parastatals under National Party rule placed 
Afrikaners in positions of control in key manufacturing sectors; government contracts 
and subsidies benefited the Sanlam industrial investment subsidiary, Federale 
Volksbeleggings in particular; the three major Afrikaner financial groups, Sanlam, Old 
Mutual394 and Volkskas, began to diversify their holdings moving into manufacturing 
in the 1950s; the drop in share prices and flight of foreign capital following 
Sharpeville in the 1960s was used by Afrikaner business to increase their 
shareholdings in a wide range of manufacturing and other companies. This increasing 
role of Afrikaners in private enterprise is illustrated in table 6. 
393 O'Meara, forty Lost Years, p.138. 
394 It is somewhat of a controversial point to consider the Old Mutual as an Afrikaner business as it 
was formed in 1845 and had in 1946 a mainly English board of directors. Even in 1995 the directors 
mainly came from an English background. Sanlam always gave the image of the insurance 
company for Afrikaners in contrast to the Mutual's English image. This does not detract from 












TABLE 6: AFIUKANER PERCENTAGE OWNERSHIP IN THE PIUVATE 
SECTOR 1948-9 1954-5 1963-4 1975 
Agriculture, 
Forestry and 85 84 83 82 
Fishing 
Mining 1 1 10 18 
Manufacturing 
6 6 10 IS 
and Commerce 
Trade and 
25 26 24 16 
Commerce 
Transportation 9+ 14 14 15 
Liquor and 
20+ 30 30 35 
Catering 
Professions 16 20 27 28 
Finance 6 10 21 25 
Miscellaneous 27 35 36 45 
Aggregate 24,8 25,4 26,9 27,5 
Aggregate 
excluding 9,6 13,4 18,0 20,8 
Agriculture 
+ Estimates 
It is apparent from the above table that the major beneficiaries in the Afrikaner 
business community during the apartheid years were those involved in the financial 
industrial and commercial sectors with the Cape interests dominating in all these three 
sectors. In the 1960s Afrikaner finance consisted basically of two groups: Sanlam and 











Afrikaner involvement in the mining industry followed on the transfer of General 
Mining by the Anglo American Corporation to Sanlam's subsidiary Federale Mybou. 
The Cape based Rembrandt Group grew rapidly after 1948, becoming one of the 
world's major tobacco corporations and it also had very substantial liquor and other 
holdings, both locally and overseas. The predominantly Afrikaner controlled Cape 
liquor industry also boomed after 1948.395 Rembrandt obviously benefited from the 
Nationalist government, but Anton Rupert, the chairman and founder of the 
Rembrandt Group had a very stormy relationship with Prime Minister Verwoerd in the 
1960s. Rupert was of the view that it was essential that blacks be given the 
opportunity to own houses in white urban areas, but Verwoerd reacted violently to the 
suggestion. Rupert then modified his suggestion to one of a 99 year lease, but 
Verwoerd was incensed with Rupert. He never forgave him and never again spoke 
directly to him. Verwoerd had previously had an unfortunate experience with an 
investment, and accordingly did not trust capitalists.396 Rupert's relationship with 
Verwoerd's successor, Vorster, was considerably easier, but Rembrandt's progress 
must have been adversely affected by the conflict between Rupert and Vervoerd.397 
Rupert was critical of the Bantustan policy, introduced by Verwoerd, which, in his 
view, more than anything else, resulted in poverty in South Africa. Rupert favoured 
white investment in black areas, but this was contrary to Verwoerd's policy and was 
another source of conflict between them.398 By 1981 eight conglomerates controlled 
more than 60% of the assets in the private sector. Four years later, four of these 
conglomerates had been taken over by the big four: Anglo American, Sanlam, S A 
395 0' Meara, Forty Lost Years, p.140. 
396 Ibid, p.71. 












Mutual and Rembrandt, who now together controlled over 80% of the shares listed on 
the Joharmesburg Stock Exchange, with the Afrikaner economic movement being led 
by Sanlam and Rembrandt. 399 
The Afrikaner business community in the Western Cape was adversely affected by 
apartheid, but the benefits they received from the government in the period from 1960 
to 1990 more than compensated for this and Afrikaner business boomed in the period. 
Annexures D (a) and (b) give a summary of the performance of Sanlam from 1971 to 
1990. The normal measure of the performance of an insurance company is to examine 
the changes in premium income and total assets. SANLAM's premium income 
increased from Rm 92 in 1971 to Rm 533 in 1980 and to Rm 7428 in 1990, and the 
total assets of Sanlam were Rm 529 in 1971, Rm 2450 in 1980, and Rm 27908 in 
1990.400 Giliomee said that in the apartheid years the smaller Afrikaner businesses had 
complained that SANLAM had siphoned off capital that should have gone to them, 
and that they had not received the benefits which, as Afrikaners, they should have 
received.401 Apartheid might have adversely affected SANLAM, but the patronage of 
the Nationalist government was such that it boosted the company to impressive 
heights and without government support where would SANLAM have been in 1990'1 
The attitude of SANLAM's management to government policies changed during the 
years of apartheid. As stated in Chapter 1, Dr. Louw, in his chairman's address at the 
1962 annual general meeting, stated that, notwithstanding the attacks from within and 
without South Africa, the economy had grown to a remarkable degree, there was 
stability in the political and economic areas, and exports of gold and other items had 
399 Ibid, p. I 77. ~ 
400 SAN LAM's AIUlual Reports, 1980 & 1990, pp.3 & 4 respectively. 











shown a remarkable increase. When Dr. Louw referred to 'separate development' ,402 
he said that the goverlUl1ent was aware o[ the necessity of expanding and 
consolidating the Bantustans as soon as possible. 40J By the time of his Chairman's 
Address at SANLAM's 1964 annual general meeting, Dr. Louw was referring to 
inflationary pressures which had arisen in the economy and to the increasing overseas 
concern as to the impact of apartheid on the South African people and its economy; 
yet he also drew attention to the improvement in the conditions o[ the non-whites in 
South Africa.404 
The Chairman's Address to SANLAM's 1986 annual general meeting, given by Dr. 
F.J. du Plessis was not as confident as those of his predecessors. He said that the 
South African economy had not performed in a satisfactory manner, growth was low 
showing the largest fall since the days of the great depression in the 1930s, inflation 
was at 18% at the end of 1985, and the exchange rate of the rand had sharply declined. 
Whilst the current account of the balance of payments reflected a record surplus due 
to the fall in the rand exchange rate, the capital account was a serious problem and 
South Africa faced a currency crisis. The country was experiencing weak international 
demand [or its products and falling exp011 prices. In Dr. du Plessis's view it had not 
attracted sufficient overseas investments and had to resort to short-term overseas 
loans, which were to cause her considerable problems, when overseas banks refused 
to roll over these loans. Dr. du Plessis referred to the impact that political uncertainty 
had on the South African economy: to foreigners the fall in the exchange rate of the 
rand was an indication that the position in South Africa was out of control. Dr.du 
Plessis also referred to the inflationary impact that the increasing wages for blacks had 
402 The tenn was being used by the government in place of apartheid, but the latter term continued to 
be used, both within and without South Africa. 
401 Louw, Chainnan's Address to SANLAM's 1962 Annual General Meeting, p.6 











on the economy and he called for a national strategic plan to deal with the increasing 
danger of overseas sanctions and boycotts to the economy.405 The mood in Afrikaner 
business had changed, panic was in the air. The same Dr.F.J.du Plessis, in his role as 
president of the Urban Foundation, in an address to its ammal general meeting on 31 
January 1986, referred to the fact that notwithstanding the political changes which had 
been made, the pendulum of South Africa's fortunes seem to have been 'permanently 
stuck at its negative extremity'. The South African government, in Dr. du Plessis' 
view, had rejected political domination by one community, exclusion of any 
community from political decision making, racial discrimination and impairment of 
human dignity, and irUustice or inequality in the opportunities available to any 
community. In Dr. du Plessis' view these developments meant different things to 
different communities; the whites conceded that they were significant; older blacks 
conceded that the circumstances they found themselves in had improved, but the 
young blacks were critical of the tinkering with the system, which they rejected in its 
entirety, whilst foreign governments and media were not only confused, but 
disbelieved the sincerity of the government. The position had become more serious in 
1985. Dr. du Plessis referred to the actions of government which undermined the 
sincerity of its reforms. He noted the South African attack on Cabinda in Angola, 
when the United States Congress was debating the constructive engagement policy; 
the Botswana attack at the same time as the United Nations Security Council was 
debating South African issues; the shootings in Cape Town, whilst the British Prime 
Minister was strenuously opposing sanctions at the Commonwealth Conference; the 
killings at Langa in Cape Town on the anniversary of the Sharpeville massacres, and 
on the same date that President P W Botha was interviewed on a United States 











television programme; the Rubicon speech by President Botha on 15 August 1985, 
when a statement on reform was expected, but did not eventuate; and police action 
against Winnie Mandela at the same time as there was a ministerial atmouncement 
that restrictions on her were being eased. Dr. du Plessis found it hard to accept that in 
all these events were simply coincidental. There were two conflicting theories; firstly 
that the government's actions were being undermined by right-wing elements, and 
secondly that the government's insistence that reform could only take place by 
negotiation with those black leaders who renounced violence, was merely a facade 
behind which the government would sporadically fuel existing tensions to minimise 
the chances of negotiations getting under way. The overseas business sector was 
confused and this increased the 'hassle factor' of doing business in South Africa. Dr. 
du Plessis said that South Africa had three priorities: violence in black towns must be 
stopped; the economy must be brought back on a sound footing; and the demise of 
apartheid must be established and in its place must come a 'just society with equal 
opportunities for all'. He also said that: 'Signalling the tinal demise of apartheid and 
the determined pursuit of reform will have to be clear and unequivocal, if moderation, 
. 11 d 11 . ·1' 406 mterna y an externa y IS to preval . 
In his chairman's address to the 1988 annual general meeting of SANLAM, Dr. F J du 
Plessis referred to President P. W. Botha's announcement that South Africa can only 
achieve a just and stable political future, if the economy is sufficiently robust to deal 
with the economic consequences of achieving this object. In Dr. du Plessis' view the 
overseas financial sanctions had already weakened the South African economy and 
that South Africa is in a crisis and needs crisis management to deal with our 












problems.407 Compared to their approach in 1962, SANLAM management realised in 
1988 that change had to come and that apartheid had not provided a viable solution to 
South Africa's problems, and the economy could not afford the cost. The change in 
the sentiment in the Afrikaner business community in the 1980s was due to the 
deteriorating economic situations in South Africa and a concern that the government 
did not have an answer to the country's political, social and economic problems. The 
optimistic views of Afrikaner business in the 1960s had evaporated, and they were 
fearful of what the future would hold. 












TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
REPORT (TRC) 
The TRC was a couli-like body, set up by the government of National-Unity, which 
assembled after the end of apartheid, giving anyone, who had been a victim of 
violence under apartheid, the opportunity to be heard. Perpetrators of violence during 
the apartheid period could also give testimony and request amnesty from 
prosecution. 408 The report of the TRC on the institutional hearings on business and 
labour referred to the complex power relations of apartheid which included the 
consequences of job reservation, influx control, wages, and unequal access to 
resources, migrant labour and the hostel system. The report said that two dominant 
positions emerged. One saw apartheid as part of a system of racial-capitalism, and 
thus was beneficial for white business. According to this view, business as a whole, 
benefited from the system, but some sectors of the economy, notably Afrikaner 
business, the mining and armaments industry benefited more than others. The other 
position, which was argued by the business community, claimed that apartheid raised 
the cost of doing business, eroded the skill base and undermined long-term 
productivity and growth.409 
The TRC referred to what they calledjirst order involvement, where business played a 
central role in designing and implementing apartheid policies, which applied 
particularly to the mining industry and that this approach resulted in lower costs and 
408 http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilTruth and Reconciliation Commission, 
R. Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-
Apartheid State, pp26-26. 












increased profits. The second order involvement referred to those businesses whose 
dealings could not reasonably be expected to have contributed directly or 
subsequently to repression. Here the example the TRC gave was those businesses that 
supplied armoured vehicles to the police during the mid-1980s. The TRC said that 
both businesses of the first and second order involvement had more to answer for than 
other businesses. Finally the TRC referred to third order involvement, which refelTed 
to those businesses who benefited indirectly by virtue of operating within the 
I 'd 410 apali1el system. 
In evidence before the commission, the Anglo American Group and the South African 
Breweries Group, both with extensive Western Cape interests, referred to the special 
relations between Afrikaner business and the ruling Nationalist Party. Whilst 
SANLAM, the large Afrikaner insurance conglomerate, did not consider that they had 
any preferred status with the Nationalist Party, Professor Sampie Terblanche agreed 
that the government favoured Afrikaner business.411 
In its evidence to the commission the National African Federated Chamber of 
Commerce (NAFCOC) said that the apartheid state systematically undermined black 
business. This was achieved by discriminatory legislation, the application of the 
Group Areas Act and the allocation of licences, and by other means. These measures 
restricted and stifled black business and also gave white business the opportunity to 
take advantage of the business opportunities denied to black business. These 
businesses were denied the opportunity to trade in white areas in terms of the Group 
Areas Act. Those black businesses which obtained licences to trade in certain areas in 
petrol, liquor etc. benefited to some extent as there was limited competition, as a 
result of the implementation of apartheid policies. This provided some measure of 
410 Ibid, pp.24-26. 











protection for those few businessmen who obtained licences, and in evidence before 
the commission the Indian-owned Avalon Cinemas said that it could not operate in 
white areas, but the white-owned Ster Kinekor was permitted to operate in Indian 
areas. The Islamic Chamber of Commerce said to the commission that there were 
black businesses who 'collaborated with the apartheid regime, were involved in 
sanction-busting, and together with corrupt politicians in the tri-cameraI government 
were engaged in procuring business contracts, land, houses etc. for their own benefit 
to the exclusion of those rightfully deserving of these assets,.412 The commission was 
of the general view that the overall impact of apartheid was to 'undermine black 
business systematically and perniciously, and in addition the government limited the 
development of black managerial expertise, thus prejudicing the acquisition of 
business skills by blacks.413 
In its findings arising out of the business sector hearings the commission said that 
business was central to the economy that sustained the South African state during the 
apatiheid years. They also remarked that certain businesses, especially the mining 
industry, were involved in designing and implementing apartheid policies and in the 
commission's view most white businesses benefited from operating in a racially 
structured context.414 Overall the commission was critical of white business in its 
actions during the apartheid years. They considered that generally white business 
benefited from apartheid, in contrast to the view expressed by business that apartheid 
adversely affected them. 
412 Ibid, p.35. 
413 Ibid, p.32. 













From 1960 to 1974 there was an era of substantial and unparalleled growth in the 
South African economy, following on steps taken by government, after the Sharpeville 
massacre to restrict imports and reduce capital outflows. The Western world was at 
the same time experiencing the latter end of the' long boom', which boosted the local 
economy. It was generally agreed by businessmen that apartheid adversely affected 
the South African economy, but Middlemann said that there were three economic 
events which disguised the reality of the South African situation in the years from 
1946 to 1976. These were firstly, the substantial increase in gold production following 
on the discovery and development of the Free State and Far West Rand goldfields, and 
secondly, this was combined with the dramatic increase in the price of gold, and this 
increased revenue was used to develop the countries natural and human resources. 
Thirdly, there was the significant contribution made by the 'brilliant' Afrikaner 
entrepreneurs to the South African economy.415 From 1976 onwards the South African 
economy weakened following on the slump in the world economy. Conditions became 
ripe for the outbreak of black violence. Weak reforms in the 1980s led to mass 
insurrection, which caused the debt standstill; South Africa became a net exporter of 
capital and the value of the rand collapsed. During the 1980s there was ever greater 












concern in the Afrikaner business community as to the political, social and economic 
conditions in the country. 
The Western Cape had no mining industry and was far from the country's economic 
centre, which affected its economic performance. Yet the area did have great strength 
in agricultural, property and financial services. In the view of Western Cape 
businessmen, apartheid had a negative impact on their businesses, but there were 
certain businesses in the area which prospered. Professor Thomas said that the 
Western Cape benefited in being far from the major markets and also because of the 
strict labour laws which restricted the use of black unskilled labour. These factors 
caused the development of high-tech service industries in the area. 416 Business in 
South Africa suffered punitive rates of tax, both at corporate and individual level, in 
order to pay for the country's disastrous apartheid policies. Whether the South African 
tax rates were higher than in other countries is a moot point, but businesses in other 
countries received generous tax allowances and incentives not enjoyed in South 
Africa. Furthermore job reservation, together with the coloured labour preference 
policy created a major shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour in the area. This 
created problems for Cape industrialists in particular and was of great concern to the 
Cape Chamber of Industries. The administration of the coloured labour preference 
was a burden for business, as the process of obtaining exception was slow and 
laborious, but towards the end of the apartheid years job reservation was relaxed, and 
in addition many non-whites were illegally employed in skilled and semi-skilled 
positions. 
The government's decentralisation policy took capital away from the Cape as the 
incentives were so attractive that investments went into border areas. The only 











economic growth point in the Western Cape was at Atlantis, which failed. The Group 
Areas Act restricted business' trading operations and moved workers far from their 
jobs, which created economic and social problems. Sanctions and boycotts affected 
the Cape's fruit and wine exports and frightened off visitors to the Cape. If one 
considers the present tourist boom in the Western Cape one appreciates how much 
revenue Western Cape business lost in the apartheid period. 
The major concern of Cape business was the lack of a stable social environment in the 
area. Business cannot prosper in uncertain times, when there are civil disturbances of 
one form or another. Giliomee said that any liberal policies adopted in the period 
would have created unstable conditions in the country and played into the hands of 
communists. He also said that there was less corruption under apartheid than there 
was now, as in the early years the Afrikaners had the ideal of apartheid and now there 
was only greed.417Whilst business in the area generally suffered from the effects of 
apartheid, certain businesses, particularly Afrikaner business, prospered. The 
patronage they received from government more than made up for the adverse effects 
of apartheid on their businesses. 
Organised business, mainly Assocom, pressed government for change, particularly in 
times of a downturn in the economy. In the 1980s one saw increasing criticism of 
government policy from the Afrikaner business conm1Unity. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was of the view that business was central to the economy 
that sustained the South African state during apartheid and that it systematically 
undermined black business. 
Overall the review of the impact of apmiheid on business over the period gi ves mixed 
messages. On the one hand apartheid restricted the economic development of the 











country, but on the other hand certain businesses prospered under apartheid, notably 
the Afrikaner business sector. The South African businessmen, both English and 
Afrikaner, were skilful in adapting to the difficult conditions in South Africa which 
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TABLE 10.10: TRADE SANCTIONS IN FORCE AGAINST 
SOUTH AFRICA, 1988 
Imports from South Africa Exports to South 
Africa 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
Belgium x x x x 
Canada x x x x x x x X Xl X x 
France x Xl x X X X x 
WGermany x x x X X4 x 
Hong Kong x x x 
Israe I x x3 X3 x 
Italv x x x x 
Japan x Xl x X X x 
Netherlands x Xl x X X X X x 
Switzerland x x x 
UK x x x x x x x 
USA x x x x x x x x x x x 
'- Voluntary ~ Phase-out fur parastatals 3 Quota freeze 4 Restrictions short of outright ban 
A = Agricullural produce 
B = Goid coins 
C = Procuremcnt bv government 
D=Cllal 
E = I roll orc/pig ore 
F = Uranium 
C; = Steel 
H =Computers to security forces/government agencies 
I = Oil and petroleum products 
J = Nuclear related items 











- TABLE 17.7: FOREIG!'I VISITORS TO SOGTH AFRICA, 
1959-88 (SELECT YEARS) 
'---' 
Year Total 
1959 160 635 
1960 169 534 
1961 170912 
1963 217005 
1965 226 896 
1970 389694 
1973 610 170 
1975 no 368 
1976 638479 
1977 589 025 
1978 644 329 
1979 682 198 
1980 702 794 
]981 708 716 
1982 659913 
1983 7044..J-4 
1984 792 387 
1985 727 552 
1986 6-+4502 
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1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 19,0 growth rate 
Assets (R million) 
fixed pmpeny 471 673 801 976 I 247 I 411 I 592 I 816 2205 2838 21 % 
Sb",es 506 III I 058 I 228 1459 2 154 J 030 3879 6252 9 754 16% 
Secwities aod loans: Public sectc) 1037 I 531 2000 2536 1 160 4061 5 143 6204 6192 8250 27% 
Othel interest-bearing jnvest~ents 801 695 792 1012 I 167 1100 I 818 1804 6017 4 710 21 % 
Fix~d and CUI rent assets 256 322 198 506 147 866 1049 I 290 1739 2136 29 % 
r etal assets 3013 3932 5049 6258 7780 9594 12632 169932242527908 28 % 
!ncome and expendi(ure 
(R million) 
Premium inCome 645 861 1079 I 314 I 605 2087 3527 5 174 6036 7428 10% 
~ves!ment income 293 4io 540 684 872 1075 1 320 I 739 2451 2990 31 % 
Policy b<nefits 224 300 395 545 759 1003 1409 1 937 2436 3880 37 % 
A~~lni~~tative ~xpenscs 43 58 II 83 107 1JJ 170 225 289 408 29% 
Saies.re·mune~tiof! 67 77 7J 103 129 188 263 380 461 546 28 % 
~djusted for inflation 
(to the 1990 rand) 
Premium income 2197 2556 2829 3 102 1292 3619 5226 6 751 6908 7428 13% 
Investment income 998 I 247 I 416 I 615 1 788 I 864 I 956 2 269 2805 2990 14 % 
Policy benefits 763 890 I 036 I 287 I 557 I 739 2087 2527 2788 3880 19 % 
AdministJative expenses 146 172 186 196 219 232 252 294 331 408 13% 
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BILL NEAfE: INTERVIEW ON 2 MARC I-I 2006 
Neate joined Imperial Cold Storage (ICS) in 1942 and became Chairman and 
Managing Director in 1978. He retired in 1989, but remained on the board until 1994. 
I Ie was involved in the company's operations in the Cape, as a local general manager 
in 1968 and before that in 1966 he was the Managing Director of Sea Harvest, a 
company set up by ICS in 1964, which was a joint-venture fishing operation 
established at Saldanha in the Western Cape. Dutch and Spanish companies held 
shares in Sea Harvest. 418 ICS was involved in the perishable food industry with the 
main operations of their business in the meat, dairy and ice-cream industries. But 
with the establishment of Sea Harvest they diversified into commercial fishing. Neate 
commented that ICS was involved in the white fish (hake etc.) industry, but they 
could not get permits to operate in the pelagic (sardines, pilchards etc.) fish industry 
as these permits were only granted to friends of the government. 
Neate commented on the adverse effect of apartheid on ICS, particularly in relation to 
their Cape interests. With regard to taxation, he had no particular comments, expressing 
the view that his company paid the same tax as other companies with one major 
exception; the co-operative societies enjoyed preferential tax treatment. This put them 
in an advantageous position in competing with commercial trading companies. ICS was 
at a distinct disadvantage, when competing with co-operative societies. In addition 
these societies received cheap finance from the Land Bank. These concessions enabled 
them to ofler considerable benefits to the farmers (producers), which IeS could not 
match. In addition the cooperatives had great influence on the Marketing Boards. 
Whilst the favoured treatment received by cooperatives was not a direct policy of 
apartheid adopted by the Nationalist government, the cooperatives enjoyed these 











benefits owing to the fact that the farming community (members of the cooperatives) 
were a major source of the National Party' political power. 
The main impact of apartheid on ICS was in respect of job reservation and in 
particular the coloured labour preference policy which applied in the Western Cape. 
Neate spuke un the difficulties they had in obtaining coloured milk deliverers at the 
time when milk was delivered door-to-door. It was only with great difficulty, much 
effOli and long meetings with govenm1ent that they were able to employ blacks to 
deliver milk. The coloured community were not interested in this occupation. In 
addition to the normal wages, which ICS had to pay, they also were required, at their 
own cost, to erect hostels to accommodate their contract black milk deliverers. 
With regard to sanctions and boycotts ICS had problems in obtaining know-how 
relating to perishable food production from overseas sources. Many overseas 
countries were not prepared to do business with South Africa and in one case a 
contract for the supply of teclmical knowledge was cancelled after the government of 
the country concerned applied pressure on the proposed supplier of the information. 
There were problems for ICS in obtaining trawlers from overseas shipbuilders and 
they had to rely on the local shipbuilding industry whose costs were considerably 
higher than those of overseas shipbuilders. 
Civil disturbances in South Africa as a result ofthe apartheid policies created 
problems for ICS and affected the company's profitability. There were lockouts in 
Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban, which impacted on the profitability of ICS. 
Military conscription, which was introduced by the apartheid government, had a 
major impact on the operations of rcs, as key personnel were called up for military 











Neate was of the view that apartheid affected the development of the company, as 
they were not able to branch out into other trading areas. It also placed limitations on 
their exports and imports, especially equipment. ICS however made money in the 
apartheid years. ICS's annual report for 1988 gives the review of the trading results 
of the company from 1982 to 1989. It shows that the company's profitability was 
reduced in the years from 1983 to 1986 but that the profitability increased 
dramatically in 1987 and 1988.419 
Neate said that in the early years of apartheid there was stability which was good for 
the operations of the company, and in his view the company was master in its own 
house. In the latter years of apartheid, however, stability broke down and this affected 
ICS' profitability. Neate said that he was not aware of any prejudice by the central 
government against the Western Cape because of its more liberal approach. He said 
thatlCS did not make contributions to any political party and adopted a non-political 
attitude. 
Overall, in his view apartheid did not have a major impact on ICS nationally nor in 
the Western Cape with the exception of the coloured labour preference policy which 
wa~; adopted in that area. 
PHlLlP KRAWITZ: INTERVIEW ON 4 APRIL 2006 
Philip Krawitz is the Chief Executive Officer of the Cape Union Mart Group (CUM) 
and has held that position since 1980, joining the group in 1970 when his father 
became ill. Krawitz was President of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce and 
President of the Southern African Chamber of Business, and he was prominent in 
many civic organisations. 











CUM was originally a general store, which tried to be different in the range of stocks 
it held and in providing out of season wear. They operate a range of retail stores 
dealing with outdoor wear, and they have a range of stores providing uniforms for 
security and other staff. The group also has a manufacturing division making uniforms 
and other outdoor gear. In addition the group has a property division, buying and 
selling properties. CUM's head office is in Cape Town, but they carryon business 
throughout South Africa. In the apartheid period CUM tried to source stocks globally, 
but they ran into difficulties in doing so owing to the hostile attitude in overseas 
countries to the South African apartheid policies. The management of CUM visited 
overseas trade shows and in many cases the stallholders would not talk to them. 
Krawitz said that the heavy tax burden on both companies and individuals restricted 
the development of companies. He said that: 'Bad law had created crooks out of 
honest people': a practice of tax avoidance 420 had arisen and many adopted the view 
that any means could be used to reduce one's tax liability; it was felt that it was 
legitimate to avoid pying tax, if one had reservations as to how those taxes were 
spent. 
The significant deficit on the capital account of the balance of payments in the worst 
years of apartheid, led the government to introduce strict controls on imports in order 
to achieve a surplus on the current account of the balance of payments. These 
measures included an Import Surcharge421 . There were also high duties on imports, 
and the result was that after paying all the taxes there was little left over for business 
to finance development. As a result CUM only expanded from a one-store operation 
420 Tax aviosion is the practice of arranging one's affairs to minimise the tax liability in manner which 
is not illegal, but very close to being so. 
421 In effect an additional form of tax, which it was originally stated would be temporary but was not 











in the late 1980's. The government also restricted imports by requiring importers to 
obtain permits from government for all imports. This set up an enormous bureaucracy, 
and the system was basically COITupt and was open to abuse and bribery. Importers 
had to spend an inordinate amount of time in obtaining permits, and businesses 
situated in the Cape had to frequently visit Pretoria as this was the only way they 
could obtain permits. Imports were essential for CUM, as they formed a significant 
part of their turnover and the anogance of the officials was such that in many cases 
they demanded 'favours' before granting permits. 
CUM was severely affected by the coloured labour preference policy which restricted 
the employment of blacks in the Western Cape. Krawitz said that the coloured 
community was not keen onjobs requiring manuallabour.422 There was a large pool 
of blacks available to do this work, but it was a major administrative burden to get the 
permits needed before they could employ blacks. There was even a service industry 
of consultants assisting businesses to obtain these permits. 
CUM was one of the first companies to employ coloured sales staff, but there was 
some resistance from customers, who had been brought up on the insidious diet of 
apaI1heid. Government policy had created tensions between CUM's staff and their 
customers. 
A major impact of the Group Areas Act was that the poor were moved far from their 
places of employment. Initially govemment subsidised the additional travel costs, but 
later this was forgotten, when severe restrictions had to be placed on government 
expenditure. Employers thus had to increase salaries of their non-white staff to cover 
this additional cost burden on these members of staff. A further point was that the 
long hours that the non-whites needed to get to work affected their productivity, and 
422 Shaw said that whilst coloureds might not be inclined to do manual labour, many had in earlier 











the employers could not ask them to work oveltime no matter how urgent the need 
was. 
CUM was also affected by the Group Areas Act in relation to a shop they traded in on 
the boundaries of District 6 and which received strong support from the local coloured 
community. When the mainly coloured population was moved out far from the centre 
of town, their profitable shop was no longer viable. The Central Business District 
never recovered from the dislocations caused by the Group Areas Act. 
With regard to decentralisation benefits, Krawitz, said that the government created an 
unsustainable business model, and they used business to achieve purely political 
objectives. The government paid businesses to open their factories adjacent to the 
black areas, but most ofthese businesses did not survive, and they provided unfair 
competition to businesses established in urban areas. They could negotiate special 
wage agreements to pay their workers low rates of pay which created chaos in the 
industry, undercutting and distorting the economy. CUM could not compete with 
industries set up in the Border areas, in view of their low wage rates. 
CUM earned a considerable turnover with foreign tourists. These tourists were 
particularly interested in the safari goods which were stocked by CUM. Prior to the 
apartheid years, South Africa was a regular port of call for the cruise liners. The 
passengers on these liners were good customers of CUM. As the apattheid policies 
toughened, the operators of the cruise liners decided that South Africa, for political 
reasons, was off limits. 
Since the fall of apartheid, there has been tremendous growth in the hotel industry in 
the Cape and one has also seen a vibrant and expanding self-catering and bed and 
breakfast accommodation industry, accompanied by a dramatic increase in the number 











owing to apartheid. During the apartheid years tourists did not come to South Africa 
because they considered that it was not a safe place to visit. In addition many 
potential tourists did not come here for moral reasons. 
In Krawitz's opinion, in some ways apatiheid was hugely successful, but in other 
ways it was only partly successful. South Africa began to realise that the' laager,423 
mentality would not see us through. In the modern world isolation did not work, and 
one could not be part of the global community and have isolationist policies. The 
effects on South African business were dramatic; there were countries that one 
couldn't visit, let alone trade with, and this was particularly so with regard to 
Scandinavia. One could obtain any goods from anywhere in the world, but at a 
premium. For example, with regard to Norwegian socks, one could not purchase them 
direct from Norway, but one could purchase them from wholesalers in Britain at 
greater cost, 30% to 40% more. As a result of sanctions luxury items and motor 
vehicles were more expensive in South Africa than in the rest of the world. 
In one way sanctions were effective. Consumer boycotts were particularly effective as 
was the anti-South African attitude of the overseas trade unions. The activities of dock 
and postal workers often disrupted exports to South Africa. Civil disturbances 
particularly in the latter years of apartheid created problems for CUM. The head 
office of CUM was situated near to Parliament, and accordingly CUM suffered 
disruptions to their normal trading activities and damage to their premises. The 
imposition of military conscription on whites caused severe disruption particularly to 
small businesses. It exacerbated the skill shortage and CUM, as did other companies, 
made up the difference between the military pay and the pay the serviceman normally 











received. This was an additional cost on business, without any additional revenue 
accrumg. 
Krawitz said that apartheid affected business in many ways. He quoted a commentator 
who said that 'When the rate of internal disintegration exceeds the rate of extcmal 
disintegration, a family, a company or a country will cease to exist'. Krawitz was of 
the view that apartheid hindered a company from building up team spirit in the 
company. The provision of separate amenities for each racial group, created barriers 
between these groups. In addition the provision of these separate amenities was an 
added cost burden for the company. Krawitz said that in the apartheid economy 
everything was a favour. Corruption was rife in areas like import control and the 
obtaining of permits for black labourers in the Western Cape. Much energy had to be 
expended by the corporate sector in dealing with the apatiheid bureaucracy. The 
corporate sector is doing well today, as it survived apartheid. 
The profitability of companies who imported was affected as they earned lower 
profits than in earlier years. Companies had to bear the costs of separate staff 
facilities and the cost of dealing with import control including the employment of 
special consultants to facilitate them getting reasonable import control allocations. 
The period from 1976 to 1986 was the worst for business: riot insurance cover had to 
be obtained, and there was considerable damage to CUM's stores from riots. Business 
tried to influence government to change its policies, without achieving as much as it 
hoped. Krawitz said that he was a non-political person, who tried to bring about 
changes in government policy. These activities had an impact on his business in view 












HERBERT HIRSCH: INTERVIEW ON 5 APRIL 2006 
Hirsch was the Chief Executive Officer of a small import agency, Walter Hirsch, 
which was family owned. This company imported fabrics, mainly from the East, and 
then on-sold them to chain-stores and the garment industry. 
Hirsch was a member of the Cape Provincial Council from 1974 until 1986, and a 
Cape Town City Councillor from 1972 to 1984. In both cases he was a representative 
of political parties, in opposition to the Nationalist government. Over the years he was 
involved in many community organisations, being President of the Cape Town 
Chamber of Commerce in 1992, and earlier being involved in ratepayers' associations. 
In his view sanctions did not have a major impact on his business. He said that 
sanctions had more serious implications for expOliers. Foreign companies, who 
exported to South Africa, often could get round the sanctions which their governments 
imposed, possibly by routing their expOlis to South Africa via an nternlediate country. 
Job reservation had had little impact on Walter I-Iirsch, as they had a small staff. The 
heavy burden of tax had an impact on the company, but was not of great concern to 
him. 
In Hirsch's view the business climate was difficult, when the conditions in the country 
were unsettled. Protective tariffs and import control assisted the local manufacturing 
industry, and it was a closed market, which resulted in a number of protected 
industries, who often were inefficient and not globally competitive. Because of 
protection, in Hirsch's view, white bosses in the manufacturing industry had an easy 
time, not having to face overseas competition. The weak rand affected Walter Hirsch, 
as it made its fabrics considerably more expensive. Military conscription did not 
impact directly on Hirsch's company, but it created uncertainty in the market, which 











The company's profitability was not directly affected by apartheid. Hirsch himself 
was very involved in the Chamber of Commerce movement, trying to influence the 
govenm1ent to change its policies. Hirsch said that his company would have been 
more profitable if he had not had this involvement, nor his involvement in politics. In 
Hirsch's view the major impact of apartheid on business was when there were major 
civil disturbances in the country. In his view there was a particular downturn in 
sentiment in the business community after President P.W.Botha's 'Rubicon' speech in 
1985, and that the action taken by President de Klerk in 1990 was as a result of 
economIC pressures. 
With regard to the Provincial Council, wide ranging economic debates did not take 
place in the Council, as its mandate was very restricted, mainly covering education, 
transport and health. Further the Council only raised about 10% of its income, the 
balance being provided by central government, and this meant that the Council's 
activities were strictly controlled by central government. Hirsch did not consider that 
the Cape's liberal attitude had any impact on decisions by central government relating 
to funding of Cape development. The Provincial Council was controlled by the 
Nationalist Party, in contrast to the Cape Town City Council which was controlled by 
opposition parties. In Hirsch's view this did not impact on the provision of funds by 
central government to the Cape area. With regard to the Cape Town City Council 
budgets, these only required the overall approval of the central government, in order 
to ensure that the budgets were in line with central govermnent economic plam1ing. 












Hirsch said that one of the effects of apartheid was a decline in moral standards. 
Importers adopted the tactic of arranging with their suppliers to over-invoice the 
goods imported, the overpayment being kept overseas in an account in the importer's 
name, in contravention of the exchange control regulations. Overall Hirsch was of the 
view that apartheid did not materially affect the profitability of his business. 
Apartheid, however, created uncertainty in the market, and in his view South Africa 
would have been in a much stronger economic position, if more liberal policies had 











PROFESSOR WOLFGANG TIlOMAS: INTERVIEW ON 6 APRIL 2006 
Thomas has had a long academic career, firstly as a lecturer at Stel1enbosch from 1964 
to 1970, and then as a senior lecturer in economics at University of Cape Town in 
1972. In 1975 he joined the University of the Western Cape as a Professor and head 
of the Institute for Social Development, in 1977 he was deported for his political 
activities, returning to South Africa in 1980 to the University of the Transkei, where 
he was head of the Economics Dep~rtment. From 1983 to 1986 he was a Professor 
and Head of the Economics Department at the University of the Western Cape. 
He was involved in an initiative that aimed at developing the Western Cape called 
Wesplan, and in 1986 was appointed to the board of directors of the Small Business 
Development Corporation. In that year he was also appointed to the board of Wesgro, 
a private and public partnership set up to promote the growth of the Western Cape. He 
has been involved with the coloured community, particularly in relation to labour 
matters and entrepreneurship in small business in that community. 
At the outset of the interview, Thomas said that the Western Cape had benefited to a 
considerable degree by being far from the major South African markets and not being 
reliant on an unskilled black labour pool. In the late 1970s the Western Cape lagged 
behind the rest of the country, but by the 1980s the relatively better educated coloured 
community, and other factors, gave the area an advantage. The Western Cape moved 
into the more modern technically advanced areas, and by the second half of the 1980s 
the Western Cape was leading the rest of the country. The growth in the Western Cape 
was not reliant on an increase in population due to an influx of blacks, nor on 











and the area had an economy not reliant on manual labour. The Western Cape 
benefited from being on the sea, which assisted exports, and had considerable tourist 
appeal. The Western Cape thus concentrated on services, particularly of a high-tech 
nature. When, after the fall of apartheid, the blacks flocked to the Cape, they were a 
large consumer market, which benefited the area. 
Thomas was of the view that in the 1970s and 1980s our tax rates were not out of 
proportion with the rates of tax applicable in the rest of the world. South Africa did 
have a problem in that it was a small economy, with no economies of scale, so that 
there was a very small tax base. Under apattheid there was very little, if any, spending 
on black development and the money saved was used to pay for the ever rising cost 
of the security forces, Bantustans and other apartheid policies. In Thomas' view the 
overall tax burden in the period was still too high. 
Thomas agreed that job reservation, combined with the emigration of skilled whites, 
created severe inflexibility in the labour market in the Western Cape. Business in the 
Western Cape could not legally promote blacks, so if they wanted to do so they had to 
use them in positions out of the public eye, and in addition they could not give their 
black employees any form of outside technical training. Job reservation restricted the 
opportunities to promote coloureds and in many cases they too were employed in 
areas out of public scrutiny. When Western Cape businesses employed blacks 
illegally, they were at risk of being prosecuted, as the authorities undertook raids on 
businesses to see whether they were complying with the labour laws. The problems 
created by the coloured labour preference policy in attracting coloureds to jobs 
requiring manual labour, was due to the fact that there was a stigma in the coloured 











community was not inclined to manual labour, as a large number were previously 
employed by local authorities as manual labourers in the Western Cape.424 
In the 1960s and 1970s the Cape was not an attractive area to those resident in the 
then Transvaal. In fact during that period there was a considerable migration of skills 
from the Western Cape to the north. The Western Cape was not industrialised and had 
fewer highly remunerative job opportunities, compared to the then Transvaal. In the 
1980s the paradigm changed, as new industries were set up in the Western Cape and 
they attracted up country skills. 
Decentralisation benefits, generally not accruing in the Western Cape, created a 
position which was disadvantageous to conventional labour-intensive industries in 
that area. These benefits were granted at Atlantis in the Western Cape, but this 
development was a failure. Initially Mercedes established a diesel engine 
manufacturing plant at Atlantis in the Western Cape, but when this closed, there was 
not much left there. The government's policy of housing blacks far from employment 
opportunities had its cost implications through employees, but in Thomas' view the 
major problem this policy created was in its impact on the productivity of workers. In 
Thomas' view the restrictions on employing black labour assisted the development of 
the Western Cape, in that it gave greater opportunities to the coloured population. He 
said that the coloureds would not have progressed as much, if the black inf1ux had 
been greater, and provided cheap unskilled labour, and also the area was not subject to 
the political pressure from a large black population. He said that Professor van der 
Ross had been in favour of the coloured labour preference policy, and that his views 
had been shared by David Currie of the Labour Party. He was not sure whether 
Professor van del' Ross would still have the same views today. 











Thomas said that South Africa's poor overseas image impacted on tourism. The 
domestic tourism market was limited in the apartheid years to whites. Thomas said he 
believed there were approximately two million overseas tourists a year in the period 
from 2000 to 2005. In 1994 he estimated that we had approximately one million 
overseas tourists. In the 1970s the number of overseas tourists would have been 
considerably less, probably only one hundred thousand a year. Apartheid cost us a 
considerable amount of tourist revenue. In the apartheid years we had no black or 
Indian South African tourists and obviously few from the rest of Africa, and the 
development of the tourist industry was delayed by apartheid policies. 
The Western Cape was not as badly affected by sanctions as other areas of South 
Africa, as we did not have minerals or other major industries, like motor vehicle 
plants. The wine exports were small, the fruit industry suffered but where the Western 
Cape felt the effects of sanctions most was in the high-tech businesses. These 
businesses were dependent on the import of foreign teclmology and exports, which 
were in many cases restricted by sanctions. The fruit industry was affected by 
overseas consumer boycotts and this resulted in the industry using labels not directly 
identifiable with South Africa. Exports of fruit from the Western Cape had a specific 
appeal but this was lost, if there was no reference to that area on the label. The exports 
of fruit to the smaller dealers in Germany were not as susceptible to consumer 
boycotts as were the fruit exports to German supermarkets, but fruit exports to Britain 
were vulnerable to consumer boycotts. 
Civil disturbances did not affect the area as severely as other parts of the country. The 
black population was small, and the coloureds were not as politically motivated as the 











disturbances. With regard to military conscription the Western Cape suffered more 
than the rest of the country, as it was endeavouring to develop a more sophisticated 
economy. The area did not have the benefit of a mining industry, nor was there a 
defence industry in the area. The price of gold did not have the same impact on the 
Western Cape as in the mining area, the region's growth was more stable, less subject 
to fluctuations in the price of metals. Overall, Thomas was of the view that being far 
from the major South African markets and being subject to stricter labour laws had 
benefited the Western Cape, in that it had influenced the growth of the specialised 











JOHN DRAKE: INTERVIEW ON 8 SEPTEMBER 2006. 
Drake joined ShelllBP in 1969 as Company Secretary. He continued with Shell when 
it became a separate trading operation in South Africa, initially as Retail Director. 
After an overseas assignment he became Managing Director, Coal Division, and then 
Managing Director, Oil Division, and was thereafter in 1993 appointed as Chief 
Executive Officer for Shell in South Africa. Shell was involved in oil refining and 
marketing, coal exports, chemicals and metals. In the early 1990s Shell sold its metals 
business and in the mid-1990's sold their coal business. Shell, as a company, 
prospered when the South African economy prospered, but Drake held that, as a result 
of apartheid, the South African economy underperformed. 
The major adverse impact of apartheid on Shell, and in fact on the entire oil industry, 
was the creation of Sasol, which converted coal into oil, and the development of the 
Mossel Bay oilfields. These investments had a major impact on the profitability of the 
oil industry in South Africa. The investments in Sasol and Mossel Bay oil were made 
to ensure that South Africa was less reliant on imported oil, as South Africa was 
concerned that the growing strength of the Anti-Apartheid movement would make it 
more difficult for South Africa to obtain fuel supplies. Drake was of the view that the 
subsidies these companies received could have been better utilised in meeting some of 
South Africa's socio-economic needs. The result of oil being produced at Sasol and 
Mossel Bay was that the oil industry's refineries were under-utilised, and they had to 
export product into an overseas market which, at times, was over-supplied. As a 
result the prices they obtained for their exports were reduced. 
The other major impact of apartheid on Shell was the poor image of South Africa in 
overseas markets, which affected their coal exports. Many customers would not buy 











brought prospective customers to South Africa to show them Shell's good labour 
practices, and in pat1icular the housing they provided for their employees at their 
mines. Yet because Shell traded in South Africa and the country had a poor image 
overseas, Shell's international trading operations were affected by boycotts and 
unfavourable consumer reaction. A Centwy in Oil, the history of Shell Transport and 
Trading Company refelTed to the pressures on Shell to disinvest from South Africa. 
Holmes, the Chairman of Shell International, said: 
Outside South Africa we were hated by the anti-apartheid groups, because we 
were determined not to leave under duress, indeed not to leave at all - we felt 
we could do more good by being there than by making an empty gesture, and 
leaving the country would have been an empty gesture.425 
Drake said that the South African tax rates at the beginning of the period were not 
excessive in comparison to those in other countries, but they were slow, however, 
when following world trends to reduce tax rates. Job reservation and the coloured 
labour preference policy did not have a major impact on Shell. The oil industry ,other 
than their mining operations, was capital intensive, , and if they experienced skill 
shortages, particularly at senior level, they could always obtain the skilled staff they 
needed from overseas sources within Shell's international group. As far as the Western 
Cape was concerned, it did not have any plants in the area, their major depots were in 
Albel10n in the Transvaal and Durban and their refinery was in Natal. 
A concern expressed by Drake was that the governn1ent diverted extensive cash 
resources into maintaining the security establishment and financing the Bantustans. 
This expenditure, together with the tax and other incentives provided to border 











industries, diverted funds away from education and other socio-economic needs. He 
said that the biggest problem South Africa faced was the education of the blacks, 
coloureds and Indians, in order that they might playa meaningful role in the South 
African economy; in his view one of the major adverse impacts of apartheid was the 
poor education provided to the non-whites, which could take more than a generation 
to overcome. With regard to trade union activity in South Africa, as far as Shell was 
concerned they had a normal employer - trade union relationship. The Mineworkers' 
Union in the United States took militant action against South African coal exports to 
Europe, but this, in Drake's view, was not for political reasons, but to protect the 
mineworker's jobs in the United States. 
On the question of Shell's profitability, he said that there was not much competition in 
the oil industry in South Africa. When the local economy grew, the oil industry 
prospered. He considered that the apartheid years saw a steady deterioration in moral 
standards as overseas sanctions against South Africa increased. 
The Group Areas Act did have an impact on Shell as they could trade through their 
own properties in non-white areas. They however retailed their product through 
dealer-owned sites in these areas, which were exciting areas for development. Civil 
disturbances in South Africa were more of an inconvenience then a major problem to 
Shell. Drake was of the view that South Africa managed its mineral resources in such 
a manner that the Southern African economy was not adversely affected. He did not 
consider that South Africa suffered from the 'Resources Curse' and in fact, many 
countries with large natural resources managed their economies in a non-inflationary 
manner, notably Norway, Brunei and Malaysia. He even stated that the talk of the 
'Dutch Disease' was not valid, as the Netherlands had handled their large oil stocks in 





















KENNETH MARCUS: INTERVIEW ON 20 SEPTEMBER 2006 
Marcus was first involved, as an apprentice, in the medical supply industry in the 
early 1960s. In 1963 he became a sales representative in the industry with Marcus 
Medical (MM), later occupying administrative positions, and finally becoming the 
Managing Director. Marcus was Chairman of the Cape Town Chamber of 
Commerce's Foreign Trade Committee in the early 1980s, becoming President of the 
Chamber in 1991. 
MM's main business is the import and distribution of medical and surgical products, 
refened to in the industry as medical devices, but the company was not involved in 
the pharmaceutical industry. The head office of the company is situated in Cape 
Town, but it canies on business throughout South Africa. Marcus was of the view that 
the high level of taxation was a disincentive to companies, and even more so on 
individuals. Staff members were not motivated to earn more, as the fiscus took an ever 
bigger share as their income increased. The levels of company taxation were such as 
to restrict investment within or without the company. 
Job reservation did not apply to MM, and the company since its inception had adopted 
non-discriminatory labour practices in terms of race or sex. The founders of the 
company had fled Germany in order to avoid the anti-semitic policies adopted in that 
country prior to the Second World War. Conscription did not have much impact on the 
company as it generally only employed females and males who were 24 or 25 years 
old, having completed their military training. MM did have problems in the sourcing 
of coloured medical technologists, as the poor school education they received made it 
difficult for them to train as technologists. In fact there was also a sh0l1age of white 











industry became more sophisticated, technologists began to require a higher level of 
training. 
The Group Areas Act did not adversely affect the company, and in fact the 
government's policy of erecting hospitals in areas accessible to the formally 
disadvantaged benefited MM. In Marcu's view first world medical care was provided 
to all members of the South African society in the apartheid years and these services 
were provided by people with first-world training. In his view the overall standard of 
the health services provided to the South African population in that period was better 
than it is now. Neither the coloured labour preference policy nor the government's 
policy of providing decentralisation benefits had any impact on the company. Import 
control did not affect the company, nor did exchange control as health care was 
deemed to be an essential industry. 
Marcus commented on the position of a number of American companies who invested 
in South Africa. Whilst the South African economy was doing well they were happy 
to continue doing business in South Africa. When there was a downturn in the South 
African economy and they were subject to pressure by the Anti-Apartheid movement, 
they then disinvested from South Africa, particularly as this country provided a small 
part of their global earnings. During the apartheid years, MM's overseas principals 
generally did not visit South Africa, because of their dislike of the country's political 
policies. They were also nervous of the violence in the country. This made it easier for 
MM as they did not have their principals looking over their shoulder in South Africa. 
They left MM alone, as long as their sales performance was satisfactory. They were 
very happy to make money out of South Africa, but were reluctant to come here. 
During the period MM did not have the suppOli of its overseas principals in dealing 











Trade sanctions and boycotts had no impact as they did not apply to healthcare and 
education. Insurrection and civil disturbances resulted in greater demands on the 
health services, leading to a greater demand for MM's products. There were problems 
in some cases when sales representatives, especially females, were unable e to go into 
certain areas, to provide necessary technical assistance and training. 
Marcus said the poor moral standards which existed in South Africa in the years under 
apartheid have continued into the new era and the legacy of corruption is still with 
US.
426 Overall, apartheid did not have an adverse impact on MM and its profitability, 
but changes brought about since 1992 have severely impacted on the company. 











RAYMOND ACKERMAN: INTERVIEW ON 24 OCTOBER 2006 
Ackerman has been Chairman of Pick' n Pay since 1967 and was also Chief 
Executive until 1995. Pick 'n Pay is a food and general merchandise retailer, 
operating nationally in South Africa and internationally. Its head office is in Cape 
Town. 
Ackerman said that the large army and security costs resulted in a heavy tax burden 
on business and on the individual, but the greatest impact of apartheid was on the 
moral side. He said that he, and other businessmen, had to spend so much time on 
non-business matters and he was involved in a number of community organizations, 
which negotiated with government for an alleviation of the burden of apartheid. As he 
was not able to devote all his time to the company, this had a major effect on the 
manpower and productivity of the company and its profits. 
Military conscription affected the company, as staff was called up for military 
training. This made it difficult to build a management core. It also encouraged bribery 
and corruption, while many young people left South Africa to avoid military service 
and because of unhappiness with the political situation, which exacerbated the skills 
shortage. In Ackerman's view the legacy of the poor education system for the people 
of colour, especially blacks, is with us today. We are paying the price of the of the 
disastrous education policy of the apartheid years. Ackerman said that the job 
reservation legislation, and in particular the coloured labour preference policy in the 
Cape, made it difficult to run a business. 
In Ackerman's book Hearing Grasshoppers Jump he referred to the interview he had 
with Prime Minister Vorster who gave his approval to Pick 'n Pay employing black 
managers. 427 It was the policy of the company to provide loans to their managers for 











housing, but the Group Areas Act prohibited black managers purchasing houses in 
white areas. The company purchased land and erected houses for these black 
managers, but this was illegal and the houses could have been taken away by the 
government. Generally the Group Areas Act restricted Pick 'n Pay's operations, as 
only 40% of the country was open to them. 
Ackerman said that the result of the apartheid policies was that, in that period the 
world was closing itself against South Africa. He said that the company had had 
difficulty keeping up-to-date with international trends in retailing and they had had 
problems in investigating new trends in the industry. With regard to sanctions Pick n' 
Pay sourced 95% of their merchandise in South Africa, so that sanctions didn't have a 
major impact on the company. I-Ie said that the adverse impact of apartheid on tourism 
can be seen when one looks at the tremendous boom in tourism since the 
establishment of a fully democratic South Africa. Since 1995 we have seen many new 
large hotels being erected in Cape Town. He said that one could not measure how 
much tourist revenue South Africa lost during the apartheid years. He said that civil 
disturbances had had a major impact on the company and 1976 was the beginning of 
the bad times. One had had to build up the company or get out and many international 
companies had from then on disinvested in South Africa. 
Pick 'n Pay was the first company to recognize black trade unions. Prior to this, staff 
relations were difficult, in that should there be labour dispute, there was no one to talk 
to. A further impact of apartheid was the control of the oil industry, which prevented 
reasonable competition, and this position still applies today. 
Whilst apartheid impacted on the profitability of the company, the tough times made 











into Southern Africa. In Ackerman's opinion South Africa was held back by apartheid 
in every way: morale, immigration, education, fear of the future, fear of black/white 
confrontation. Finally Ackerman commented that South Africa is today so much better 
than in the past; the black government has been successful and there are huge 
opportunities that did not exist in the past. South Africa is the engine room of the 











INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR I-IERMANN GILIOMEE ON 31.3.2007 
Giliomee was appointed a lecturer in history at the University of Stellenbosch in 
1967, and a professor of political studies at the University of Cape Town in 1984, 
retiring in 1998. 
He is very sceptical about the motives of people who have said that they endeavoured 
to avoid paying taxes in the apartheid years for political reasons. He sees this as a 
retrospective rationalization, as a result of their guilty feelings they have about their 
behaviour in the apartheid years. Their motives were suspect, even if they said that 
they had adopted this action, due to their opposition to the excessive expenditure on 
the security establishment. 
With regard to job reservation, and in particular the coloured labour preference policy 
in the Western Cape, he said that these policies were purely ideological and political; 
the coloured labour preference policy did not succeed in 'stemming the tide' of black 
immigration to the Western Cape and had in fact created a skills shortage. By the mid-
1970s coloureds were being more and more used in administrative positions. The 
Group Areas legislation moved the poor far from their places of employment, in 
contrast to the position, elsewhere in the world, where generally the poor lived close 
to their work. Decentralisation policies as applied in South Africa had not worked. 
Small Afrikaner businesses said that in the apartheid years SANLAM had siphoned 
off capital, which should have gone to them, and thus they had not received the 
benefits which as Afrikaners they should have received. 
Giliomee said if more liberal policies had been adopted in South Africa in the period 
there would never have been stability. If the United Party had come into power in 











He said that the United Party would have introduced a qualified limited franchise for 
all races by the early 1960s. If this had occurred the position in South Africa would 
have been very unsettled, somewhat like what occurred in Argentina. If South African 
society had collapsed in 1970, South Africa would have faced the larger evil of 
commul11sm. 
He was of the view that liberal policies would have resulted in tremendous costs in 
terms of stability. He did not accept the view that liberal policies always had a 
positive outcome, particularly in South Africa, which had come out of colonialism. In 
his view there would have been serious trouble in South Africa, if the transition to full 
democracy occurred before the fall of communism. 
Giliomee said that there was less corruption under apartheid then there is now, as in 
those earlier years the Afrikaners had the ideal of apartheid, but now there was only 
greed. He referred to an article which recorded the views of a Polish visitor to South 
Africa in 1970, who said that the country was the least corrupt society he had visited. 
In Giliomee's view there were fewer civil disturbances in the Cape, than in the rest of 
the country during the period under review, and throughout South Africa civil 
disturbances were concentrated in Shoti periods in the early 1960s, in 1974 and in the 
1980s. He was of the view that there had been a fall off in business morals and that 
greed had created problems in the South African economy. By the end of the 1960s 
the government's policies were rapidly losing their moral foundation and they had to 
evolve policies which would enable them to survive. The major adverse economic 
impact of apartheid on the Western Cape was in respect of the tourist industry. The 
fear factor discouraged tourists from visiting South Africa and this resulted in the 











INTERVIEW WITH GERALD SHAW ON 4.4.2007. 
Shaw held senior editorial positions with the Cape Times newspaper from 1973 to 
1996, but he was only involved in the editorial side of the newspaper. Obviously the 
newspaper had to make profits to survive, but in the early years there was strong 
editorial independence, however, towards the end of apartheid, there had been 
greater emphasis on profits, and more interference by the directors in the editorial 
content of the newspaper. 
With regard to job reservation, and the coloured labour preference policy, the Cape 
Times had problems in employing black journalists as they could not obtain the 
approval of the authorities to employing them. He said that it had been raised that the 
coloured population was not inclined to do manual labour but he mentioned that a 
large number of coloureds had previously been employed by local authorities as 
manual labourers. With regarded to the tax burden Shaw said that, during the 
apartheid years, South Africa was fighting two surrogate wars in Angola, and in 
Mozambique with its support for Renamo which opposed the government. The budget 
vote for defence tripled in these years and in addition there was the enormous cost of 
the Bantustans. 
No empirical data is available as to the extent of corruption in the apartheid period, as 
it was swept under the carpet, but towards the end of the apartheid years corruption 
raised its head and there was the trial of Piet du Plessis for corruption and Fanie Botha 
resigned under suspicious circumstances. For most of the time corruption was covered 
up, in contrast to the position now where corruption is widely reported on by the 
media, but the culture of corruption continues under the new dispensation. 
Shaw referred to the Tomlinson Commission which was set up in 1954 to investigate 











Dr. Tomlinson, who said that even if white capital had poured into the Bantustan 
areas, and industries had been set up, the best hope there was that one-third of the 
rural population of the Bantustans would move into these industries. Millions would 
have to have to be invested, and Shaw doubted that whites would have been prepared 
to make this sacrifice. Even then no magisterial district in South Africa would have 
had a majority of whites and in his view the decentralisation policy never worked. 
He commented on Giliomee's statement that if United Party had won 1948 election, 
they would have granted a qualified franchise to all of the population. He said that the 
United Party had right-wing sentiments, particularly after the more liberal elements 
broke away to form the Progressive Party in 1959, and he did not think it at all likely 
that the United Party would have taken this course of action. 
In Shaw's view there were strong links between the business and the government in 
the P.W. Botha era. Businessmen felt more optimistic in the hope, rather naively, that 
the tri-cameral parliament could provide an answer to South Africa's problems, even 
though the blacks were excluded. 
Apartheid had left a legacy of low moral standards and business ethics had 
deteriorated. In the apartheid years, respect for the law declined in the light of the 
repressive and illogical laws which were introduced. Shaw quoted the words of 
George Soros, the noted financier, who said that self-interest had been elevated to 






















QUESTIONNAIRE - IMPACT OF APARTHEID ON COMMERCE AND 
INDUSTRY 1960-1990 (Used in Interviews). 
1. NAME 
2. WHAT POSITION DID YOU HOLD IN BUSINESS OVER THE PERIOD? 
3. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF YOUR EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS 
ACTIVITIES? 
4. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS HAD THE MAJOR ADVERSE 
IMPACT ON YOUR OWN OR OTHER BUSINESSES AND WHY? 
• High levels of taxation 
• Job reservation in restricting certain occupations to whites. 
• Group Areas Act in restricting the operation of businesses to certain 
demarcated areas. 
• Coloured labour preference policy in the Western Cape. 
• Decentralisation benefits to areas outside Western Cape. 
• Poor overseas image of potential tourists of South Africa as a result of 
apartheid. 
• Trade sanctions, consumer boycotts and overseas trade union activity. 











• Military conscription. 
5. DID APARTHEID HAVE ANY ADVERSE IMPACT ON YOUR BUSINESS 
OTHER THAN DETAILED UNDER 4 ? 
6. WAS THE PROFIABILITY OF THE BUSINESSES AFFECTED BY 
APARTHEID? 
7. IF SO TO WHAT EXTENT? 
8. ANALYSE THE IMPACT OF APARTHEID ON YOUR BUSINESS OVER 
THE YEARS FROM 1960-1990. IN WHICH YEARS WAS THE IMPACT 
SEVERE AND IN WHICH YEARS WAS IT NOT SO SEVERE? 
9. WHAT INVOLVEMENT DID YOU HAVE IN POLITICAL OR 
COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS OVER THE PERIOD? 
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